Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation by McEwen, Craig A. et al.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1995
Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce
Mediation
Craig A. McEwen
Nancy H. Rogers
Richard J. Maiman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
McEwen, Craig A.; Rogers, Nancy H.; and Maiman, Richard J., "Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to
Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation" (1995). Minnesota Law Review. 1059.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1059
Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the
Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness
in Divorce Mediation
Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers, and
Richard J. Maiman*
Introduction ............................................. 1319
I. The 'Fairness" Debate .............................. 1323
II. Evaluating the Two Dominant Statutory
Approaches ......................................... 1329
A. The "Regulatory Approach" ...................... 1330
1. Mediator Duties Regarding Fairness ......... 1332
2. Case Selection ............................... 1335
3. Issue Limitations ............................ 1340
4. Mediator Qualifications ...................... 1343
5. Lawyer and Court Review of Mediated
Agreements .................................. 1345
6. No Recommendation by the Mediator to the
Court ........................................ 1347
B. The "Voluntary Participation" Approach ......... 1348
III. Assumptions Underlying the Dominant Approaches. 1350
A. The Disappearing Lawyer ....................... 1351
B. Mediation as Monolith .......................... 1353
C. Lawyers as Spoilers ............................. 1354
* The empirical research on divorce lawyers in Maine and New Hamp-
shire that is reported later in this Article was done by Craig A. McEwen, Rich-
ard Maiman, and Lynn Mather with support from grants by the Law and Social
Science Program of the National Science Foundation (SES-8910625; SES-
8910649; SES-8911653). The opinions expressed in this Article are those of the
authors, not of the National Science Foundation. We would like to thank James
Brudney, David Goldberger, Michele Hermann, Ellen Kandoian, Lynn Mather,
Leonard Riskin, Jessica Shimberg, and Phil Sorensen for their helpful critiques
of this Article, Joan Tromski Fotta, Aaron Epstein, James Joslin, and Brian
Chisling for their fine research assistance, and Carol Peirano for her helpful
secretarial assistance. Craig A. McEwen is the Daniel B. Fayerweather Profes-
sor of Sociology, Bowdoin College. Richard J. Maiman is Professor of Political
Science, University of Southern Maine. Nancy H. Rogers is Professor of Law
and Associate Dean, Ohio State University College of Law. A brief synopsis of
this Article was published in ABA Dispute Resolution Magazine, July 1994, at
8.
1317
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1317
D. Mandated Mediation Versus Trial ............... 1355
IV. The Assumptions Underlying the Dominant
Approaches Are Myths: A Case Study of Maine's
Mandatory Divorce Mediation Involving Lawyers .... 1357
A. The Study of Divorce Lawyers and Mediation in
M aine ........................................... 1357
B. The Assumptions Prove to be Myths in Maine ... 1358
1. The Disappearing Lawyer .................... 1358
a. Lawyer Participation in Maine Mediation
Sessions and Divorce Cases ............... 1358
b. Lawyer Advocacy in Maine Divorce
M ediation ................................ 1360
2. Mediation as Monolith ....................... 1362
3. Lawyers as Spoilers .......................... 1364
a. Settlement and Lawyer Participation ..... 1364
b. Encouraging Reasonable Positions and
Behavior in Mediation .................... 1368
c. Spoiling Mediation for Clients ............ 1371
4. Mandatory Mediation Versus Trial:
Mediation Substitutes for or Supplements
Negotiation .................................. 1373
5. Conclusions: The Myths and Maine
M ediation .................................... 1373
V. Bring in the Lawyers ............................... 1375
A. Compared to the "Regulatory" Approach ......... 1376
B. Compared to the "Voluntary Participation"
Approach ........................................ 1378
C. Concerns about the "Lawyer-Participant"
Approach ........................................ 1378
1. Mediation Versus Negotiation ................ 1379
2. Mandated Lawyered Mediation and Self-
Determination ............................... 1385
3. Cost and Lawyer Presence ................... 1388
4. Fairness for Unrepresented Parties .......... 1390
5. Is This "Real Mediation?" .................... 1392
Conclusion ...................................... 1394
Appendix A: Jurisdictions with Regulated Mandatory
M ediation ............................................... 1396
Appendix B: Jurisdictions with Voluntary Participation
or Less Regulated Mandatory Mediation ................. 1404
1318
DIVORCE MEDIATION
INTRODUCTION
Mandatory divorce mediation1 is under attack. According to
some critical commentators, divorce mediation reinforces bar-
gaining imbalances between parties and places women at a dis-
advantage. 2 Professor Penelope Bryan, for example, concludes
that there is an "insidious nature of mediation" for divorcing wo-
men and that "those who structure court affiliated programs, as
well as mediators, now should recognize their complicity in the
continued oppression of women and their dependent children."3
She and other critics charge that mandatory mediation pro-
grams4 represent an unnecessary step that leaves divorcing par-
ents unprotected by lawyers and makes the divorce process less
fair. Bryan claims that mediation "exploits wives by denigrating
their legal entitlements, stripping them of authority, encourag-
ing unwarranted compromise, isolating them from needed sup-
port, and placing them across the table from their more powerful
husbands and demanding that they fend for themselves."5 Pro-
1. Commentators define mediation as a process in which a person not in-
volved in a dispute helps the disputing parties negotiate a settlement. The me-
diator has no authority to issue a binding award in the event that the parties do
not reach a settlement. JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION 7-9 (1984);
NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND
THE LAw 3 (1987).
2. See Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441, 441-46 (1992); Trina Grillo, The Media-
tion Alternative: Process Dangers For Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547, 1549-
51 (1991); see also MARTHA A. FnmAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHET-
ORic AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 144-46 (1991) (contending that media-
tion harms women because of its bias in favor of shared custody); Andre G.
Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation For Battered Women, 15 HARv.
WomEN's L.J. 272, 272-73 (1992) (asserting that mediation puts battered wo-
men at risk for more abuse); Robert Geffner & Mildred D. Pagelow, Mediation
and Child Custody Issues in Abusive Relationships, 8 BEHAV. Sm. L. 151 (1990)
(arguing that mediations premise of equal power between parties is false);
Mary P. Treuthart, In Harm's Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the At-
torney Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rav. 717, 721-31 (1993) (asserting that
the inequality inherent in our culture disadvantages women in mediation);
Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Is-
sues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431, 435-36 (1985) (arguing that mediation
harms women, trivializes family law issues, and provides fewer safeguards for
the parties than litigation).
3. Bryan, supra note 2, at 523; see also Woods, supra note 2, at 435 (argu-
ing that mediation trivializes domestic disputes and removes legal protection
for battered women).
4. Mandatory mediation programs currently operate in about one-elev-
enth of the nation's domestic relations courts. Jessica Pearson, Family Media-
tion, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION
RESEARCH 55, 55 (Susan Keilitz ed., 1994).
5. Bryan, supra note 2, at 523.
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fessor Trina GriUo contrasts mediation with the litigation pro-
cess, in which she says people believe that "what transpires is at
least partially a matter of right and justice."6 As a consequence,
critics argue, the courts should never mandate divorce
mediation.7
Mediation proponents respond that mandatory mediation
can produce results as fair as or more fair than those achieved
through a traditional divorce system, and they praise media-
tion's benefits as compared to litigation.8 To insure fairness,
however, proponents sometimes advocate regulation.9 Under
6. Grllo, supra note 2, at 1559.
7. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (citing critics who assert that
mediation reinforces power differentials to the detriment of women).
8. For writings that generally find divorce mediation fair, see FLORENCE
BIENENFIELD, CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION: TECHNIQUES FOR COUNSELORS, AT.
TORNEYS AND PARENTS 2-4 (1983); TioMAs E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 170-72
(1989); O.J. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETLEMENT 1-2
(1978); ROBERT COULSON, FIGHTING FAIR: FAMIY MEDIATION WILL WORK FOR
You 5-6 (i983); STEPHEN K. ERICKSON & MARILYN S.M. ERICKSON, FAMILY ME-
DIATION CASEBOOIC THEORY AND PROCESS 1-5 (1988); JOHN M. HAYNES & GRET-
CHEN L. HAYNES, MEDIATING DIVORCE: CASEBOOK OF STRATEGIES FOR
SUCCESSFUL FAMILY NEGOTIATIONS 13-16 (1989); HowARD H. IRVING, DIVORCE
MEDIATION: A RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 22-26 (1980);
HowARD H. IRVING & MICHAEL BENJAwN, FAMILY MEDIATION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1987); JOHN A. LEMMON, FAMILY MEDIATION
PRACTICE (1985); LENARD MARLOW, DIVORCE AND THE MYTH OF LAWYERS (1992);
DONALD T. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 17-22 (1983) [here-
inafter SAPoSNEK, CUSTODY DISPUTES]; Mary A. Duryee, Mandatory Mediation:
Myth and Reality, 30 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 507 (1992); W. Richard
Evarts & Frances H. Goodwin, The Mediation and Adjudication of Divorce and
Custody: From Contrasting Premises to Complementary Processes, 20 IDAHO L.
REV. 277, 282-83 (1984); H. Jay Folberg, Divorce Mediation-A Workable Alter-
native, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 11, 26-30
(1982); Joshua Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 Amz. L. REV. 467,487-91
(1991); Donald T. Saposnek, Clarifying Perspectives on Mandatory Mediation,
30 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 490, 501 (1992) [hereinafter Saposnek,
Mandatory Mediation]; Gary A. Weissman & Christine Leick, Mediation and
Other Creative Alternatives to Litigating Family Law Issues, 61 N.D. L. REV.
263, 279-80 (1985). See generally STEPHEN GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 292-425 (2d ed. 1992)
(collecting commentary on the fairness of mediation); Frank Gibbard & Fred
Hartmeister, Mediation and Wyoming Domestic Relations Cases-Practical
Considerations, Ethical Concerns and Proposed Standards of Practice, 27 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 435, 465-66 (1992) (concluding that mediation reduces acri-
mony between the parties and presents a beneficial alternative to litigation);
Mark C. Rutherford, Lawyers and Divorce Mediation: Designing the Role of
"Outside Counsel," MEDIATION Q., June 1986, at 17, 19-21 (discussing the bene-
fits of mediation relative to litigation).
9. RICHARD A. GARDNER, FAMLY EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY MEDIA-
TION, ARBITRATION, AND LITIGATION 513-16 (1989); Diane Neumann, How Medi-
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this view, the elaborate scheme of statutes and court rules en-
acted to ensure that mediation is "done right"10 should produce
uniformly high quality, and thus fair mandatory divorce media-
tion. This "regulatory" approach to mandated mediation often
includes mediator duties to assure fairness (such as a duty to
assure a balanced dialogue); exemption of some cases from com-
pulsory mediation; limitation of the scope of discussion during
sessions to custody and visitation issues; requirement of ad-
vanced degrees and mediation training for mediators; require-
ment that the parties' lawyers and the court review mediated
agreements; and prohibitions against the mediator making rec-
ommendations to the court."1
This "regulatory" approach to assuring fairness in divorce
mediation contrasts with the "voluntary participation" approach
often favored by those most critical of mediation. 12 Unlike the
"regulatory" approach, the "voluntary participation" approach
leaves courts without authority to compel the parties to attend
mediation sessions.13 Under this approach, the parties presum-
ation Can Effectively Address the Male-Female Power Imbalance in Divorce, 9
MEDIATION Q. 227, 238 (1992); Saposnek, Mandatory Mediation, supra note 8,
at 491; Margaret L. Shaw, Mediator Qualifications: Report of a Symposium on
Critical Issues in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 125,
125-27 (1988); see also NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, RECOMMENDATION OF
TiE LAW REVISION COMMISSION TO THE 1985 LEGISLATURE RELATING TO THE
CHILD CUSTODY DECISION-MAKNG PROCESS, reported in 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 105, 130 (1985) (recommending that the New York legislature adopt
statewide standards for mediation); Thomas A. Bishop, Mediation Standards:
An Ethical Safety Net, MEDIATION Q., June 1984, at 5, 12 (advocating standard
mediation settings); John A. Fiske, Divorce Mediation: An Attractive Alterna-
tive to Advocacy, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 55, 62 (1986) (identifying minimum
standards for divorce mediation); Rutherford, supra note 8, at 22-23 (arguing
for the development of ethical standards).
10. For a list of statutes related to divorce mediation, see NANCY H. ROGERS
& CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, PoucY, PRACTICE app. B (2d ed. 1994).
For a review of the prevalence of domestic court mediation programs, see LINDA
R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS, FAMILIES,
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 37 (1990) (estimating 10% of domestic courts had medi-
ation). For a review regarding Great Britain, see John M. Eekelaar & Robert
Dingwall, The Development of Conciliation in England, in DIVORCE MEDIATION
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 3-22 (Robert Dingwall & John Eekelaar eds., 1988)
[hereinafter DIVORCE MEDIATION]. For a review regarding Canada, see C.
JAMES RICHARDSON, COURT-BASED DIVORCE MEDIATION IN FOUR CANADIAN CiT-
IEs: AN OvERviEw OF RESEARCH RESULTS 8-9, 15-19 (1988).
11. See infra part h-A (analyzing the "regulatory approach" to mediation).
12. See infra part Il.B (discussing the "voluntary participation" approach
to mediation).
13. Statutes employing this framework include Alaska, Michigan, and Wy-
oming. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.140 (1991) (providing that the court may or-
der the parties to engage in mediation if both parties agree); MICH. COMP. LAws
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ably decide whether to go to mediation based upon how well they
believe they will fare. The assurance of fairness then rests on
their ability to choose. Thus, the "voluntary participation" ap-
proach sometimes entails very little regulation of the mediation
process.
In this Article, we argue that the debate about fairness in
divorce mediation, as well as the resulting legal schemes based
on either the "regulatory" or "voluntary participation" ap-
proaches, results from the view that one must choose between a
"lawyered" process ending in the courtroom, and an informal,
problem-solving process involving parties but not lawyers in the
mediation room. In our view, this dichotomy has unnecessarily
narrowed the policy choices underlying mediation schemes, be-
cause it assumes that lawyers either cause conflict or act as
mouthpieces for clients with a cause; 14 that the divorce process
is one in which, absent mediation (where lawyers do not ap-
pear), aggressive lawyers contest custody cases at hearings; 15
and that mediators either protect parties' interests or pressure
them toward a particular (and sometimes unjust) settlement. 16
We challenge these assumptions and the two approaches in
statutes and court rules that follow from them-the "regulatory"
and the "voluntary participation" approaches. We argue that
the mediation scheme in Maine, where attorneys participate
regularly and vigorously in mandated divorce mediation, pro-
vides a third avenue-one we call the "lawyer-participant" ap-
proach. Research evidence about this third approach
undermines the assumptions that have confined the debate
about fairness. 17 Although several jurisdictions have employed
the "lawyer-participant" approach,' 8 it has not been considered
ANN. § 552.513(1) (West 1993) (providing that the court may not require the
parties to meet with a mediator); Wyo. STAT. § 1-43-101 (1994) (containing no
provisions regarding mandated mediation or regulation of the mediation pro-
cess). Often states do not specifically authorize voluntary mediation programs,
presumably because there is no perceived need to regulate them.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 216-221 (discussing the "lawyers as
spoilers" assumption).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 191-208 (discussing the "disappear-
ing lawyer" assumption); infra text accompanying notes 222-234 (discussing the
"mediation versus trial" assumption).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 209-215 (discussing the "mediation
as monolith" assumption).
17. See infra note 243 and accompanying text (describing study of Maine
divorce lawyers).
18. The National Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia, main-
tains a State ADR Program Database [hereinafter NCSC Database] that in-
cludes responses to standardized reporting forms of directors of approximately
1322
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viable because of the widely shared, but flawed, assumptions
about mediation and the divorce process. In this Article we cri-
tique these assumptions and seek to demonstrate that the "law-
yer-participant" approach in fact promotes fairness more
effectively than the two dominant legal schemes for divorce
mediation.
Part I reviews in greater depth the debate about fairness in
divorce mediation. In Part H, we examine the merits and weak-
nesses of the two primary contending approaches in mediation
statutes, the "regulatory" and "voluntary participation" ap-
proaches. In Part Il, we identify in detail the four "myths" that
confine the debate to the two dominant approaches, and, in Part
IV, we examine the perceptions and experiences of Maine di-
vorce lawyers in an effort to challenge these myths. Ultimately,
in Part V, we reject as flawed both the "regulatory" and the "vol-
untary participation" approaches to protecting fairness in di-
vorce mediation and instead advocate Maine's "lawyer-
participant" approach. In doing so, we side with the mediation
critics in their skepticism about the capacity of the regulatory
approach to insure fairness, but we also side with mediation ad-
vocates who believe that mediation holds promise for improving
the divorce negotiation process without sacrificing fairness.
I. THE "FAIRNESS" DEBATE
Mediation critics claim that mandatory mediation, even if
regulated, is less fair than trial. 19 In contrast, mediation propo-
nents contend that the judicial system is itself destructive and
thus introduces an unfairness of sorts.20 For instance, mediator
John Haynes begins his book, Divorce Mediation, with the asser-
tion, "The pain, anger, and frustration of divorce are frequently
exacerbated by the legal process as it presently works."21 Fur-
thermore, he argues, "[mluch of the decision making is taken out
of the hands of the clients, as the attorneys engage in battle
1100 court-connected or court-referred dispute resolution programs in the
United States. The Database is regularly updated. The data reported here
were supplied to us in fall 1991 by Kenneth Pankey of the NCSC. All of the
summaries of the data are based on our computations, not those of the NCSC.
19. See supra note 2 (citing sources).
20. Patricia Vroom et al., Winning Through Mediation: Divorce Without
Losers, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3, 4 (1982)
("Mediation builds relationships, unlike the adversarial approach, which de-
stroys them.").
21. JOHN M. HAYNEs, DIVORCE MEDIATION 3 (1981).
1995] 1323
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1317
within the legal system."22 Similarly, Dean Jay Folberg argues
that family law and court procedures are often used "coercively
to supplant family self-determination." 23 He states, by contrast,
that mediation enhances "self determination," and public sup-
port for it affirms "the dignity and importance of the family."24
Empirical studies provide little help in resolving the debate
whether mediation is fair.25 Professor Grillo, for example, dis-
misses as inadequate studies of party perceptions of fairness.26
Instead, Professors Grillo and Bryan point to research about wo-
men's inferior societal position or gender roles and power and
infer that mediation places women at a disadvantage. 27 Alter-
natively, they cite egregious examples of divorce mediation in
which parties, particularly women, are isolated from counsel
and face pressures and threats from both their spouses and the
mediator.28 They contend that mediators, intent upon settle-
ment, force the weaker party to concede to facilitate agree-
ment.29 Under this view, inequalities in power and exposure to
settlement pressures in an informal process such as mediation
promote coerced and unfair outcomes. Mediation critics also
claim that mediators favor joint custody and press for solutions
that split the children's lives between the parents, leaving un-
settled the division of economic benefits.30 Under this view, be-
cause one party (presumably the mother) will actually take
major responsibility for the children, even equal division of child
support typically is economically unfair to the woman.31 The
critics seem to believe that these arguments should shift the
22. Id. at 5.
23. Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of Prac-
tice, MEDIATION Q., Sept. 1983, at 3, 10.
24. Id.; see also Vroom et al., supra note 20, at 5-7 (noting growing support
for mediation and its positive impact on the family).
25. Considerable research reports that both men and women perceive me-
diation as fair. See, e.g., Jeanne A. Clement & Andrew I. Schwebel, A Research
Agenda for Divorce Mediation: The Creation of Second Order Knowledge to In-form Legal Policy, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 95, 98-99 (1993) (reporting
high satisfaction rates from parties who participate in mediation); Jessica Pear-
son, The Equity of Divorce Mediation Agreements, 9 MEDIATION Q. 179, 191,(1991) (finding no evidence that women settling through mediation fared worse
financially than those who settled without mediation, but noting difficulty in
comparing outcomes). These perceptions might not reflect the actual outcomes.
26. Grillo, supra note 2, at 1548-49.
27. Id. at 1601-07; see also Bryan, supra note 2, at 481-98 (discussing how
sex role ideology affects divorce mediation).
28. See Bryan, supra note 2, at 491-93; Grillo, supra note 2.
29. Bryan, supra note 2, at 446-98, 523; Grllo, supra note 2, at 1610.
30. FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 146-48; Bryan, supra note 2, at 491-95.
31. GriUo, supra note 2, at 1570-72.
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burden of persuasion in the fairness debate to advocates of
mandatory mediation. In their view, advocates have not met
this burden and mediation should be completely voluntary, if it
is used at all.32
Mediation advocates, however, confidently refer to the em-
pirical evidence regarding parties' perceptions of mediation and
dismiss the critics' examples as exceptional and not reflective of
good mediation practice.33 Using anecdotes, they contend that
well-trained, sensitive, ethical mediators compensate for power
imbalances between parties, do not exert pressures to settle, and
remain impartial, freeing the parties to accept or reject agree-
ments.3 4 "Good" mediation practice, according to Professor
Joshua Rosenberg, does not permit mediators to advise judges
how to decide cases that do not settle, because doing so would
exert settlement pressure on the parties.3 5
Although they believe that mediation is usually fair, many
mediation proponents take seriously concerns about the excep-
tional dangers of unfairness. They advocate assuring fairness in
mediation by regulating the process to assure qualified
mediators use appropriate procedures. 36 Regulation is seen as
the "fail-safe" mechanism of mandatory mediation, the safety
net that provides the final protection against unfairness.
What do mediation critics and proponents mean by "fair-
ness" in the context of divorce mediation? They seem to refer to
several aspects of procedural fairness, and appear to link them
to outcome fairness. Procedural aspects of fairness in divorce
mediation3 7 commonly include balanced bargaining between
parties;38 a "level playing field" in the mediation process;3 9 self-
32. Gagnon, supra note 2, at 291; Grillo, supra note 2, at 1610.
33. E.g., Duryee, supra note 8, at 507-11, 513-16; Rosenberg, supra note 8,
at 467-73, 504-06.
34. Linda K. Girdner, Custody Mediation in the United States: Empower-
ment or Social Control, 3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 134, 152-54 (1989); see also
Duryee, supra note 8, at 513-15 (discussing training only).
35. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 473.
36. GARDNER, supra note 9, at 513-16, 607; Ann Milne & Jay Folberg, The
Theory and Practice of Divorce Mediation: An Overview, in DIVORCE MEDIA-
TION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 19-20 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne eds., 1988); Neu-
mann, supra note 9, at 231-32; Shaw, supra note 9, at 125.
37. Jay Folberg, Divorce Mediation: Promises and Problems, in GOLDBERG
ET AL., supra note 8, at 308, 309-10.
38. Gagnon, supra note 2, at 274; Geffner & Pagelow, supra note 2, at 155-
157; Treuthart, supra note 2, at 719, 728-29; see also Robert H. Mnookin, Di-
vorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1015,
1017 (1985) (posing questions designed to address bargaining imbalances).
39. SAPosNEK, CUSTODY DIsPuTEs, supra note 8, at 257-78.
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determination by parties without undue settlement pressures or
imposition of a mediator's values; 40 and consideration of the
children's interests.41 Commentators on divorce mediation seem
especially concerned with those bargaining imbalances that may
reflect differences in power between men and women, because
these may lead to negotiated results that favor men.42 Bargain-
ing imbalances thus produce "unfair results" unless mediators
can overcome them.43 If mediators intervene too strongly to bal-
ance differences between parties, however, they may actually
tilt the "level playing field" that "neutral" mediators arguably
establish.4 When the circumstances of mediation permit a me-
diator to impose his or her preferences for an outcome on the
parties-as when mediators make recommendations to the tri-
ers of fact-settlement pressures not only violate the principle
of self-determination, but also may destroy a "level playing field"
and produce unfair results, at least when these pressures affect
parties differently.45 Court procedures that penalize the recalci-
trant party or that impose costs that one party can bear with
more ease than the other can also lead to arbitrary and unequal
pressures to capitulate.46
40. GWYNN DAVIS & MARIAN ROBERTS, ACCESS TO AGREEMENT: A CoN-
SUMER STUDY OF MEDIATION IN FAmLy DISPUTE 74-75 (1988); Robert Dingwall,
Empowerment or Enforcement? Some Questions About Power and Control in
Divorce Mediation, in DIVORCE MEDIATION, supra note 10, at 150; Gagnon,
supra note 2, at 274; Geffner & Pagelow, supra note 2, at 155-57; Girdner,
supra note 34, at 152; Grillo, supra note 2, at 1593. But see Bryan, supra note 2,
at 515 (asserting that parties will not reach a fair settlement in abuse cases
unless monitored by the court).
41. SAPOSNEK, CUSTODY DISPUTES, supra note 8, at 118-34, 257-78. Some
statutes require mediators to discuss or advocate the children's interests in me-
diation. Mnookin, supra note 38, at 1017.
42. Examples of bargaining imbalances include different knowledge of fi-
nances, different experience in negotiation, and intimidation of one by the
other. These differences are said to lead to unfair apportionment of property
and custody arrangements that favor one party. Folberg, supra note 8, at 12,
26; Treuthart, supra note 2, at 728-29.
43. Unfortunately, there is little agreement about how to define bargaining
imbalances, identify them in practice, -or understand the degree to which they
relate to such characteristics as gender differences among parties in conflict.
For example, Erickson and Erickson argue that power and power imbalances
are largely in the eye of the beholder. ERICKSON & ERICKSON, supra note 8, 173-
93.
44. For a critique of mediator neutrality, see Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin,
Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation, 16 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 35, 36-39 (1991). For research on the mediator's influence, see
Dingwall, supra note 40, at 166.
45. Bryan, supra note 2, at 523; Grillo, supra note 2, at 1610.
46. See Gagnon, supra note 2, at 286-87, 292.
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Although an unfair process would produce unfair outcomes,
commentators differ sharply about whether there exist stan-
dards for evaluating the fairness of outcomes. For some media-
tion advocates, fair outcomes are in the eyes of the beholder-if
parties believe the outcome to be fair, then it is. 47 For others,
fair settlements must creatively incorporate a variety of values
and goals, rather than exclusively legal ones, and parties should
arrive at them without pressure.48 Some would also add that
fair results work in favor of children's interests. 49 For some me-
diation critics, however, fair settlements mirror likely court rul-
ings rendered after a contested hearing.50 Any outcome
departing from that standard means that one party relinquished
too much.
Sometimes, commentators include "party empowerment" as
another aspect of fairness,51 but they differ on how to achieve
it.52 For mediation critics, legal advocacy and court hearings
equalize power and diminish pressures for settlement.53 They
view lawyers particularly as buffers between demanding
spouses and intimidated clients.54 Lawyers insure that parties
understand the alternatives to settlement. For some mediation
advocates, however, legal advocacy and decision making dimin-
ish party autonomy and freedom-and thus "empowerment7-
by allowing lawyers and courts to shape decisions using legal
rules in a way that may have little relationship to the parties'
priorities, needs, and interests.55
47. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 487-88 (asserting that mediators are
able to guide parties to an appropriate understanding of fairness).
48. See MARIAN ROBERTS, MEDIATION IN FAmLY DISPUTES 103-09 (1988);
Stephen K Erickson, The Legal Dimensions of Divorce Mediation, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 36, at 105, 106-07; Leonard L.
Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 APiz.
L. REV. 329, 330 (1984); see also Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev,
Trading at Divorce: Preferences, Legal Rules and Transactions Costs, 8 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 279, 292 (1993) (noting a distinction between what par-
ties want and what the courts can provide).
49. Mnookin, supra note 38, at 1031-35; Saposnek, Mandatory Mediation,
supra note 8, at 491-93.
50. See Woods, supra note 2, at 435-36.
51. GARDNER, supra note 9, at 504; Girdner, supra note 34, at 141-42, 147-
51.
52. For a challenge to the concepts of empowerment in mediation, see
JONATHON G. SHAILOR, EMPoWERMENT IN DISPUTE MEDIATION 135-36 (1994).
53. Gagnon, supra note 2, at 273.
54. Grlo, supra note 2, at 1597.
55. Erickson, supra note 48, at 106; Fiske, supra note 9, at 59; see also
Diane Trombetta, Custody Evaluation and Custody Mediation: A Comparison
of Two Dispute Interventions, in THERAPISTS, LAWYERS, AND DIVORCING SPOUSES
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At the extremes, these two views of outcome fairness and
empowerment lead mediation critics to advocate against settle-
ment and mediation proponents to oppose trials.56 An interme-
diate position, typically supported by commentators from both
camps, involves determining how far a settlement departs from
one that informed, unpressured parties would have reached ab-
sent mediation.57
Because comparisons with adjudication are difficult, 58 a
rough comparison to settlement resulting from negotiation
outside mediation represents a practical definition of fairness.
In fact, the benchmark standard of fairness used by some com-
mentators is the lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation. For example,
Professor Bryan states that "lawyers have a professional obliga-
tion to pursue and protect the client's interests during negotia-
tions. The lawyer advocate also insulates the disadvantaged
wife from her husband and prevents the tangible, intangible,
and sex role differences between them from dictating the terms
of the agreement."59 Women's rights advocate Laurie Woods
notes that negotiations between lawyers take place with access
to applicable laws and knowledge of both the capacity to secure
discovery and the alternatives to settlement.60 Academics point
out the role of lawyers as effective advocates for battered wo-
65, 69-70 (Esther 0. Fisher & Mitchell S. Fisher eds., 1982) (discussing differ-
ences between the major tenets of mediation and other forms of intervention).
56. Similarly, if one demands complete equality between parties as a pre-
requisite for fairness-as some critics appear to-one must inevitably reject the
fairness of mediation or negotiation. In reality, the parties to settlement have
different values and priorities. For mediation advocates, this is a virtue. Gary
J. Friedman & Margaret L. Anderson, Divorce Mediation's Strengths, in Di-
VORCE MLDIATION READINGS 81, 81-82 (1985). In fact, it is the very existence of
differing values and priorities that sometimes permits each to gain by settling.
See, e.g., HAYN,- supra note 21, at 5 (concluding that when a mediator focuses
couples on ways to achieve individual goals, it is possible to achieve a win-win
situation). To adopt this position one must of course assume that the alterna-
tive to mediation is legal advocacy and that legal advocates equalize the posi-
tions and resources of parties.
57. SUSAN L. KEILTrrz T AL., MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT OF DIVORCE MEDIA-
TION AND TRADITIONAL COURT PROCESSING 37 (1992); Pearson, supra note 4, at
73-76.
58. Pearson, supra note 25, at 191.
59. Bryan, supra note 2, at 519-20.
60. Woods, supra note 2, at 435. The presence of lawyers in mediation
would not necessarily respond to Woods's other critique of mediation, namely
that it "trivializes family law issues by relegating them to a lesser forum," one
which "diminishes the public perception of the relative importance of laws ad-
dressing women's and children's rights... by placing these rights outside soci-
ety's key institutional system of dispute resolution-the legal system." Id.
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men.61 The critics appear to accept the view of Professors Rob-
ert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser: that with represented
parties "the outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is
reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips-an endow-
ment of sorts."62 Obviously, lawyers vary in ability and exper-
tise, but this is the sort of variance that operates as well in other
parts of the disputing process, such as trial.
Clearly, fairness in divorce mediation concerns both critics
and advocates. Most embrace a comparable notion for fair-
ness-that is, mediation should approximate the results
achieved in lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation. Even when they em-
brace this mainstream definition of fairness, however, their com-
mentary about how best to insure fairness in mediation has
been constrained by common assumptions about the absence of
lawyers, the similarity of all mediation programs, the role that
lawyers would play if present, and the role of trial as the alter-
native to mediation. The same faulty assumptions have also
confused the analysis of the dominant "regulatory approach," to
which we now turn.
II. EVALUATING THE TWO DOMINANT
STATUTORY APPROACHES
The two dominant statutory schemes of mediation-the
"regulatory" approach and the "voluntary participation" ap-
proach-reflect the debate over fairness in divorce mediation.
The "regulatory" approach requires divorcing parents to attend
an introductory session on mediation or mediation itself,63 and
the process is highly regulated in an effort to make it fair, de-
spite the usual absence of lawyers at mediation sessions. The
"voluntary participation" approach enables the parties to choose
whether to participate in an introductory session or mediation
session. Because lawyers will not attend mediation sessions,
parties should opt not to participate if they anticipate conditions
that will lead to unfairness.
61. Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation
in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 S.M.U. L. REv. 2117, 2153 (1993).
62. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1992).
63. We do not distinguish between mandatory attendance at an introduc-
tory session or at mediation itself because the parties do not seem to perceive a
distinction. JEANNE CLEMENT ET AL., DEsciPrm STUDY OF CHILDREN WHOSE
DIVORCING PARENTS ARE PARTICIPATING IN VOLUNTARY, MANDATORY OR No Cus-
TODY/VISrrATION MEDIATION 16 (1993) (reporting that 82.4% of Columbus, Ohio,
parties ordered to an assessment felt pressured to attend mediation).
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In this section, we explain why the efforts to add regulations
or remove compulsion in order to make mediation fair are not
only ineffective, but also introduce significant costs. In doing so,
we measure the fairness against lawyer-to-lawyer negotiations,
a process few commentators question.64
A. THE "REGULATORY" APPROACH
Early divorce mediation statutes were simple. They author-
ized the courts to require divorcing parents to appear for media-
tion of custody or visitation disputes before an impartial
mediator.65 That was all. Over the last decade and in the con-
text of the debate about the fairness of mandatory mediation,
regulatory schemes accompanying the authority to compel par-
ticipation have emerged and burgeoned.66 At present, numer-
64. Bryan, supra note 2, at 519-23; Woods, supra note 2, at 435. There is
both research and commentary raising questions about the fairness and ade-
quacy of lawyered negotiation outside of the divorce process. For example, re-
search on negotiation of tort cases suggests that plaintiffs do better the more
they participate in the process. DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT:
WHO'S IN CHARGE? 38-56 (1974). Similarly, clients lose control of their cases in
the typical lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation, which excludes them. Stephen
Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 46-47 (1992); Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative
Incoherence of Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MO. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1991).
These authors, however, simply point out that negotiation can be improved;
they do not contend that negotiated settlements are less fair than adjudicated
judgments.
65. E.g., COLO. Rav. STAT. § 14-10-129.5(1) (1987 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.183 (West Supp. 1995) (effective Oct. 1, 1986); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.41(2) (West Supp. 1994) (enacted in 1984).
66. In 1986, California amended its statutes to require the California Judi-
cial Council to adopt standards regarding equalization of power and safeguard-
ing children's rights and interests and to provide special provisions for domestic
violence cases. CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 3180-85 (West 1994). Colorado amended its
statutes in 1992 to exclude domestic violence cases upon request and to deal
with cases involving other situations of unfairness. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-
311 (Supp. 1994). In 1992, the Florida Supreme Court adopted Rule 10.060 of
its Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators dealing with power im-
balance. FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED & COURT APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.060 [herein-
after FLA. MEDIATORS R.]. The Indiana Supreme Court promulgated rules on
alternative dispute resolution in 1992, giving mediators certain duties regard-
ing fairness. IND. R. ALT. DisP. RESOL. 2.7(D). In 1986, the Iowa Supreme
Court adopted rules requiring family mediators to assure a "balanced dialogue"
and to assume other duties related to fairness. IowA R. PRAC. FOR LAWYER
MEDIATORS IN F m. Disp. 5(B) [hereinafter IOWA MEDIATOR R.], reported in IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598 App. (West Supp. 1994). In Missouri, the rules of civil proce-
dure deal with fairness in family mediation. Mo. R. Cwr. P. 88.07(b). New
Jersey also deals with fairness in the rules of civil procedure. N.J. R. GEN.
APPL. 1:40-4(e). The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in 1989, adopted a Code of Pro-
fessional Conduct for mediators, requiring mediators to end the mediation
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ous statutes, supplemented by court rules, reflect in varying
degrees the dominant scheme for regulating court-directed
mediation. 67
Under the dominant regulatory scheme, mediation is a ne-
gotiation that the mediator guides. The lawyers usually will not
attend the mediation session or will attend in silence. Statutes
in California, Kansas, and Wisconsin permit exclusion of law-
yers from mediation sessions.68 In some Arizona courts, counsel
can confer with the mediator at the beginning, but can be ex-
cluded thereafter. 69 In some other jurisdictions, parties have a
right to bring their lawyers, 70 although in Florida the lawyers
may be instructed to speak only privately to their clients. 71 Re-
search indicates that in most jurisdictions, lawyer participation
is the exception. 72
The typical rationale for excluding lawyers is that they
"spoil" mediation: lawyers will interfere with candid expres-
sions by the parties and thwart a problem-solving style of nego-
tiation.73 Statutes reflect this by highlighting problem solving
under certain circumstances related to fairness. OK.A R. & PROC. FOR DISP.
RESOL. AcT app. A [hereinafter OKLA. R. FOR DisP. RESOL.], reported in OKL..
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 37 app. (West 1993).
67. Seventeen states have mandatory mediation that is more heavily regu-
lated than in other states, in an attempt to achieve fairness. The regulations
and the states adopting them are listed in Appendix A, infra.
68. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3182 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(6)
(West 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(10)(a) (West 1993).
69. ARLz. SUPER. CT. R. LOCAL PRAC., (MmuCOPA CTY.) R. 6.8(e), (PMA CTY.)
R. 8.7, (PmrAL CTY.) R. 4.2(4), (YAvAPAi CTY.) R. 10.2, reported in 17B ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. (West 1988).
70. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060(c) (1991 & Supp. 1994); DEL. FAm. CT. Crv. R.
16; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-05 (1991).
71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.1011(d) (West Supp. 1995).
72. Data from the NCSC Database indicate that 14% of the programs re-
ported lawyer participation in most mediation sessions. See NCSC Database,
supra note 18. Sometimes lawyer attendance varies widely, even within a par-
ticular state. For example, in three Florida counties, attorneys attended the
sessions in less than 10% of the cases, while in one county attorneys were pres-
ent in 98% of the cases mediated. JENNIFER L. MASON & SHARON B. PRESS,
FLORIDA DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR., FLORIDA MEDIATION/ARBITRATION PRO-
GRAMS: A COMPENDIUM 4-5 to 4-7 (1991).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 216-221 (exploring the "lawyers as
spoilers" assumption).
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by the parties74 and emphasizing that the parties themselves
should speak in mediation. 75
As discussed above, most commentators would not find such
extensive regulation necessary to ensure fairness if lawyers at-
tended and participated in mediation, because the process then
would become the equivalent of lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation in
terms of fairness. 76 To obviate potential unfairness in the ab-
sence of attorney representation, commentators have advocated
regulating the mediator and the mediation procedures. 77 In this
section, we discuss whether each of the varying forms of regulat-
ing divorce mediation is likely to contribute to fairness in the
absence of lawyers, and we examine the probable costs of regula-
tion in terms of other mediation goals.
1. Mediator Duties Regarding Fairness
Some statutes and court rules make the mediator accounta-
ble for the fairness of the mediation process and result.
Mediators often must encourage the parties to consult with their
lawyers before signing a mediated agreement.78 In some juris-
74. CAL. F6.. CODE § 3161 (West 1994) ("The purposes of the mediation
proceeding are as follows: (a) To reduce acrimony that may exist between the
parties, (b) To develop an agreement.... ."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:352 (West
1991) (same); MINN. STAT. § 518.619(1) (1994) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
13.1(b) (Supp. 1994) (instructing mediators to provide "nonadversarial setting
that will facilitate . .. cooperative resolution"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.015(1) (West Supp. 1995) (asserting that mediation can reduce
acrimony).
75. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060(c) (1991 & Supp. 1994); DEL. FAM. CT. Civ. R.
16; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.1011(d) (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENr. CODE § 14-
09.1-05 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.785(a) (Butterworth 1990).
76. But see Penelope E. Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's
Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L. Q. 177, 222 (1994). Professor Bryan ar-
gues that mediation "cools out" the lawyer, a phenomenon not confirmed by our
research in Maine. See infra part IV.B (documenting lawyers' advocacy during
mediation).
77. See GARDNER, supra note 9 at 513-16, 607; Gagnon, supra note 2, at
291-93; Neumann, supra note 9, at 231; Saposnek, Mandatory Mediation, supra
note 8, at 491-92. See generally Edward F. Hartfield, Qualifications and Train-
ing Standards for Mediators of Environmental and Public Policy Disputes, 12
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 109, 124 (1988) (concluding that personal qualifications,
temperament, and personality may be the most significant aspects for consider-
ation); Shaw, supra note 9, at 136 (concluding that guidelines for selecting and
developing mediators should be measured in terms of human skills and demon-
strated performance rather than technical or theoretical parameters).
78. FIA_ R. Civ. P. 1.740(f); IOWA MEDIATOR R., supra note 66, R. 6; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-603 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:353B (West 1991); MINN.
STAT. § 518.619(7) (1994); Mo. R. Civ. P. 88.06(c); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2913(6)
(Supp. 1994); NEv. R. PRAC. FOR 8TH DIST. 5.70(c); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-
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dictions, mediators must ensure that the parties make factual
disclosures to each other.79 The mediator must define or explain
the mediation process, fees, and limitations.8 0 In Iowa, the me-
diator must "assure a balanced dialogue," and in Florida a "bal-
anced process," although these terms are left undefined.81 In
California, the mediator must be "vigilant" about power imbal-
ances,82 "conducting negotiations in such a way as to equalize
power relationships between the parties."8 3 Elsewhere, the me-
diator must terminate the mediation in certain situations, such
as when the parties cannot "participate meaningfully" or "harm"
will result,84 or when the mediator believes this to be the case 85
or believes that the agreement would be unconscionable.8 6
In addition, the mediator commonly must assess and some-
times advocate for the best interests of the children.87 For ex-
ample, Iowa divorce mediators must ensure that participants
"consider fully the best interests of any affected child and that
they understand the consequences of any decision they reach
concerning the child."88
07 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-29(1) (Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11
(West 1993).
79. IOWA MEDIATOR R., supra note 66, R. 4; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(7)
(1988).
80. CAL. STANDARDS OF JuD. ADmIN. § 26(b), reported in CAL. Cirv. R. app.
(West Supp. 1994); FL. MEDIATORS R., supra note 66, R. 10.100; IOWA MEDIA-
TOR R., supra note 66, R. 1; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603 (1988); Mo. R. Civ. P.
88.06(a).
81. IowA MEDIATOR R., supra note 66, R. 5; FLA. MEDIATORS R., supra note
66, R. 10.060.
82. CAL. STANDARDS OF JuD. AD1nz. § 26(h), reported in CAL. Civ. R. app.
(West Supp. 1994).
83. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3162(b)(3) (West 1994).
84. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-604(b) (1988); see also IOWA MEDIATOR R., supra
note 66, R. 1 (requiring mediator to terminate mediation if party or mediator
cannot participate in good faith); Oxr. R. FOR DIsP. RESOL., supra note 66, app.
A at (B)(1)(e)(1) (requiring termination if continuation would cause harm or
prejudice).
85. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-604(b) (1988); Mo. R. CIrv. P. 88.07(b); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-2913(4) (Supp. 1994); see also N.J. R. GEN. APPL. 1:40-4(e)(1) (provid-
ing circumstances when mediator should terminate mediation).
86. Mo. R. Civ. P. 88.07(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2913(4) (Supp. 1994).
87. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3180(b) (West 1994) ("The mediator shall use his or
her best efforts to effect a settlement ... in the best interests of the child.");
IOWA MEDIATOR R., supra note 66, R. 3 (requiring that the mediator shall en-
sure that the parties "consider fully the best interests of any affected child");
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(8) (1988) (requiring that the mediator shall "en-
sure that the parties consider fully the best interests of the children").
88. IOWA MEDIATOR R., supra note 66, R. 1
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In some jurisdictions, there is no apparent sanction for
breaching these mediator duties and no indication that the du-
ties create defenses to enforcement of a settlement agreement.
Civil liability is not a risk in jurisdictions providing immunity
for negligent acts.89 In several jurisdictions, however, the duties
are accompanied by a risk of liability90 and even sanctions.91 In
Florida, for example, a mediator who violates statutory duties
may lose the certification to receive court referrals, may be re-
quired to pay costs, or may receive other sanctions. 92
Nonetheless, there is little reason to believe that these me-
diator duties ensure fairness. Miranda-type warnings do little
to address critics' concerns about bargaining imbalances and
pressures to settle that might produce settlements placing at
least one party in a worse position than would have resulted
from lawyer-to-lawyer negotiations. Although the broader re-
quirements imposed upon mediators respond to critics' concerns,
they implicitly demand that mediators play a quasi-judicial
function, in conflict with their mediary role and without gui-
dance as to the meaning of "harm," "power imbalance," or "bal-
anced dialogue." 93 Aside from highlighting conflict between the
mediator's role in assisting settlement and the demands to pro-
mote fairness, the effect of such duties is unclear. As Professor
Robert A. Baruch Bush has noted regarding mediator standards
generally, "Where the mediator is confronted... with the need
to choose between two values, like fairness and self-determina-
tion, the codes typically contain provisions that, read together,
tell her to choose both."94 Even if mediators are eager to comply
with their broad duties, they may not have sufficient informa-
tion to do so. Mediators do not hear the witnesses or make fac-
tual findings, and often do not talk with the children.9 5
Furthermore, if mediators are not eager to comply, it is not
89. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-305(6) (Supp. 1994); FLA_ STAT. ANN. § 44.107
(West Supp. 1995).
90. DEL. SUPER. CT. INTERIm R. 16.2(f); FLA. MEDATOR S R., supra note 66,
R. 10.220, R. 10.230.
91. FLLA MEDIATORS R., supra note 66, R. 10.240; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 328-C:7 (Supp. 1993).
92. FLA_ MEDIATORS R., supra note 66, R. 10.240.
93. See Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply
to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 91-97 (1981) (profiling mediator
functions).
94. ROBERT A.B. BUSH, THE DuLEmMAs OF MEDIATION PRACTICE 30 (1992).
95. Cf Gary Paquin, Protecting the Interests of Children in Divorce Media-
tion, 26 J. FAm. L. 279, 310 (1987-88) ([M]any private mediators usually never
even see the children....").
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likely that the parties can show that they violated the duty, even
if sanctions are available. One is reminded of Lerner's lyric:
A law was made a distant moon ago here,
July and August cannot be too hot;
And there's a legal limit to the snow here
in Camelot.9 6
Thus, the primary virtue of legislating such mediator duties is to
instill optimism in the rule-maker or legislator.
Because provisions of mediator accountability are unlikely
to be effective, and because they are unnecessary if the parties
bring their lawyers to the session, it is important to examine the
costs of mediator duties. By analogy, one can examine commen-
tary on the cost of defensiveness in the medical field, which ar-
gues that warnings, disclosures, and additional tests result in
expenses for the patient and government and physician unwill-
ingness to accept certain cases. 97 If the threat of accountability
is taken seriously, mediators may react in similar fashion, issu-
ing warnings, insisting on written acknowledgements, and tak-
ing only "low-risk" cases. In this event, the spontaneity,
simplicity, and availability of the mediation process will likely
fade, a particularly dear cost because these aspects of mediation
make it more effective than traditional court processes in engag-
ing parties actively and assisting in identifying creative solu-
tions.98 Given low prospects for ensuring fairness, mediator
duties seem like a costly placebo.
2. Case Selection
If one accepts that unfairness in lawyerless mediation
stems in part from bargaining imbalances, it follows that the
process becomes more fair if courts exclude cases from mediation
that are likely to involve such imbalances. 99 Presumably, fair-
ness would also be enhanced if the courts similarly excluded
cases involving parties who are particularly susceptible to medi-
ator pressures. 10 0 Mediation statutes identify several classes of
96. ALAN J. LERNER & FREDERICK LowE, CAMELOT (Chappell & Co., 1967).
97. See BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAW 163 (2d ed. 1991); HARvARD
MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDy, PATIENTS, DoCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEw YORK 9-10
(1990).
98. Folberg, supra note 23, at 9-11; Pearson, supra note 4, at 61-65, 68-69.
99. Ngoh Tiong Tan, Developing and Testing a Family Mediation Assess-
ment Instrument, MEDIATION Q., Spring 1988, at 53, 55.
100. Gagnon, supra note 2, at 291-92 ("If there is reason to believe that
there is current physical abuse or that the women fears for her own or her chil-
dren's safety due to a history of domestic abuse, mediation is not appropriate.").
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parties who might be subject either to imbalances or mediator
pressure: victims of domestic violence; persons with substance
abuse or mental health problems; and persons who fit in a more
general category of bargaining disadvantages.'10 Domestic vio-
lence exclusions have been the primary subject of debate and
regulation.' 0 2
The problem with exclusion as a means to achieve fairness
is the difficulty in predicting whether and how power imbal-
ances will appear or when the mediator will pressure a party to
settle. Scholars of the negotiation process note that power shifts
frequently during negotiation. 10 3 Based on studies of mediation
transcripts, Janet Rifkin, Sara Cobb, and Jonathan Miller ob-
serve that the mere order of presentation of the opening stories
in the mediation may impact significantly on bargaining advan-
tage and thus outcomes.' 0 4 Ethnic identifications between
mediators and parties may also affect outcomes.' 0 5 The imbal-
ances probably shift according to the issue under discussion as
101. AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-381.23 (West 1991) (undue hardship); N.C.
GEN STAT. § 50-13.1(c) (Supp. 1994) (drug, alcohol, mental health, spousal
abuser or neglect); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.179(3) (Butterworth 1990) (emo-
tional distress); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-22 (Supp. 1994) (undue hardship,
abuse, substance abuse, and mental illness); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(8) (1993)
(undue hardship); see also infra note 102 (citing statutes that exclude cases in-
volving domestic abuse).
102. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-311(1) (Supp. 1994) (excluding cases with do-
mestic abuse); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (excluding case
if significant history of violence would compromise mediation); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 363 (West Supp. 1995) (excluding case if court finds that family
violence exists); MD. R. SPEC. P. S73A(b)(2) (excluding case if there is genuine
issue of physical or sexual abuse of party or child); MINN. STAT. § 518.619(2)
(1994) (excluding cases with probable cause of domestic abuse); NEv. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 3.500(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1993) (allowing exclusion of case with a show-
ing of child abuse or domestic violence); N.J. R. GEN. APPL. 1.40-5, -7; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.1(c) (Supp. 1994) (excluding cases with allegations of party or
child abuse); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-02 (1991) (excluding case if issue of
abuse); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.052(A) (Anderson Supp. 1993) (providing
that conviction or determination that parent perpetrated abusive act is a factor
in deciding whether mediation is appropriate); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-22
(Supp. 1994) (excluding case if mediation participation would cause undue
hardship or threaten health or safety); see Fischer et al., supra note 61, at 2173;
see also Desmond Ellis, Comment, Marital Conflict Mediation and Post-Separa-
tion Wife Abuse, 8 LAw & INEQ. J. 317, 339 (1989-90) ("[Mlediation is inappro-
priate in the presence of pre-separation abuse and alcohol and/or drug abuse.").
103. DAVID A. LAX & JAMEs K SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 119-
44 (1988).
104. Janet Rilkin et al., Toward A New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique
of Neutrality, 9 MEDIATION Q. 151 (1991).
105. MICHELE HERMANN ET AL., THE M-Rno COURT PROJECT FINAL REPORT
137-48 (1993).
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well as the order of proceedings.' 0 6 Power shifts may also occur
if there is a sense of guilt or lack of knowledge on particular
issues. Thus, it is difficult to predict power imbalances either by
category of case or by individual in advance of the mediation
session. 0 7
Even if one focuses only on imbalances stemming from do-
mestic violence, the problems arising in implementing case se-
lection by statute or court rule become apparent. Statutes
employ three primary means to exclude domestic violence cases
from mediation: categorical prohibition, case-by-case screening
by the court,'08 and exclusion by the court upon a party's motion
and special showing.' 0 9  Each of these methods proves
problematic.
Categorical exclusions from mediation are "blunt instru-
ments." Research and experience indicate that they may lead to
underinclusion of cases, particularly when such exclusions are
based only on court pleadings." 0 In a pilot study of 261 con-
tested custody cases in three Ohio courts, parties alleged vio-
lence in the pleadings twenty-six percent to thirty percent of the
time."' A much higher proportion, however, fifty-one percent of
the eighty-nine respondents to surveys and forty-five percent of
those interviewed by employees of one court, said that their
marriage had been violent." 2 Elsewhere, interviews show a
106. Melvin Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Set-
tlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637, 638-65 (1976).
107. For a discussion on power shifts during mediation sessions, see Albie
Davis & Richard A. Salem, Dealing With Power Influences in Mediation of Inter-
personal Disputes, MEDIATION Q., Dec. 1984, at 17, 17.
108. OKLA. R. FOR Disp. RESOL., supra note 66, R. 8B; Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.11(8)(b) (West 1993).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(c) (Supp. 1994) (allowing waiver of
mandatory mediation for "good cause," including "undue hardship," allegations
of substance or family abuse, or emotional problems); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 107.179 (Butterworth 1990) (permitting waiver if court "finds that participa-
tion... will subject the party to severe emotional distress"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-3-22(1) (Supp. 1994) (permitting waiver if attendance would pose a threat
to mental or physical health or safety); Wis. STAr. ANN. § 767.11(8) (West 1993)
(permitting court to waive attendance if it would cause "undue hardship" or
"endanger the health or safety" of a party).
110. MAINE COURT MEDIATION SERV., MEDIATION IN CASES OF DOMEsTIc
ABUSE: HELPFUL OPTION OR UNACCEPTABLE RISKS, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
DoMESTic ABUSE AND MEDIATION PROJEcT 26-29 (1992) (relating experience
about reluctance of victims to reveal abuse); CLEMENT ET AL., supra note 63, at
20-21 (discussing research about differences between allegations in pleadings
and statements to court personnel).
111. CLEMENT ET AL., supra note 63, at 20-21.
112. Id.
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higher incidence of violence reported to court personnel than al-
leged in pleadings. 113
Procedural hurdles that serve to curb misuse of categorical
exclusions lead to further underinclusion. Legislators appear
hesitant to exclude cases from mediation solely on the basis of a
statement of abuse to a court counselor. In fact, they seem to
worry that permitting exclusion based on allegations in the
pleadings will lead to misuse and overexclusion. Thus, some
statutes do not provide for exclusion from mediation solely be-
cause of reported violence.114 In California, for example, cases
receive special treatment only if parties allege domestic violence
under penalty of perjury.115 Some statutes require a finding of
probable cause,116 a showing to the satisfaction of the court, 117
or a finding that the violence occurred.118 Although the reaction
to possible bogus claims is understandable, this higher thresh-
old widens the gulf between actual violence cases and those
cases that are excluded from mediation. A conservative esti-
mate based on the Ohio data1 19 indicates that almost fifty per-
cent of domestic violence cases are excluded where something
more formal than the victim's statement to a counselor is
required.
The substantiation requirement also adds to cost, because it
introduces additional court processes prior to mediation. This
also probably interferes with early mediation scheduling. By ad-
ding cost and introducing delay, substantiation may destroy the
cost-effectiveness of mediation for the parties and allow conflicts
to escalate.
Categorical case exclusion would seem to be relatively cost-
free if based solely on a party's statement. Reliance on the state-
ments alone, however, might result in substantial overexclusion,
and cases that could be mediated fairly would not enter the pro-
113. One study found that in Alaska, in 61% of eligible cases, one divorcing
party said in an interview that violence had occurred. SusANNE D. DIP'TRO,
ALASKA CHILD VISITATION MEDIATION PILOT PROJECT, REPORT TO THE ALASKA
LEGISLATURE i (1992).
114. MINN. STAT. § 518.619(2) (1994) (requiring probable cause that abuse
occurred); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.052(A) (Anderson Supp. 1993) (requir-
ing conviction or determination in another proceeding).
115. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3181(a) (West 1994).
116. MINN. STAT. § 518.619 (1994).
117. LA.. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:363 (West Supp. 1995).
118. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.052(A) (Anderson Supp. 1993).
119. CLEMENT ET AL., supra note 63, at 20-21.
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cess.' 20 One study indicates that four-fifths of the divorce medi-
ation couples had families with serious substance abuse, child
abuse, or family violence situations.121 Given the view that law-
yer advocacy helps balance power in cases of abuse,122 blanket
categorical exclusion would be unnecessary if lawyers partici-
pated actively in mediation and if provisions were made for sep-
arating the parties in mediation upon request.
Individual case assessments by court personnel have been
touted as a means to identify instances of domestic violence and
to predict whether the violence will present serious bargaining
imbalances. 23 We do not have research on which to evaluate
the success of case assessment in excluding cases that involve
substantial bargaining imbalances. As we discussed above,
however, it is difficult to predict how the negotiations, and thus
bargaining power, will play out in mediation. 124 In addition,
high-quality screening is costly. In one Ohio court, for example,
a full-time equivalent mediation professional assessed 594 cases
in the course of a year and recommended against mediation in
only fifteen percent of the cases. 12 5 In contrast, during the same
time in another Ohio court, the equivalent of one mediation pro-
fessional provided free mediations in about seventy-five cases,
resulting in almost one-half of them settling.'2 6
Similar arguments about under- and overinclusion and
costs could be made for other types of bargaining imbalances,
such as those created by persons who are risk averse or have low
aspirations. Case selection is thus questionably effective in
achieving the same level of fairness as in lawyer-to-lawyer nego-
tiations, and it is costly. Categorical exclusions are likely either
to vastly over- or underexclude or to add delay and cost. Individ-
120. See DiPmmo, supra note 113, at i-ii (reporting that, as the result of
various exclusions, only 20 cases of a potential 475 cases screened and 125
cases deemed eligible for mediation services actually reached mediation; domes-
tic violence allegations excluded 61%, despite statements by victims that they
wanted to try mediation).
121. Pearson, supra note 4, at 71 (citing Charlene E. Depner et al., Building
a Uniform Statistical Report System: A Snapshot of California Family Court
Services, 1989 FAm. CONCILATION CTS. REV. 30).
122. Fischer et al., supra note 61, at 2153.
123. Linda Girdner, Mediation Triage: Screening for Spouse Abuse in Di-
vorce Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 365, 376 (1990).
124. Fischer et al., supra note 61, at 2155.
125. Telephone Interview with Jessica Shimberg, Director of Mediation,
Franklin County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division (Mar. 4,
1994).
126. Telephone Interview with Michele McFarland, Director of Mediation
Services, Lucas County Common Pleas Court (Mar. 4, 1994).
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ual assessment, the method most likely to be effective, requires
expending staff resources that could otherwise be used to offer
free mediation.
3. Issue Limitations
Commentators state that bargaining imbalances are more
likely to cause harm if parties discuss economic as well as child
status issues during the mediation.1 27 Justifications for this as-
sertion vary. One commentator contends that an aggressive
parent will demand economic concessions in exchange for al-
lowing the other parent more access to or rights concerning the
children.1 28 Separating economic issues from child custody and
visitation issues in the mediation process presumably averts
these inappropriate trade-offs. Other commentators add that
the legally-naive party faces the greatest disadvantage in the
negotiation of economic issues, where legal advice, higher educa-
tion, and experience make choices more informed.' 29 One also
argues that lawyers will resist mediation if non-lawyer
mediators "handle" economic issues. °30 Most statutes authorize
mandatory mediation only for contested custody and visitation
-issues, probably to prevent linking these to economic issues, to
reduce bargaining imbalances, and to avoid resistance from the
bar.' 3 ' In two states, separate mediation programs, staffed by
attorney-mediators, are authorized for economic issues.
32
The statutes that purport to separate economic from cus-
tody/visitation issues probably do not succeed in actually sever-
127. Bryan, supra note 2, at 496-97; Gagnon, supra note 2, at 292.
128. See Ann Milne, Mediation-A PromisingAlternative for Family Courts,
1991 Juv. & FAm. CTs. J. 61, 68.
129. Bryan, supra note 2, at 449; Treuthart, supra note 2, at 735-36, 752.
130. SINGER, supra note 10, at 42.
131. Appendix A pt. D and Appendix B pt. D list 27 statutes of this type. See
CAL. F.m. CODE § 3170 (West 1994); MD. R. SPEC. P. S73A(c)(2); MIcH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 552.531 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. R. Cirv. P. 88.03; NEv. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 3.500(2)(a) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(b) (Supp.
1994); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 107.179, 107.765(1) (Butterworth 1990) (requir-
ing written approval of parties or counsel); S.D. CODIFED LAws ANN. § 25-4-56
(Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-25 (Supp. 1994) (permitting mediation of
property division if related to custody); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(9) (West 1993)
(limiting issues mediated unless parties agree in writing to broaden issues); see
also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.052 (Anderson Supp. 1993) (T]he court may
order parents to mediate .... ."). But see MINN. R. GEN. PRAcTICE 310.04 (al-
lowing mediator to address all issues unless limited by court order); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-09.1-01, -02 (1991) (allowing mediation to include support).
132. CAL. F m. CODE § 20034 (West 1994); MICH. CT. SPEC. PRoc. R. 3.211.
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ing these issues or in preventing parties from linking them.133
Dean Folberg suggests that we must "romanticize" to believe
these issues are not considered together.13 4 In fact, despite stat-
utory language limiting mediation to custody and visitation is-
sues, a recent national survey indicates that, in a substantial
number of programs, mediators are likely to discuss child sup-
port.13 5 Some private mediators consider other economic issues
so intertwined with custody that they now consider them to-
gether.13 6 Professor Grillo points out that joint custody arrange-
ments often assume equal financial obligation when, in fact, one
parent usually has the major care responsibilities and thus fi-
nancial burdens, 137 creating economic implications when cus-
tody is resolved. In sum, it is doubtful whether issue limitations
in fact circumscribe discussion of financial matters or prevent
parents from linking them together inappropriately.
There is reason to doubt whether those seeking custody will
be forced to trade financial support for custody. A recent study
of California divorce cases found "no statistically persuasive evi-
dence that mothers who experienced more legal conflict had to
give up support to win the custody they wanted." 38 Sociologist
Jessica Pearson also characterized "custody blackmail" as a "rel-
atively rare phenomenon." 13 9
Given doubts about the need for and effectiveness of issue
limitations, it is important to assess their costs. One important
cost is the apparent inference by lawyers that they need not at-
tend the mediation sessions, thus creating risks of unfairness.
After reviewing selected state statutes and court rules gov-
133. Severing issues, even if possible, may not be a good idea, inasmuch as
"simultaneous exploration of custody and financial matters significantly in-
creases the total number of potential solutions available." IRVING & BENJAiN,
supra note 8, at 134.
134. Folberg, supra note 8, at 33-34.
135. See generally Susan Myers et al., Court-Sponsored Mediation of Di-
vorce, Custody, Visitation and Support: Resolving Policy Issues, 13 STATE CT. J.
24 (1989) (indicating custody issues are commonly discussed despite statutory
prohibitions).
136. IRvNG & BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at 134; Folberg, supra note 8, at 33-
34 ("As much as we would like to romanticize parenting and separate children's
needs from the financial needs of parents, we know that custody and the attend-
ant financial arrangements represent some trade offs in the minds of the divorc-
ing parties that we can only pretend to keep separate.").
137. GriUo, supra note 2, at 1571; see also Bryan, supra note 2, at 492 (dis-
cussing how mediators' assumptions that husband and wife are equal gives
men an advantage in the custody process).
138. ELEANOR MACCOBY & ROBERT MNooKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD 273
(1992).
139. Pearson, supra note 4, at 20.
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erning lawyer participation in divorce mediation, Professor John
McCrory concluded that lawyer participation depends on the
scope of the issues subject to mediation, with lawyers more ac-
tively participating when mediation addresses property and fi-
nancial issues.140 An analysis of data on court-connected
mediation programs supports McCrory's view. 141 It reveals that
lawyers participate in only thirty-eight percent of the programs
that mandate custody mediation but participate in ninety-one
percent of those mandatory programs that touch on economic is-
sues in addition to custody and visitation. 142
Another cost is in the effectiveness of mediation. A British
study of marital conciliation reports more satisfaction and
greater savings when the mediation included all issues in the
divorce,14 3-a logical result considering that mediated settle-
ment removes the need for further proceedings, other than
presenting the agreement for court approval. If the mediation
addresses only custody matters, however, then either a court or
the parties with their lawyers must separately craft the finan-
cial terms of the divorce. In addition, British and Canadian re-
searchers suggest that settlements of isolated issues, such as
child custody, will not endure as long as more comprehensive
settlements. 44
Issue limitations thus do not seem to solve the problem for
which they were designed-avoiding linkage between economic
and custody issues. They may be based on faulty premises of
custody blackmail. They tend to discourage lawyer attendance,
thus eliminating a promising fairness protection. Furthermore,
they are costly in terms of party expenditures, party satisfac-
tion, and compliance.
140. John P. McCrory, Legal and Practical Issues in Divorce Mediation: An
American Perspective, in THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS: A
CoMPARATrVE PERSPECTIvE 142, 150-52 (Vermont Law Sch. Dispute Resolution
Project ed., 1987).
141. Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation and the Management of
Divorce Practice, 28 LAw & Soc'y REV. 149, 181 (1994) (analyzing data collected
by the National Center for State Courts).
142. Id.
143. ANTHONY OGus ET AL., REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE COSTS
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONCILIATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 219, 264, 385
(Conciliation Project Unit, Univ. of Newcastle Upon Tyne 1989).
144. Id. at 264, 385C; RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 45.
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4. Mediator Qualifications
In the early days of divorce mediation, there were few, if
any, legal qualifications for divorce mediators.1 45 For example,
mediators could be court employees or volunteer retirees who
had impressed a court administrator as fit for the job. Like
negotiators-and, indeed, like judges-mediators were thought
to vary in ability, but not in easily quantifiable terms.
Now, the quality or fairness of mediation is treated as a di-
rect product of the mediator,1 46 and mediator qualifications, set
by statute or rule, commonly include educational degrees and
specialized training.1 47 In a number of jurisdictions, mediators
who receive court referrals must have post-baccalaureate de-
grees. 148 The advanced degree may be in one of a variety of
fields, such as law, mental health, or accounting.149 The media-
tion training requirement is often described in terms of hours of
class, usually forty hours, sometimes by a trainer who has met
yet another set of certification requirements. 150 Occasionally,
145. California, for example, provided that the mediator could be an em-
ployee of the court, probation department, mental health agency, or any other
person designated by the court. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3164 (West 1994) (formerly
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607 (effective 1980)).
146. See GARDNER, supra note 9, at 513-26 (discussing disadvantages of
mediation).
147. See infra Appendix A pt. A (listing statutes).
148. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1815, 3155 (West 1994); FLA. MEDIATORS R., supra
note 66, R. 10.010(b); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(j)(6); IA. Cirv. CODE ANN. art 9, § 356
(West 1991) (permitting experience as substitute); Mo. R. Cirv. lNoc. 88.05; N.J.
R. GEN. APPL. 1:40-20 (experience may sometimes substitute); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-494(c) (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-27 (West Supp. 1994).
149. FLA. MEDIATORS R., supra note 66, R. 10.010(b) (master's or higher in
behavioral sciences, or a physician, lawyer, or accountant); LA. CIv. CODE ANN.
art. 9, § 356 (West 1991) (attorney, master's in counseling, social work); MICH.
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 552.513(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (psychologist,
master's in counseling, social work, behavioral science, attorney, or five years of
experience); Mo. R. Cirv. P. 88.05 (graduate degree in behavioral science, attor-
ney); N.J. R. GEN. APPL. 1:40-10 (master's in behavioral science or other train-
ing or experience); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-494(c) (1994) (master's degree in
human relations discipline); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-27 (Supp. 1994) (psychia-
trist, social worker, family therapist, attorney).
150. CAL. STANDARDS OF JuD. ADmn. § 26(b), reported in CAL. Civ. R. app.
(West Supp. 1994); DEL. SUPER. CT. INTERIM R. 16.2(g) (25 hours); FLA.
MEDIATORS R., supra note 66, R. 10.010(b) (40 hours in program certified by
court); IND. R. ALT. Disp. REsOL. 2.5 (40 hours); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 552.513(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (40 hours); MINN. STAT. § 518.619(4)
(1994) (40 hours); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2905(1) (1993) (60 hours); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 328-C:5 (Supp. 1993) (48 hours and 20 hours in internship); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-494(c)(2) (1994) (40 hours in program approved by court); OHIO
R. SUPER. CT. C.P. 81 (40 hours); TEx. Cirv. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 154.052 (West
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the rules require continuing education.' 51 There have also been
proposals to add or substitute skills testing.152 These statutes
and rules aim to screen out all but the "good mediator," 153 who
will then protect the parties against unfairness. 154
There is reason to be skeptical about whether mediator
qualifications, particularly those requiring educational degrees,
substantially contribute to the fairness of the process. Research
on mediator qualifications has failed to show a correlation be-
tween the mediator's education and rough indicators of perform-
ance, such as settlement rates or satisfaction by the parties. 55
The content of the required education also provides little reason
to predict that mediator qualifications affect bargaining imbal-
ances.' 56 Law and accountancy programs require few, if any,
courses that develop qualities that might make mediators effec-
tive at promoting fairness, such as ability to perceive and under-
stand power imbalances, demonstrate empathy, show sensitivity
to diverse values, and distance the mediator's values from the
issues.' 57 Indeed, some commentators and researchers raise
concerns about the powerful influence of the mediator's profes-
sional ideology on the parties' decisions. 158
Supp. 1995) (40 hours); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-27 (Supp. 1994) (40 hours);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(4) (West 1993) (25 hours).
151. OKLA. R. FOR Disp. RESOL., supra note 66, R. 11B.1.
152. TEST DESIGN PROJECT, INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR SELECTING MEDIATORS
1-2 (1993). For a series of articles critiquing the guidelines, see 9 NEGOTIATION
J. 309-53 (1993).
153. See GARDNER, supra note 9, at 504.
154. Cf Gagnon, supra note 2, at 292 (advocating ending mandatory divorce
mediation for domestically abused women).
155. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation Research Re-
sults, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 36, at 429,
435-41 (comparing lawyers and mental health professionals); see also SINGER,
supra note 10, at 41 (finding no evidence tying mediators' educational qualifica-
tions to performance).
156. But see GARDNER, supra note 9, at 522-23 (asserting that many years of
professional experience make a difference).
157. COMMISSION ON QUALIFICATIONS, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, QUALIFYING NEUTRALS: THE BASIC PRINCIPLES 9 (1989); TEST DE-
SIGN PROJECT, supra note 152, at 5-6; see also SINGER, supra note 10, at 41
(suggesting familiarity with divorce law and basic counseling techniques as pri-
mary qualifications).
158. FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 145-47; GARDNER, supra note 9, at 524
(warning against mental health professionals with a classical psychoanalytical
orientation as custody mediators); Bryan, supra note 2, at 490; David
Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Obser-
vations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAw & Soc'y REV. 613,
613-16 (1989); Marian Roberts, Systems or Selves? Some Ethical Issues in Fam-
ily Mediation, 1990 J. Soc. WELFARE L. 6, 14.
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Enhanced educational qualifications may carry a variety of
costs. A "blue ribbon" commission of dispute resolution profes-
sionals warns that high educational qualifications may produce
a contracting pool of mediators who lack diversity and who
charge higher fees.159 Already, there is anecdotal support for
this. For example, private mediators in Florida receiving court
referrals usually charge $125 per hour for several hours of medi-
ation.160 Florida requires advanced degrees. In Maine, by con-
trast, mediators are paid $50 per mediation.16 ' Maine does not
have such educational requirements. Furthermore, some rural
counties may be unable to operate mediation programs, because
no one in the community meets the educational qualifications.
In addition, varying qualifications may restrict mediators from
handling cases in other jurisdictions. 62
In sum, mediator qualifications can be costly. They may
serve other purposes,' 63 but they are not needed to preserve
fairness if lawyers attend mediation sessions, and they are prob-
ably ineffective at insuring fairness if lawyers do not attend.
5. Lawyer and Court Review of Mediated Agreements
Mediated agreements regarding children do not become fi-
nal until the court approves them.' 64 In some jurisdictions,
mediators must also advise the parties to seek attorney review
of the settlement before execution of the mediation
agreements. 65
Court review has traditionally been viewed as a check on
only the most egregious and obvious unfairness, because the
judge receives only the written result of negotiations and has no
advocate for non-signature.' 66 Professors Robert Mnookin and
Lewis Kornhauser point out that the "sheer quantity of cases
159. COMAISSION ON QUALIFICATIONS, supra note 157, at 5.
160. Telephone Interview with Sharon Press, Director, Florida Dispute Res-
olution Center, Florida Supreme Court (May 10, 1993).
161. Telephone Interview with Paul Charbonneau, Director, Court Media-
tion Services, Augusta, Maine (Mar. 8, 1994).
162. For an analogy to social worker regulation, see David A. Hardcastle,
Public Regulation of Social Work, 22 Soc. WORK 14, 19 (1977).
163. For example, some qualifications may affect settlement rates or public
perception of programs.
164. E.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE ACT § 306(a)-(c), 9A U.LA. 216-17
(1987).
165. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9, § 353 (West 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.11(12) (West 1993).
166. Bryan, supra note 2, at 519; Folberg, supra note 8, at 24; Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 62, at 993; Pearson, supra note 25, at 194.
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that a judge must oversee" makes it impractical for a judge to
attend to cases prone to injustice. 167 Nonetheless, court ap-
proval costs the parties relatively little and does not hamper the
effectiveness of the mediation process. Thus, we see little reason
to change this requirement.
By contrast, lawyer review of mediation agreements ap-
pears to present better prospects for meaningful protection.
Lawyers, however, express frustration over their limited ability
to advise on these agreements, because they do not witness the
give-and-take of the negotiations that created them and lack ac-
cess to the information needed to evaluate properly alternatives
to settlement. 68 One commentator warns of legal malpractice
liability for advice under these circumstances. 169 Some lawyers
refuse to provide opinions because they believe that they cannot
competently do so under the circumstances. 17 0 The Boston Bar
Association approved the process of attorney review of mediated
agreements, but warned, "A separation agreement cannot really
be evaluated by one who has not participated in the negotiations
leading to it and, therefore, cannot judge whether it appropri-
ately reflects the views, needs, strengths, and weaknesses of
each of the parties."1 1
While providing limited help in assuring fairness, post-me-
diation lawyer review is a costly process. The more thorough the
review, the more costly it will be. Lawyers who are uncertain
about whether the agreement represents the best possible result
may recommend against execution, perhaps unnecessarily scut-
tling the client's best option. Even the possibility of frequent
lawyer consultation does not seem to avert rejections of tenta-
tive agreements. In fact, mediators view lawyer recommenda-
tions against signing tentative mediation agreements as a
significant problem.' 7 2 Thus, the cost and effort of the media-
tion may be lost when lawyers do not participate. In sum, re-
quired lawyer review is a costly and less effective alternative to
lawyer attendance.
167. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 62, at 993.
168. Pearson, supra note 25, at 194.
169. Rutherford, supra note 8, at 24.
170. See generally Bryan, supra note 2, at 515-19 (discussing this dilemma).
171. Boston Bar Ass'n, Op. 78-1 (1979), reprinted in 5 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA)
2606-07 (May 29, 1979).
172. Stephen K. Erickson & Marilyn S. McKnight, Divorce Mediation:
Strategies For Breaking Impasse, in ABA OPTIONs FOR ALL AGEs, FAmY Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTON 55, 58 (Velitta F. Prather ed., 1990).
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6. No Recommendation by the Mediator to the Court
Some of California's domestic relations courts allow the me-
diator to make a recommendation to the court if the parties fail
to reach a settlement during mediation. 173 This procedure en-
ables the mediator to threaten a recalcitrant party with a nega-
tive report. Professor Grillo most recently attacked this kind of
settlement pressure.'7 4 "Blue ribbon" reports on mediation by
members of the dispute resolution profession have also criticized
this approach.175 Though mediator recommendations have be-
come a highly visible target through Grillo's article and other
reports, court rules more often eschew mediator recommenda-
tions to the court, and some statutes specifically prohibit
these.176
The prohibitions against mediator recommendations re-
move a potential source of pressure to settle and, thus, of unfair-
ness. As such, these laws serve a valuable fimction, regardless
of whether lawyers attend the mediation sessions, and we
strongly support them. They do not, however, address bargain-
ing imbalances that may exist even in jurisdictions where the
mediators do not provide recommendations. 177
The "regulatory" approach attempts to insure fairness in
the absence of lawyer participation in mediation sessions. Only
one type of regulatory provision-judicial review-is relatively
low in cost. Only one type of provision-prohibition of mediator
reports on the merits-seems likely to increase the fairness of
divorce mediation. The others-issue limitations, case selection
procedures, high mediator qualifications, mediator duties, and
lawyer review-threaten to make mediation more expensive
and, in some cases, more rigid and less effective, with little pros-
pect of positive effects on fairness. In short, substituting regula-
173. This process is in place in San Francisco and 32 other California coun-
ties. CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 3163, 4351(f) (West 1994) (providing authority for local
court rules). One commentator suggests that Massachusetts probate courts fol-
low this procedure as a matter of practice. Gagnon, supra note 2, at 279.
174. Grillo, supra note 2, at 1554-55.
175. CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION & THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN-
ISTRATION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS
Recommendation 9.4 (1992); SoCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION As r RELATES TO THE COURTS Recommendation 3, at 16-17 (1991).
176. MINN. STAT. § 518.619(6) (1994) (unless parties agree otherwise); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-08 (1991); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.052(B) (Ander-
son Supp. 1993); OIL REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.765(2) (Butterworth 1990).
177. See supra note 176 (citing statutes).
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tion for lawyer-participation threatens to undermine important
qualities of mediation without doing much to insure fairness.
In addition, regulation fails to address the deepest concerns
of critics of mediation-that even the best mediators can never
be "neutral" and will play a powerful role in shaping out-
comes178 that may create disadvantages for the parties. Law-
yers who participate in mediation can address these concerns.
Lawyer representation does not guarantee equity, but critics of
mediation tend not to criticize as unfair divorce outcomes result-
ing from lawyer negotiations. Their confidence in lawyer-negoti-
ated outcomes suggests a general agreement that attorney
representation provides the best insurance of fairness that we
know. The research in Maine, discussed below, indicates that in
practice, lawyers play just such a role in protecting client inter-
ests in mediation.
B. THE "VOLUNTARY PARnCIPATIoN" APPROACH
Some commentators argue that mediation will be more fair
if legislators or courts simply eliminate the compulsion to par-
ticipate. 179 Presumably, if parties choose to use mediation,
those who do will be informed, and their rights will not be jeop-
ardized, even though lawyers generally will not attend the medi-
ation sessions. These commentators thus advocate against
mandatory participation.
There is reason to doubt, however, whether lawyers can pre-
dict when they need to attend to protect their clients against un-
fairness. 180 Furthermore, a voluntary system that lacks lawyer
participation presents the risk that lawyers will encourage me-
diation to resolve the problems they dislike or feel uncomforta-
ble handling. In Maine, as elsewhere, lawyers encourage
divorcing clients to do part of the negotiating themselves.' 8 '
Thus encouragement appears much more likely on some issues
178. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 44, at 60-62; Greatbatch & Dingwall, supra
note 158, at 614-16.
179. Gagnon, supra note 2, at 291; Geffner & Pagelow, supra note 2, at 157;
Treuthart, supra note 2, at 777 (arguing that mandatory mediation is a "contra-
diction in terms").
180. See supra text accompanying notes 103-107 (discussing the difficulty of
predicting when lawyer's presence is necessary to protect party).
181. The New Hampshire lawyers interviewed were as likely as Maine law-
yers to report that their clients negotiated some part of the divorce agreement.
Divorce Lawyer Interview Data, infra note 243; see also Howard S. Erlanger et
al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions From the Di-
vorce Context, 21 LAw & Soc'y REv. 585 (1987) (critiquing informal divorce
settlement).
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(the division of personal property and visitation schedules) and
for some clients (those with less income).18 2 Such encourage-
ment probably stems from a concern about controlling costs, es-
pecially when there are insufficient resources to pay attorneys.
It also arises from a desire by some lawyers to avoid "pots and
pans issues."183 According to these lawyers, these matters do
not require legal expertise, unlike matters involving real prop-
erty, alimony, and pensions. Parties, however, may well need as
much support and guidance on these issues as they do on more
legally relevant topics, but may find themselves referred either
to party-to-party negotiation or mediation without lawyers, if it
is available. 84 Thus, a statutory approach that relies wholly on
voluntary participation may indirectly exacerbate problems of
unfairness by delegating difficult and important "nonlegal" is-
sues to mediation without lawyers present.
Voluntary participation, as a means of assuring fairness,
may also entail costs if voluntary mediation programs are party-
paid. This makes mediation an option primarily for the well-to-
do. For instance, in an Ohio study of contested cases, while only
forty percent of all divorcing parties with contested cases had
incomes over $20,000, seventy-three percent of those attending
voluntary, party-paid mediation had incomes over $20,000.85
182. Lawyers whose clients were generally upper middle class were far less
likely to report that their clients frequently did most of the negotiating (9%)
while those with a range of clients or largely working class clients reported
more often that clients frequently did most of the negotiating (25%). Divorce
Lawyer Interview Data, infra note 243.
183. For example, in commenting on what went on at mediation a handful of
lawyers interviewed in connection with the authors' research noted observa-
tions such as the following: "But then there are some things, if they're talking
about visitation times, if they're talking about dividing up the personalty, I
don't need to be there for that." Interviews, infra note 243, No. 28. "What's a
lawyer going to do with pots and pans? Why should a lawyer get involved
whether it's Friday at five or Sunday at six? That's ridiculous, I mean clients
aren't babies." Id. No. 29. See also infra note 244 (presenting percentages of
representation in New Hampshire cases).
184. We found, for example, that those New Hampshire attorneys we inter-
viewed who expressed an interest in the potential of mediation generally
viewed it either as an alternative for potential clients to lawyer representation
or as an adjunct to representation where parties could be sent on their own to
work out these "pots and pans" issues, including visitation. Typical New Hamp-
shire lawyers who worked with a voluntary, private system of divorce media-
tion were two who observed: "The only time I encouraged them to do mediation
is on the issue of visitation." Interviews, infra note 243, No. 112. "Not on the
financial aspects. I don't mind, too much, mediation in terms of visitation or
mediation in terms of personal property." Id. No. 133.
185. CLEMENT ET AL., supra note 63, at 17.
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Experience indicates that mediation does not occur fre-
quently unless states require that parties participate or require
attendance at a session where parties are urged to partici-
pate.18 6 One parent may reject the option when it is (or because
it is) favored by the other parent. At least one of the parties
rejected even free mediation services in half of the cases re-
ported by one custody mediation study18 7 and even more in an-
other.188 Thus, if reduced use of mediation constitutes a cost, 8 9
voluntary mediation carries with it an additional disadvantage.
Under the voluntary approach, parties would rarely use me-
diation and would have little assistance of counsel when they
did. Requiring the divorcing parties to attend a mediation ses-
sion at which their lawyers actively participate would seem to
promote fairness more effectively. Regulators and commenta-
tors, however, assume that this would destroy mediation. Fur-
thermore, those advocating voluntary mediation often assert
that trial will obviate fairness concerns, assuming trial is the
alternative to attending mediation sessions. 90
Such assumptions as these have artificially limited the ex-
amination of alternatives for promoting fairness in divorce me-
diation. Consequently, the debate about fairness has revolved
around the "regulatory" approach and the "voluntary participa-
tion" approach, neither of which satisfactorily addresses fair-
ness. These limiting assumptions, however, prove to be
inaccurate. We turn now to evidence showing that the assump-
tions that the two dominant approaches present are myths.
This opens up a third policy choice-the "lawyer-participant"
approach.
III. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE
DOMINANT APPROACHES
Four assumptions are implicit in the two dominant statu-
tory approaches to assuring fairness in mediation, and also in
the commentary for and against mandatory mediation: (1) law-
yers do not attend mediation sessions but do attend trials; (2)
divorce mediation sessions are all alike; (3) lawyers spoil media-
186. Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7
JUST. Sys. J. 420, 426-29 (1982).
187. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 155, at 431.
188. DiPiEmo, supra note 113, at ii.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 329-354 (comparing mediation with
negotiation).
190. See supra part fl.B (discussing the "voluntary participation" approach).
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tion if they attend and participate in the sessions; and (4) trial
represents the typical alternative to mediation. We address the
assumptions in turn, and in the next section show them to be
myths.
A. THE DISAPPEARING LAWYER
Critics and proponents of mediation alike see the absence of
lawyers as a defining aspect of divorce mediation.19 ' According
to mediation advocate Joshua Rosenberg, for example, "Admit-
tedly, one significant difference between court hearings and
most mediation sessions is the presence of attorneys at one and
not the other." 9 2 Case summaries of "ideal" mediations by a
number of commentators describe sessions without lawyers
present.'9 3 A diminished role for lawyers is indeed one of the
goals of some divorce mediation advocates. 94 For example, af-
ter describing a structured mediation process for divorce, O.J.
Coogler asks, "What is there for the lawyer to do when media-
tion is completed?" 9 5 His answer is, "Not much.' . . Even if
the divorce is handled by an attorney, it is a ministerial ritual
for which only a very nominal fee can be charged."196 Under the
dominant view, the parties' lawyers may consult before or after
the session, perhaps even by phone during it, but they disappear
when the parties sit down with the mediator.197
Statutory provisions in several states that permit exclu-
sion of lawyers from mediation reinforce the presumption of at-
torney non-involvement.' 98  Even where attorneys may
191. ERICKSON & ERICKSON, supra note 8, at 173; GARDNER, supra note 9, at
504-05; IRVING, supra note 8, at 83; Bryan, supra note 2, at 515-19; Folberg,
supra note 8, at 11, 13; Geffner & Pagelow, supra note 2, at 156; Grillo, supra
note 2, at 1581.
192. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 500.
193. GARY J. FRIEDMAN, A GUIDE TO DIVORCE MEDIATION 67-293 (1993);
HAYNES & HAYNES, supra note 8; IRVING & BENJAMIN, supra note 8, at 79-111;
JANET R. JOHNSTON & LINDA E.G. CAMPBELL, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DY-
NAMICS AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CoNFeCT 198-244 (1988); MARLOW, supra
note 8, at 144-50.
194. See MARLOw, supra note 8; Victoria Solomon, Divorce Mediation: A
New Solution to Old Problems, 16 AKRON L. REv. 665, 669-70 (1983); Weissman
& Leick, supra note 8, at 266-67.
195. COOGLER, supra note 8, at 91.
196. Id.
197. Rutherford, supra note 8, at 23-34.
198. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182 (West 1994); FLA. R. CI. P. 1.720(d);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(6) (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(10)(a) (West
1993); see also text accompanying notes 68-72 (discussing limited role for
lawyers).
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attend, 99 they generally do not.200 It is possible that they have
accepted mediation sessions as being outside their turf or be-
lieve that mediation covers issues not squarely within their legal
expertise.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that lawyers are nota-
bly absent in the commentary on what occurs during divorce me-
diation sessions.20' Research about divorce mediation focuses
largely on the experience of the parties and seldom mentions
lawyers. 202 Popular accounts adopt this view as well: "[Media-
tion] does, of course, represent a trade-off. A couple in mediation
forgoes a lawyer's advocacy in return for avoiding a lawyer's fric-
tion."20 3 Although most books about divorce mediation practice
list "lawyers" briefly in the index, they figure in the text most
prominently as lawyer-mediators, as promoters of the adver-
199. Alaska, Delaware, and North Dakota prohibit exclusion of lawyers
from divorce mediation sessions. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060(c) (1991); DEL. FAM.
CT. Civ. R. 16(b)(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-05 (1991). A report of The Soci-
ety of Professionals in Dispute Resolution has recommended against exclusion.
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 175, at 2-3, 18.
200. NCSC Database, supra note 18.
201. Among the critics, see FINEMAN, supra note 2; Bryan, supra note 2;
Fischer et al., supra note 61, at 2117, 2172 (asserting that excluding lawyers
increases unfairness in domestic violence cases); Grillo, supra note 2; M. Laurie
Leitch, The Politics of Compromise: A Feminist Perspective on Mediation, MEDI-
ATION Q., Winter 1986/Spring 1987, at 163; Woods, supra note 2, at 435. Among
the proponents, see JOAN BLADES, FAMILY MEDIATION: COOPERATIVE DIVORCE
SETTLEMENT 50 (1985); COOGLER, supra note 8, at 23-38; HAYNES & HAYNES,
supra note 8; Michelle Deis, California's Answer: Mandatory Mediation of
Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 149, 152-
55; Milne & Folberg, supra note 36, at 6-9; Rosenberg, supra note 8; Saposnek,
Mandatory Mediation, supra note 8.
One of the reasons for the presumption that lawyers will be absent has
been the preoccupation with private, voluntary mediation. According to Kelly's
and Gigy's study of private divorce mediation clients, 81% went to mediation in
order to "reduce contact with lawyers and court." Joan B. Kelly & Lynn L. Gigy,
Divorce Mediation: Characteristics of Clients and Outcomes, in MEDIATION RE-
SEARCH 263, 270 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989). As states have turned to
public, mandatory mediation, these presumptions have turned up variously in
policies and policy discussions of the proper role of lawyers in mediation. Some
of the myths of mediation have developed out of and in response to the early
marketing of private, voluntary, attorney-free divorce mediation as a better
way to handle divorces than adversarial processes.
202. E.g., Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 155 (discussing results of two
major research projects).
203. Peggy Clausen et al., Divorce American Style, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10,
1983, at 42, 45. But see Ted Gest, Divorce: How the Game Is Played Now, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1983, at 39,41 ("[Mjediation does not necessarily
save money, because couples are advised to hire their own attorneys on top of
paying the mediator.").
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sarial climate, or as reviewers of mediation agreements. 204 One
book even lists "legal advice" as a subheading under "Obstacles
to Successful Mediation."20 5
Critics of mediation also assume that lawyers do not partici-
pate in mediation. They see the results, however, as bad rather
than good.206 For them, lawyers who protect clients from domi-
nation at all other points in the divorce process disappear into
the shadows during mediation except to advise clients on the
wisdom of agreements reached. Bryan, for example, asserts,
"Negotiating lawyers rely upon these legal entitlements and di-
vorce agreements reflecting them, thereby loosening the control
men traditionally wield over economic resources and the sociali-
zation of children [but]... mediation [without attorneys] unob-
trusively reduces this threat to patriarchy by returning men to
their former dominant position."207 Thus, critics believe that
the absence of lawyers in mediation and their ineffectiveness in
advising parties about mediation agreements precludes effective
advocacy and fails to protect legal rights in mediation. Professor
Grillo starkly poses the dilemma resulting from the presumed
absence of lawyers from mediation. She states that "[the choice
presented today is between an adversary process with totally
powerful legal actors, in which clients never speak for them-
selves (and often do not know what is going on), and a mediation
process in which they are entirely on their own and
unprotected."208
B. MEDIATION AS MONOLITH
Much commentary treats mediation generically, as if all me-
diation was alike.20 9 Many critics of mediation offer as prototyp-
204. See BLADES, supra note 201, at 50, 238 (mentioning lawyers also par-
ticipate in exceptional cases); COOGLER, supra note 8, at 27-28; ERICKSON & ER-
ICKSON, supra note 8, at 129; Milne & Folberg, supra note 36, at 13-15;
Saposnek, Mandatory Mediation, supra note 8. Several of these authors, how-
ever, note the potential value of lawyer participation in mediation, in cases that
have reached impasse.
205. LEMMON, supra note 8, at 107-08.
206. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and
Legal Change in Child Custody Decision-Making, 101 HARv. L. REv. 727, 774
(1988); Woods, supra note 2, at 435. In a recent article, Professor Bryan urges
lawyers to participate in mediation for "high risk clients." Bryan, supra note
76, at 208.
207. Bryan, supra note 2, at 443-44.
208. Grillo, supra note 2, at 1609.
209. See GARDNER, supra note 9, at 503-04; Bryan, supra note 2, at 447-48;
Evarts & Goodwin, supra note 8, at 279-80; Geffner & Pagelow, supra note 2, at
155-56; GriUo, supra note 2, at 1547-51, 1610.
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ical the mediation programs of one jurisdiction.210 Professor
Grillo, for instance, draws her examples from a county in Cali-
fornia that follows the minority rule of permitting the mediator
to make disposition recommendations to the court if the parties
fail to reach agreement.211 Professors Bryan and Martha
Fineman assume a generic, lawyerless mediation, in which the
mediator is a mental health or social work professional who
lacks financial sophistication and who holds a bias toward joint
custody.212 This runs counter to studies that show no mediator
bias toward joint custody,213 and to the reality that there are
thousands of divorce mediators who are not mental health or so-
cial work professionals. 214
Supporters of mandatory mediation also treat mediation ge-
nerically in their aspiration to a world of uniformly "good"
mediators. They argue that "bad mediation" is an aberration
that training and tighter or better regulation can cure.21 5
C. LAWYERS AS SPOILERS
Laws that regulate mandatory mediation seem designed to
protect the parties' interests in the absence of their lawyers.
This regulatory approach implies that the easy solution-en-
couraging lawyer presence-must be avoided because lawyers
negatively affect mediation.21 6 For example, Professor Rosen-
berg argues against lawyer involvement in mediation because
the advocacy role that attorneys play may promote reluctance
"to explore helpful and creative solutions. Possibilities that
might help both parties could be permanently lost."21 7 Professor
Thomas Carbonneau warns that adversarial attorney interac-
210. Bryan, supra note 2, at 447-48; Grillo, supra note 2, at 1551-55.
211. Grilo, supra note 2, at 1551-55. For a criticism of Professor Grillo on
this point, see Duryee, supra note 8, at 513. See generally supra notes 173-176
and accompanying text (discussing Grillo's criticism of California domestic rela-
tions courts).
212. Bryan supra note 2, at 491; Fineman, supra note 206, at 765-66, 774.
213. MACCOBY & MNooKiN, supra note 138, at 290; Pearson, supra note 4, at
67.
214. Approximately 1250 mediators who are members of the Academy of
Family Mediators are attorneys. Telephone Interview with Linda Wilkerson,
Executive Director, Academy of Family Mediators (Mar. 18, 1994).
215. Girdner, supra note 34, at 152-55; Hugh McIsaac, Reducing the Pain of
a Child Custody Struggle, 14 FAM. ADvoc. 26, 29, 56 (1992); Rosenberg, supra
note 8, at 469-70.
216. GARDNER, supra note 9, at 514-15; MARLow, supra note 8, at 69-80.
217. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 500. But see Saposnek, Mandatory Media-
tion, supra note 8, at 496 (indicating a change in his views to favor greater
involvement of lawyers in family mediation).
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tion in divorce mediation "threatens to compromise the viability
of the process," adding that lawyers who do not agree with medi-
ation goals are "likely to become a dysfunctional element in the
process, not only jealous of its intrusion into their domain of
competence, but also unable to adapt professionally to a situa-
tion of controlled and defused, rather than polarized and conten-
tious, conflict."218 Mediation proponents also suggest that
lawyer participation may reduce commitment to, and thus com-
pliance with, the settlement reached.219
Critics of mediation also assume that lawyers would "spoil"
the mediation process.220 Because they see the virtues of a
lawyered process, but believe that lawyers and mediation are in-
compatible, they give little attention to lawyer presence as a pro-
tection against unfairness.221
D. MAINDATED MEDIATION VERSUS TRIAL
Much of the current debate about the fairness of mediation
presupposes a choice between trials and mediations, although
some critics such as Professor Bryan,222 some advocates such as
Blades,2 23 and some researchers such as Chandler 224 recognize
that most divorce cases settle.225 Thus, Professors Grillo and
Rosenberg debate whether judges or mediators are more biased
and whose biases are more consequential. 226 Proponents sell
mediation as a way for parties to control their own fate.227 By
contrast, critics deride mediation because it removes the oppor-
tunity to have a judge find on behalf of a weaker party.22 8
218. CARBoNNEAU, supra note 8, at 174.
219. See Sheila D. Isbell, The Attorney's Role in Mediation and Conciliation
of Domestic Disputes: An Overview, 12 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 167, 169 (1988).
220. Bryan, supra note 2, at 445 n.7; Grillo, supra note 2, at 1548 (extolling
party control in decision making).
221. But see Bryan, supra note 76, at 208; Grllo, supra note 2, at 1597-1600
(discussing exceptions).
222. Bryan, supra note 2, at 445 n.8.
223. BLADES, supra note 201, at 10.
224. David B. Chandler, Violence, Fear, and Communication: The Variable
Impact of Domestic Violence Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 331, 332 (1990).
225. Folberg, supra note 8, at 12 ("Divorce mediation... has been proposed
as an alternative to traditional judicial intervention and divorce litigation.");
Weissman & Leick, supra note 8, at 268-69; Terri Garner, Comment, Child
Custody Mediation: An Alternative To Litigation, 1989 J. DisP. RESOL. 138,
148-49.
226. GriUo, supra note 2, at 1588-90; Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 488-89.
227. MARLow, supra note 8, at 174; DIANE NEUmANN, DIVORCE MEDIATION
49 (1989).
228. Grillo, supra note 2, at 1559.
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Mandatory mediation programs have been instituted for
"contested" custody or divorce proceedings. 229 As the California
statute makes clear, the goal of mediation is to "reduce acrimony
... [and] develop an agreement."230 Mediation advocates as-
sume that mediation-when it works-largely replaces trial or
hearing with settlement. 231 Proponents celebrate this conse-
quence. They believe court contests harm parties and children,
and find judicial decisions frequently inadequate for dealing
with the complex and highly individual needs of divorcing par-
ties and their children.23 2 That presumed consequence is consis-
tent with the claims that mediation saves money for the parties
and reduces the burden on the courts.233
In sum, the four assumptions underlying the dominant reg-
ulatory approaches are rarely challenged in the debate about
mandated divorce mediation. If they are accurate, there may be
only two viable alternative solutions to the universally acknowl-
edged problem of unfairness-the "voluntary participation" ap-
proach and the "regulatory" approach. But if these assumptions
are myths, as we argue they are, options for insuring fairness
can be more broadly examined. In fact, lawyers can and do par-
ticipate in mediation sessions more often than they appear in
trial; mediation can look very different from state to state and
mediation to mediation; lawyers can and do assume constructive
roles in mediation as advocates without undermining the party-
centered goals of mediation;23 4 and mediation can, and in some
places does, complement negotiation more often than it substi-
tutes for trials.
To buttress these challenges to the four assumptions, we
turn to a detailed case study of the experience of lawyers who
play an active role in mandated divorce mediation.
229. ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 10, § 7:01.
230. CAL. Fm. CODE § 3161 (West 1994).
231. Fiske, supra note 9, at 57-61; Jay Folberg, Mediation of Child Custody
Disputes, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 413, 419-21 (1985); Rosenberg, supra
note 8, at 471-74.
232. "BiENENFIELD, supra note 8, at 155; GARDNER, supra note 9, at 508-12;
Rutherford, supra note 8, at 19-21; Weissman & Leick, supra note 8, at 279.
233. Deis, supra note 201, at 161, 163.
234. See Evarts & Goodwin, supra note 8, at 295-97 (discussing the role of
lawyers as negotiators).
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IV. THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE DOMINANT
APPROACHES ARE MYTHS: A CASE STUDY OF MAINE'S
MANDATORY DIVORCE MEDIATION
INVOLVING LAWYERS
A. THE STUDY OF DIVORCE LAWYERS AND MEDIATION IN
MAINE
In Maine, divorce mediation has been mandatory since
1985.235 Maine's regulation of divorce mediation differs in key
respects from the dominant regulatory model, and the practice
of mediation in Maine differs from the mediation schemes that
many of the critics of divorce mediation eschew. First, man-
dated mediation in Maine encompasses economic and other is-
sues of the divorce, rather than solely custody and visitation. 23 6
Second, any case involving children under eighteen and any con-
tested issue-not just one regarding custody or visitation-trig-
gers compulsory participation.237 Third, lawyers usually attend
the mediation sessions.238 Fourth, Maine does not regulate me-
diation as heavily as many other states.23 9 Maine has no statu-
tory qualifications for mediators, no required assessments of
cases to determine "fitness" for mediation, no mediator duties
regarding bargaining imbalances, no mandatory exclusions of
particular cases, no limitation on issues, and no authorizations
for the mediator to exclude lawyers.
In one central respect, divorce mediation in Maine resem-
bles the model that many proponents defend and critics attack-
participation is mandatory.2 40 In another respect, it differs from
the model that some critics attack and corresponds to the model
that some advocates propose-the mediator is directed not to
make recommendations or report on the case content to judges
when the parties cannot reach agreement in mediation.2 41 Fur-
thermore, a judge must review the agreement prior to its entry
as a court order.2 42
Although the research upon which we draw was not a study
of divorce mediation per se, it effectively taps the experiences of
235. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1994).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See infra text accompanying notes 249-250 (discussing Maine lawyers'
attendance in mediation process).
239. Compare Maine statutes listed in Appendix B with statutes listed in
Appendix A.
240. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(4) (West Supp. 1994).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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Maine divorce lawyers. We undertook the research to learn how
divorce lawyers in Maine and New Hampshire (where very little
public or private divorce mediation existed at the time of the re-
search) vary in the ways they represent clients. Two of the au-
thors interviewed eighty-eight Maine lawyers, all of whom did
substantial divorce work, and a colleague interviewed seventy-
five comparable New Hampshire attorneys. These interviews
examined the attorneys' practices in general and their experi-
ence in mediation in particular.243
The portrait of divorce practice in Maine that emerges from
these interviews challenges the four assumptions that underlie
the policy debate and the statutes and explains how mandated
divorce mediation can productively reshape divorce negotiation.
B. THE ASSUMPTIONS PROVE TO BE MYTHs iN
1. The Disappearing Lawyer
a. Lawyer Participation in Maine Mediation Sessions and
Divorce Cases
Before examining whether lawyers disappear in Maine me-
diation, we must recognize that frequently in divorce cases at-
torneys never appear at all. In Maine-as in New Hampshire2 "
243. Craig McEwen, Richard Maiman, and Lynn Mather conducted these
interviews in a structured format, averaging 90 minutes per lawyer, between
July 1990 and February 1991. They interviewed lawyers who devoted a consid-
erable part of their practices to divorce law in three New Hampshire counties
and four roughly comparable counties in Maine.
To choose lawyers to interview, we sampled the 1989 divorce dockets of the
courts in these counties and recorded the names of the lawyers of record, thus
developing a frequency distribution of their appearance in each court. Then we
sampled the list, taking all the lawyers with the most frequent representations,
about half of those with moderate frequencies, and a few of those with lesser
frequencies. In no case did we choose from the many lawyers who represented
only one or two divorce clients a year.
Of the 178 lawyers initially contacted, we completed interviews with 163
(92%), 88 in Maine and 75 in New Hampshire. These interviews were taped
and each was transcribed. One part of the interview focused on the relationship
between mediation and divorce practice. It is that part of the interview from
which we draw most of the data reported in this Article.
This Article includes quotations from 39 of the Maine lawyers interviewed.
Excerpts from these interviews are hereinafter cited as Interview, and include
the interview identification number of the lawyer. Numerical summaries of
lawyer responses are hereinafter cited as Divorce Lawyer Interview Data.
Complete transcripts of all interviews are on file in the office of Professor Craig
A. McEwen, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine.
244. The New Hampshire docket data indicate that neither divorcing party
is represented in 5.2% of the cases, the plaintiff only is represented in 49.9%,
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and elsewhere in the United States 245-lawyers typically repre-
sent fewer than half of divorcing parties. In our sample of
nearly 5000 Maine divorce cases, docketed between 1979 and
1988, neither party was represented in sixteen percent of the
cases, only the plaintiff was represented in another forty-four
percent, and only the defendant was represented in less than
two percent. Both parties had attorneys in thirty-eight percent
of the cases. 246
Contested divorce cases, however, are the ones that may be
ordered to mediation, and are far more likely to involve two law-
yers.247 Eighty percent of the mediated cases in our post-man-
date docket sample involved two attorneys, and another
seventeen percent involved one lawyer.248 Thus, in examining
mandatory divorce mediation in Maine, we are largely, although
not exclusively, looking at that minority of divorce cases in
which both sides have legal representation.
In Maine, lawyers usually attend mediation sessions. Sev-
enty-eight percent of the attorneys we interviewed reported that
they "almost always" attended mediation sessions involving
the defendant only in 0.4% of cases, and both parties have lawyers in 44.5% of
the cases.
As part of the research in Maine and New Hampshire, we coded data from
docket records of 2001 New Hampshire divorces for three counties (for 1980,
1984, and 1988) and from docket records of 4790 Maine divorces for four coun-
ties (for 1979-80, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1988). These cases were system-
atically sampled to represent divorces in the counties under study. These data
will be hereinafter cited as Divorce Docket Data.
245. JOHN GOERDT, DIVORCE COURTS: CASE MANAGEMENT, CASE CHARACTER-
ISTICS, AND THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN 16 URBAN JURISDICTIONS 48 (1992).
246. These percentages are weighted averages from the District Court and
Superior Court reflecting the proportions of divorce cases filed in each court.
Lawyers are much more likely to be present in Superior Court divorces (80.7%
involved two lawyers), but less than eight percent of Maine divorces occur in
these courts.
247. According to our analysis of docket data, pro se cases in Maine take far
less time (114 days versus 288 days), involve far fewer motions (0.07 per case
versus 1.66) and require far less court intervention (0.01 hearings or orders per
case compared to 0.40) than do two-lawyer cases. Cases with only one lawyer
fall between, but closer to the pro se cases. Divorce Docket Data, supra note
244.
248. A similar pattern was found in an Ohio study of 261 contested cases in
three urban courts, where 95% of the mothers and 96% of the fathers had law-
yers. CLEMENT ET AL., supra note 63, at 15. In research about legal representa-
tion in divorce cases in 16 urban courts, the National Center for State Courts
reports a wide range of percentages of cases with two lawyers. The presence of
two lawyers, however, proved to be one of the strongest predictors of conten-
tiousness. See GOERDT, supra note 245, at 59, 61 (finding presence of two law-
yers increased the amount of time it took to settle a case and the number of
motions filed).
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their clients and another seventeen percent reported they "usu-
ally" did so. 249 Thus, in Maine, lawyers do not disappear when
mediation occurs.250 Nor do they disappear within the media-
tion sessions. Instead, Maine divorce attorneys actively partici-
pate as advisors and, when necessary, as advocates throughout
the mediation process.
b. Lawyer Advocacy in Maine Divorce Mediation
Maine lawyers believe that their primary role in mediation
is to provide a check on unfairness. According to one attorney:
I'm there to protect [my client] if I think things are not being run
fairly and to watch out for their interests, but primarily, it's them, the
mediator and the other spouse.
25 1
In describing their advice to clients in mediation and their own
responsibilities in the process, virtually every Maine lawyer in-
terviewed described a similar role for themselves.2 52 Those law-
yers who elaborated identified two aspects of the potential for
unfairness. First, "Mediation is like a crucible and bad decisions
can be made."25 3 As a result, attorneys believe they need to at-
tend mediation to prevent clients from being swept into ac-
cepting an inappropriate settlement:
I'm always there... [to] make sure they don't give away the farm
Numerous clients [begin with] a position that is somewhat unreal-
istic. And you get them to sit down across the table from somebody
who's talking reasonably and getting this person to edge in a little and
the process does work. They start them down the road and then they
do things, in those situations. Before we get an agreement, I say I
want to talk to my client, and say, "Do you agree? Are you sure you
don't feel pressured by this? These are things you said you weren't
going to concede. You've conceded some of them. Is this what you
249. Divorce Lawyer Interview Data, supra note 243.
250. By contrast, Maine lawyers, like divorce attorneys in other states, fre-
quently disappear when negotiations occur. Many attorneys would prefer to
have clients resolve on their own the "pots and pans issues" that include not
only the division of personal property but the establishment of visitation ar-
rangements. For example, over half of both Maine and New Hampshire law-
yers indicated that a majority of their clients did some or all of the negotiating
in their own divorces. This widespread practice of encouraging clients to nego-
tiate on their own is inconsistent with the presumption of Bryan, supra note 2,
at 519-22, for example, that attorneys control negotiation. See also Erlanger et
al., supra note 181, at 591 (reporting on the involvement of clients in negotia-
tions in Illinois divorce cases).
251. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 39.
252. Divorce Lawyer Interview Data, supra note 243.
253. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 214.
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want to do? You're entitled to do it and I think it will work, if I do feel
that way, but just make sure you're not being pressured."25 4
[Or] they had a change of heart, and so I say "Let's go outside.
Just stop it right there before you make any promises that you can't
keep."2 5
5
However, in some cases where it's either been a very difficult deci-
sion or my client appears to be tentative or it's a very complicated deci-
sion, I frequently will say, "We've made an agreement here today, but I
want a couple days to let it settle before we firm it up," so that I can...
let my client sleep on it for a while.2
5 6
Experienced divorce lawyers understand that even good media-
tion-or, perhaps, especially, good mediation-can create a mo-
mentum toward settlement that prompts some parties to lose
perspective on their needs, interests, rights, and options. Un-
fairness results. Attorneys participate in divorce mediation to
prevent that from happening.
Second, Maine divorce lawyers see themselves as protecting
against mediator pressures or unfair bargaining advantages
that the other party may have:
Generally, we tell them what it's all about. The mediator cannot
force anything on them whatsoever .... Anytime, if they want to take
a break or have any questions, just say, "rd like to take a break" Then
we'll go out and talk about it.
2 5 7
I tell them that they are entitled to talk to me whenever they
want. If they want me there, and Im not there, to let me know that
and to really be prepared to not be strong-armed, kind of thing.... I
am there to get my client out when I feel they need to talk to me or be
advised and when they're either caving in or getting angry.
2 58
I don't let anyone get in control of [a mediation session] and walk
down a road that I don't want to go or that I think we're not ready for.
I wouldn't let a mediator steamroll a client in the decision on a finan-
cial issue where everything hadn't been disclosed or certain issues
need to be explored.
259
Although mediation advocates hope that good mediators can bal-
ance unequal power and refrain from pressuring parties to set-
tle, lawyers are properly skeptical. In Maine, lawyers see the
need to protect against potential sources of unfairness. Lawyers
know that even good mediation may produce a momentum to
254. Id. No. 39.
255. Id. No. 228.
256. Id. No. 205.
257. Id. No. 218.
258. Id. No. 37.
259. Id. No. 210.
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settle; they fear that mediators cannot balance unequal bargain-
ing power adequately and may exert their own pressures for set-
tlement. As a result, mediation in Maine provides substantial
room for legal advocacy.
2. Mediation as Monolith
Both critics and advocates of mediation too frequently as-
sume that "mediation" or "divorce mediation" can be described
generically. Generic discussions, however, miss the enormous
variation in the structure and processes of mediation programs.
By its very existence, Maine's divorce mediation program chal-
lenges the assumption that all mandatory mediation programs
are like those (often from California) that much of the commen-
tary portrays. 260 The little evidence available on court-related
divorce mediation programs across the country confirms enor-
mous variety.261 Both advocates and critics need to situate their
commentaries carefully within this diverse terrain of mediation
programs.
Not only do mediation programs differ widely and signifi-
cantly, but mediation experiences also differ within any program.
This wide and inevitable variation challenges regulation advo-
cates who hope for uniformity in mediation.2 62 The observations
of Maine divorce lawyers highlight the pressures for variability
that arise because parties, situations, and mediators differ.
Mediation varies particularly because parties are central to
what happens in mediation, and parties differ enormously in
260. See supra part III.B (discussing the "mediation as monolith"
assumption).
261. The NCSC Database, supra note 18, provides a broader sense of the
variation in public divorce mediation programs across the United States. The
programs encountered in this database differ in their scope and include sepa-
rate county or court programs in states such as California, Colorado, Florida,
Kansas, Michigan, and New York, as well as the entire Maine state program.
The database shows that of the 205 court-related divorce mediation programs
for which it has data, 75 mandated participation categorically, 75 permitted
case-by-case, mandatory judicial referrals, and the remaining 55 allowed initia-
tion by one or both parties. Further, 109 of the 205 court-related programs
focused exclusively on custody or visitation conflicts, while the other 96 in-
cluded spousal support and property division issues as well. Of these programs,
14% reported active lawyer participation in mediation sessions; 11% reported
that lawyers could observe proceedings; 33% reported that lawyers could par-
ticipate by stipulation of the parties; and 43% reported that lawyers did not
play a role in mediation. On variance in divorce mediation style, see Kenneth
Kressel & Edward A. Frontera, The Settlement-Orientation vs. the Problem-
Solving Style in Custody Mediation, 50 J. Soc. IssuEs 67, 67-69 (1994).
262. See supra notes 9-10 (citing sources that advocate regulation to assure
quality in mediation).
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their relationships and in their skills, interests, and perceived
needs. In describing their own role in the mediation process, the
lawyers we spoke with commonly recognized this variety:
It depends on the client, but Ill tell them, if you want to talk, feel
free to talk. The mediator would rather have you talk, but if you prefer
me to talk, that's fine.26 3
If Ive got a shrinking violet, I guess I do most of the talking. If
rve got somebody that has some opinions and wants to say something,
because sometimes in divorce cases somebody really wants to say
something, [for example] what they think of a person because they've
been stepping out behind their back for the past year, and my attitude
is, say it in mediation. That's the safest place to say it... do it. 2 6 4
Because parties have different skills and needs, lawyers in
Maine want to participate in mediation to help those who re-
quire assistance.
Situations, like clients, also differ. As a result, lawyers wish
to be present for the unpredictable occasion when a client needs
them to intervene or participate:
I like to play the role of advisor, supportive advisor, but that's not
always possible-depends on who the mediator is, depends on what
the tenor of the mediation is. There are some where I play negotiator,
and I don't let my client speak.2 65
Maine lawyers know first hand the high variability among
mediators and mediation sessions, depending as they do on the
special chemistry of the clients, lawyers, and mediators. 266
Given this variability, and given the clear differences among cli-
ents, divorce attorneys need to be present in mediation to play
the right role at the right time.
Both mediation programs and mediation sessions differ
enormously. Neither critics nor advocates should assume that
all mediation is or can be alike.
263. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 50.
264. Id. No. 3.
265. Id. No. 43.
266. Variations in style and quality of mediation within a particular juris-
diction appear even in highly regulated mediation programs. Alfini's research
in the civil mediation program in Florida, for example, documents enormous
differences among mediators-whom he classified as "hashers, thrashers, or
bashers." James Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing It Out: Is This the
End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FL& ST. U. L. REv. 47, 66-73 (1991); see also
Robert ALB. Bush, The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41
FI. L. REv. 253, 266-70 (1989) (discussing the powers of mediators to en-
courage self-empowerment of participants and allow parties to understand each
other's situation).
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3. Lawyers as Spoilers
Commentators suggest that lawyer participation would ad-
versely affect the quality of mediation in three ways.26 7 First,
lawyer advocacy would reduce settlement rates. Second, law-
yers would create an "adversarial" atmosphere. Third, lawyers
would "take over," so that clients had little opportunity to par-
ticipate. This view of lawyers as spoilers of mediation has
proven to be inaccurate in Maine. Also, the picture emerging in
Maine resembles research elsewhere on lawyers as negotiators.
a. Settlement and Lawyer Participation
The participation of Maine lawyers in mediation does not
spoil mediation's capacity to promote settlement, even in the rel-
atively short sessions used in Maine. Maine's Court Mediation
Service reports that roughly one-half of all mediation sessions
conclude with an agreement.26s The remaining sessions con-
clude without settlement, although about twenty percent are re-
scheduled for further mediation. 269 These rates compare
favorably with those in other jurisdictions where lawyers do not
attend mediation sessions.270 Furthermore, lawyer presence at
the mediation session produces firmer resolution than is possi-
ble when counsel must review a tentative resolution created in
their absence.271 A 1985 study of Maine mediations concluded
that only one percent of the cases in which the parties reached
agreements in mediation later went to trial.
272
The effectiveness of Maine mediation in promoting settle-
ment-even with lawyer participation-should not be surpris-
267. See supra part Il1.C (discussing the assumption that lawyers "spoil" the
mediation process).
268. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF COURTS, MAINE JUDICIAL DEPT., FISCAL
YEAR 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 169-73 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 ANNUAL REPORT];
Jane Orbeton & Paul G. Charbonneau, Comparing the Results of Mediated Do-
mestic Relations Cases, MEDIATION Q., Winter 1988, at 61, 64-65.
269. See 1989 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 268, at 169-72.
270. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF COURTS, CALIFORNIA FAMILY COURT SERV.
SNAPSHOT STUDY, REPORT 4--MEDIATED AGREEMENTS ON CHILD CUSTODY AND
VIsrTATION 1 (1992) (reporting 55% agreement in mediation). This compares
favorably to 40% settlement rates in court programs in Los Angeles, Minneapo-
lis, and Connecticut. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 155, at 433. Jessica
Pearson found 50%-75% settlement rates in her review of 15 divorce mediation
studies. Pearson, supra note 4, at 8. Jeanne Clement and Andrew Schwebel
reported settlement rates of 40%-75% in their review of divorce mediation stud-
ies. Clement & Schwebel, supra note 25, at 99.
271. This is subject to approval by the court, of course. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1994).
272. Orbeton & Charbonneau, supra note 268, at 67.
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ing. Rather than exacerbating conflict, lawyers report that they
and other attorneys typically try to reduce it. The professional
norm among the divorce attorneys we interviewed is that of the
"reasonable lawyer"273 who limits client expectations, resists
identifying emotionally with the client, avoids substantially in-
flating demands, understands the likely legal outcome, asserts
the client's interests, responds to new information, and seeks to
reach a divorce settlement:
And I try not to be angry which is easy to do. It's easy to take on
the emotions of your client, actually. After all, you are fighting for
them and you get the kind of "gee whiz" feeling that they have. You
know, "Gee whiz, you're doing this." But you don't want to come across
like that to a lawyer. You want to come across as understanding both
sides and having a perspective about reasonable settlement, reason-
ably reached.2
74
It's pretty much a predominant approach. It's reasonable and
wants to get things done and so forth. There's always that handful of
attorneys that just always want to litigate and contest everything.
And sometimes you run into those kinds of lawyers and some of them
have big egos. They get in the way of getting the job done for both
parties. It takes longer and more expense.
2 75
Thus, Maine lawyers believe that settlement best resolves di-
vorce cases. "Reasonable lawyers" in Maine facilitate rather
than resist settlement.276
273. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Co-
operation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509,
541-46 (1994).
274. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 228.
275. Id. No. 250.
276. The reasons for the widespread norm of reasonableness include the
continuing relationships between lawyers, concerns about costs, and deep skep-
ticism about the odds or long-term utility of outright victory in court. Lawyers
in smaller cities and towns especially noted continuing relationships, but even
big city attorneys reported them. One attorney from a large city observed, "The
bar in Portland and environs is small enough that for the most part you're deal-
ing with the same lawyer over and over again and you want to play pretty fair."
Id. No. 51. By playing "fair," an attorney encourages reciprocation by other
lawyers over time and builds a reputation for credibility among one's peers. A
credible lawyer can produce settlements much more efficiently for the client.
See Erlanger et al., supra note 181, at 601 (stating that some attorneys have
difficulties asserting their clients' demands because they do not want to be
viewed as unreasonable).
Indeed, concerns about efficiency and cost play a central role in supporting
the "reasonable lawyer" standard. The "unreasonable lawyer" forces wasted ef-
fort and considerable delay in moving toward an outcome. Costs rise when a
lawyer does not control his or her client and makes "off the wall" demands that
violate shared expectations about the "normal divorce outcome." As a conse-
quence, the "reasonable lawyer," unlike the exceptional "pit bulls," "Rambos," or
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Maine, however, is not unique in this regard. In fact, it is
not at all clear that lawyers involved in mediation are any more
likely to seek distributive solutions (assuming a fixed pie to be
divided) than integrative solutions (seeking an enlarged pie), or
to be competitive (aggressive or position-seeking) rather than co-
operative or interest-based.277 For example, Professor Menkel-
Meadow concluded, after observing civil mediation sessions, that
"lawyers were no more or less likely to engage in distributive or
competitive behaviors than parties."27s Furthermore, the image
of lawyers who polarize the parties finds little support in other
research. Felstiner and Sarat describe the lawyer's central role
as encouraging a negotiated settlement by shaping client expec-
tations and overcoming the emotional resistance of angry cli-
ents.279 Many researchers have highlighted the attorney's
central role in settling contentious divorce negotiations, for ex-
ample, by limiting the flow of information and advice to their
clients in order to maneuver them toward an agreement.280
Kressel estimates that a relatively small percentage of divorce
lawyers fit the popular image of a conflict escalator in divorce
negotiations, 281 a finding replicated by Canadian research.
28 2
In sum, research depicts divorce lawyers as pragmatic negotia-
tors who fully recognize the costs and uncertain success of pur-
suing cases through formal legal processes.
Where it exists, the competitive or disruptive negotiation
style sometimes encountered in a lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation
may stem in part from the lack of opportunity for frequent client
consultation. For example, Professor Condlin suggests that law-
yer-to-lawyer bargaining uses "argument, challenge, and de-
mand" that is carried out in a "stylized" and "impersonal
"mad dog litigators," tries to diminish rather than to escalate conflict between
parties.
277. See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 48-62 (discussing ele-
ments of negotiation).
278. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and Realities-
What We Learn From Mediators, 56 MOD. L. REv. 361, 376 (1993).
279. See generally William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of
Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1447 (1992) (describing the role that power plays in divorce
cases and mediation).
280. See GwYNN DAviS, PARTIsANS AND MEDIATORS: THE RESOLUTION OF Di-
VORCE DisPuTEs 110-26 (1988); John Griffiths, What Do Dutch Lawyers Actually
Do in Divorce Cases?, 20 LAW & Soc'y REv. 135, 164 (1986); Richard Ingleby,
The Solicitor As Intermediary, in DiVORCE MEDIATION 43-55 (1988).
281. KENNETH KRESSEL, THE PROCESS OF DIVORCE: How PROFEsSIONALS
AND CouPLEs NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENTS 284-85 (1985).
282. RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 20.
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fashion."283 Condlin's analysis, however, assumes the absence
of clients during negotiation and notes that their absence makes
it hard for lawyers to adopt more cooperative approaches.284
Although starting with client instructions about their interests,
the negotiating lawyer must face the problem that "the informa-
tion and understanding necessary to make [the] determination
[of those interests] change constantly as bargaining pro-
ceeds."2 85 Faced then with the ethical difficulty in making nego-
tiating decisions without easy opportunities to consult clients,
lawyers must assume a client who wants the greatest competi-
tive advantage. Accepting Condlin's analysis, one could con-
clude that including clients in the negotiating process would
allow lawyers to employ cooperative bargaining approaches in
lawyer-to-lawyer negotiations. 286
In addition, lawyers seem to adapt their negotiating behav-
ior as a result of mediation. Almost all the experienced Maine
divorce lawyers whom we interviewed perceived that divorce
practices had become less "adversarial" since the introduction of
mandatory mediation. 287 Furthermore, Maine lawyers were sig-
nificantly more willing to endorse "reaching a settlement fair to
both parties" as the goal of negotiation-compared with "getting
as much as possible for their cient"-than a comparable group
of New Hampshire lawyers who had never participated in court
mandated mediation. 288 In addition, the volume of motions filed
per divorce case dropped by twenty percent in Maine following
the introduction of mandatory mediation.289 In neighboring
New Hampshire, which has no such mandate, the incidence of
motions increased by twenty percent to thirty percent over the
same period.290 One plausible interpretation of these changes
and differences is that individual Maine lawyers have learned in
mediation to assist clients achieve their goals in a more coopera-
283. Condlin, supra note 64, at 29.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 30.
286. See Leonard Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference:
The Lessons of G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q.
1059, 1076-80 (1991) (asserting that because a client has a better understand-
ing of her needs than an attorney, the client has a greater opportunity to con-
tribute to a solution).
287. See McEwen et al., supra note 141, at 181.
288. Id. at 178-79.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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rive fashion.29 ' Moreover, the collective experience of the Maine
divorce bar altered expectations about appropriate attorney con-
duct in family law cases. These Maine and New Hampshire
findings are consistent with Professor Leonard Riskin's view
that law students instructed in mediation take more of a prob-
lem-solving approach to their clients' problems.292
The Maine data indicate that most lawyers do not employ
competitive and disruptive styles of negotiation, that experience
with mediation tends to moderate competitive tendencies, and
that lawyers tone down aggressive negotiation styles in media-
tion sessions. Given the evidence of general interest on the part
of divorce lawyers in achieving settlement, mediation and law-
yer representation are compatible.
b. Encouraging Reasonable Positions and Behavior in
Mediation
Despite most lawyers' general orientation toward reasona-
bleness, unreasonable lawyers do exist and unreasonable clients
do push their attorneys to advocate unrealistic positions. Medi-
ation, however, diminishes some of these acrimonious tenden-
cies. Mediation modestly challenges the conduct of these
occasional "pit bull" or "Rambo" attorneys and provides "reason-
able" lawyers increased leverage with difficult clients. The dig-
nified and structured character of the mediation process itself
can moderate the most outrageous conduct of both clients and
lawyers:
And I think it's an atmosphere where people are for some reason
or another, maybe it's because there's another person in the room
who's neutral. The climate is there for compromise and if you... sit in
a room with two lawyers, I think, clients tend to think that they've got
these two champions there and so that's the whole mode. It's just such
a different dynamic when you get into the mediation room.2 93
291. This is consistent with a finding elsewhere that lawyers are most effec-
tive in informal tribunals "if they have sufficient direct or vicarious experience
with the particular tribunal." Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value of
Counsel: 20 Years of Representation before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 26
LAw & Soc'y Ruv. 627, 663 (1992).
292. Telephone Interview with Professor Leonard Riskin, University of Mis-
souri-Columbia School of Law (Mar. 20, 1995); see Ronald M. Pipkin, PROJECT
ON INTEGRATiNG DISPUTE RESOLUTImN INTO STANDARD FIRST YEAR CouRsEs: AN
EVALUATION (Final Report to the University of Missouri- Columbia School of
Law, 1995) (evaluating results); Leonard Riskin & Jay Westbrook, Integrating
Dispute Resolution into Standard First-Year Courses, 39 J. LEGAL ED. 309
(1989) (describing curriculum).
293. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 21.
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The mediation process demands civility and a sense of decorum
that may have been lacking in the private interchanges between
lawyers and clients:
They're going to have to sit down across the table and face you and
most of the time they may have been kind of ugly to you over the phone
or the documents you've traded back and forth may have sounded very
aggressive, but when you actually sit down across the table, it's rare
that you get someone who's being [obnoxious]. 2 94
It's easy to be Tarzan over the telephone, it really is. It's real hard
to pull that garbage when the client [is present;] ... you can call my
client a slut or a crook over the telephone, but it's real different to have
the guts to do that when they're sitting across from you. A lot of law-
yers who will do that nonsense over the telephone won't do it in
person.2 9
5
Not only do the norms of mediation diminish the most aggres-
sive conduct by attorneys, but seeing the other side makes pos-
turing more difficult:
So, I like to have a mediation session so that I can sort of cut
through a lot of posturing because you can really sort of see the client
in there, you can get a pretty good handle on what's going on and who's
really calling the shots and how convinced that person is about what
they're putting on the table.
29 6
In mediation, parties also find themselves accountable to
the other party and the mediator for their positions. They can-
not simply assert a position without justifying it:
What was an unreasonable [client position], what I may consider
to be an unreasonable position earlier, all of a sudden is tempered be-
cause now it's not in the protection of the lawyer's office. It's out in a
setting where they're being judged a little more.2 97
[Mfediation... puts two parties in the same room. We're going to
talk about this. It's not, you know, I send a letter back and the client
says, "No, rm sorry I don't want to cope with that. No, rm not going to
agree to that." And I hear from the other attorney, "No, my client
doesn't want to do that." You tell your spouse face to face in the same
room and you'll be surprised at what happens. People don't do it. And
that's good. It's easy to sit back and say to your lawyer, "No, I don't
want to agree to that. No. Forget it. I already told her I wasn't going
to agree to that. rm not going to do that." And we both have, I mean,
we all have that in terms of our clients. Put them in the room with the
mediator, and the mediator says "Well, why aren't you going to agree
294. Id. No. 205.
295. Id. No. 214.
296. Id. No. 13.
297. Id. No. 1.
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to that?" "Oh. It's just not right." "Well, that's not a good enough rea-
son."... You know, that makes a difference.2 98
Mediation may help diminish client rigidity because it helps cli-
ents overcome their suspicions of the opposing side, suspicions
that are reinforced by a lack of direct contact:
I think that it clears up misconceptions that clients tend to have
about the other side, about the other attorney and what's going on the
other side, and the attorney's advising of the other spouse.2 99
The exposure of lawyers and parties to the otherwise unseen
people on the other side of the case provides opportunities to test
the degree of consensus between lawyers and clients and to chal-
lenge misconceptions.
Mediation with lawyers present also promotes settlement.
It enables lawyers to reinforce their own "reality testing" with
clients who may be unrealistic in their expectations or demands.
In their role as partisans and advocates, lawyers often find it
difficult to challenge clients to relinquish unrealistic positions
and claims. By highlighting the reactions of mediators, how-
ever, attorneys can persuasively reinforce their own advice.
Over one-half of the Maine lawyers whom we interviewed spon-
taneously described mediation as advantageous for this
reason:
300
So sometimes, the mediator... will help me in my role with a
client, if I have a hard sell with my client.
30 1
In other words, you can say, you can't get that, you go to media-
tion, the mediation takes place and this and that and it shows that it's
not only my ideas. Then I can come out and say, "Well, I told you." It
gives them almost a second opinion.
30 2
I can't force my client to do something the client is uncomfortable
with. rm not there to argue the other person's case. Whereas at medi-
ation, it's an opportunity for my client to kind of expose his or her case
to reality and the mediator many times is going to say "Wait, is that
what you really mean? Do you really think a judge is going to listen to
this? Listen, Ive just heard it for the first time and let me tell you
what my reaction is." And you're kind of exposing.., and many times
when [a client] says it to their attorney, it will be received, obviously,
differently from just a completely disinterested person.3 03
298. Id. No. 43.
299. Id. No. 236.
300. Divorce Lawyer Interview Data, supra note 243.
301. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 234.
302. Id. No. 11.
303. Id. No. 4.
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Only by participating in mediation can the lawyer make use of
these moderating effects on "unreasonable" demands. At the
same time, lawyer participation permits attorneys to encourage
client resistance to any overtures from the mediator or other
side to abandon positions already viewed as reasonable. Lawyer
participation then can simultaneously serve settlement and
fairness. 30 4
Active participation in the mediation process offers a way to
moderate the unreasonable conduct or demands of parties and
lawyers. In this fashion mediation adds a dimension to the set-
tlement process that is otherwise unavailable even to "reason-
able" lawyers. For these and other reasons, divorce attorneys in
Maine tend to view mediation not so much as an alternative to
trial, but as an improvement on negotiation. We return below to
this issue.
c. Spoiling Mediation for Clients
Mediation proponents often express that lawyer participa-
tion spoils mediation for their clients by replicating a courtroom
environment in which attorneys dominate.30 5 The evidence
from Maine suggests otherwise.306 Even with lawyers present,
clients reportedly participate actively in mediation sessions,
speak and listen to a spouse in a controlled setting, and find an
outlet for emotions such as anger.
Maine lawyers recognize that mediation generally requires
them to recede into the background, serving as client-advisors
and supporters and only occasionally as outspoken advocates.
They almost universally report encouraging their clients to take
the lead role in mediation sessions, while reserving for them-
selves the right to intervene when necessary or to confer pri-
vately with their clients:
304. These two lawyer roles in encouraging or discouraging conciliatory po-
sitions of their clients may conflict. In particular, reminding parties of their
rights and interests may undermine potential settlements. But the notion of
fairness used in this Article demands that parties reach agreements freely and
with knowledge.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 216-219 (discussing "lawyers as
spoilers").
306. Professor Rosenberg has also suggested that adversarial conduct by at-
torneys is prompted by the presence of third-parties with decision-making au-
thority. This view implies that as lawyers learn that mediators are not
decision-makers, they will be less likely to behave as adversaries. Maurice Ro-
senberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversarial Justice?, 21
CREIGHTON L. REV. 801, 812-13 (1988).
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rm much more inclined to let the client talk in the mediation room
.... [M]y experience has been that sometimes that room is the first
time that clients have been face to face, or it's one of the few times they
have the opportunity to be face to face, and they need to get some stuff
off their chest, and it can be done in that setting safely and usefully
307
I want to sit back and listen, and rm not going to interrupt unless
I feel that you've misstated something or you're misinformed on an
area or need some counseling.30 8
Most of the attorneys I deal with apparently work the same way
because everybody sits there, doesn't do all the talking, sits there and
lets them [the clients] work it out.3 0 9
With five mediation participants rather than three, one
would reasonably expect some reduction in the parties' speaking
time. That, however, may not be problematic. Research in the
community mediation setting indicates that the level of client
satisfaction relates most directly to whether the clients partici-
pate rather than the quantity of participation.3 1 0
Mediation also permits the expression of emotions. Roughly
one quarter of the Maine lawyers spontaneously remarked upon
this role of mediation for their clients:
I guess it gives them a chance before [trial] to get their side out
and hear the other side. Maybe it's cathartic, I don't know.
3 11
And I think sometimes a mediator can be very helpful in getting
the two sides to work out their anger, to talk with each other and not at
each other.3 12
[Miore often, I think you can accomplish more by sitting down, let-
ting the parties put some stuff on the table. Maybe they've got an issue
that's totally unrelated to what's really got to be decided. And maybe
you can get that out and get it out of the way. Maybe she's just upset
because he's running around with another woman. Maybe we can get
that sting out. Maybe we can address that.3 13
Thus, from the viewpoint of attorneys, mediation in Maine-
even with lawyers present-enables parties to express their
feelings and to participate actively in the divorce process.
307. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 21.
308. Id. No. 1.
309. Id. No. 39.
310. Susan J. Rogers & Claire Francy, Communication in Mediation: Is
More Necessarily Better?, MEDIATION Q., Winter 1988, at 39, 43-47.
311. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 50.
312. Id. No. 35.
313. Id. No. 238.
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Are the lawyers accurate in their description of client par-
ticipation? With such unanimity of opinion, the inaccuracy
would seem to be a matter of degree only; certainly clients were
not completely silenced. The picture that lawyers paint of party
participation is entirely consistent with one of the authors' ob-
servations of mediation sessions. The current director of
Maine's Court Mediation Service confirmed that Maine lawyers
encourage their clients to speak during sessions.314
Apparently lawyers do not "spoil" mediation, but instead
permit mediation to accomplish many of the goals surrounding
party participation and empowerment.
4. Mandatory Mediation Versus Trial: Mediation Substitutes
for or Supplements Negotiation
Although mandated divorce mediation in Maine seems to
encourage earlier settlements, it does not typically replace tri-
als. Maine lawyers did not view trial substitution as mediation's
major function, although they acknowledged cases that settled
in mediation that they otherwise thought would have been tried.
Maine divorce lawyers estimate that on average, nineteen per-
cent of their cases go to a contested final hearing, an average
only a bit lower than that of a comparable group of lawyers in
New Hampshire (twenty-two percent), who typically have no re-
course to mediation. 31 5 Unfortunately, no data are available to
indicate what proportion of divorce cases end with a contested
hearing and whether that fraction has declined with mandatory
mediation. Even if it has, in the largest proportion of cases, me-
diated settlement replaces settlement negotiated without a
mediator.
Thus, it is not surprising that Maine attorneys describe me-
diation largely as formalizing and improving negotiation, rather
than as providing an informal substitute for trials.
5. Conclusions: The Myths and Maine Mediation
Many advocates of divorce mediation assume that lawyers
create conflict and persist in legal argument and positional ne-
gotiation so that problem-solving negotiation cannot occur when
they are present. Lawyers, presumably, speak in place of their
314. Telephone Interview with Paul Charbonneau, Director, Maine Court
Mediation (July 15, 1993) ("In general, attorneys are inclined here in Maine to
have their clients do the talking in mediation, especially when it comes to chil-
dren's interests.").
315. Divorce Lawyer Interview Data, supra note 243.
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clients and resist settlement. Under this view, if lawyers re-
mind clients of legal rights, any negotiations will focus exclu-
sively on these issues, and lawyers will dominate discussions.
In order to preserve party participation and enable problem-
solving negotiation, these advocates assume that mediation
must take place without lawyers. To protect rights under these
circumstances, these advocates argue that well-regulated medi-
ation will balance bargaining inequalities and insure uniformly
high-quality mediation.3 16 As a consequence, they argue, such
mediation offers better resolution of cases than does a trial.
Critics of mandatory mediation similarly assume that medi-
ation precludes discussion of rights and presupposes the absence
of lawyers. They conclude, however, that mediators cannot ef-
fectively protect weaker parties and regularly insert their own
biases in pressuring for settlements.3 17 As a consequence, par-
ties lose out in mediation, faring less well than they would in
court. All mediation systems share these qualities and thus
mandatory mediation-perhaps all mediation-is generically
bad, especially for women.
What has occurred under Maine's mandatory mediation
scheme challenges these assumptions. First, lawyers who ap-
pear at negotiation sessions or trial typically appear at media-
tion sessions as well. Second, mandatory divorce mediation is
highly variable. The existence of a program like Maine's-and
similar programs elsewhere 3l 8-challenges the assumption that
all mandatory mediation systems are identical. Operating
under few regulations and with the active participation of law-
yers, Maine's divorce mediation differs strikingly from the ver-
sions portrayed by critics and advocates.
Differentiation does not end with the structure of the sys-
tem. Mediators and mediation sessions also vary substantially
within any system. Because of its dependence on relatively un-
guided participation of parties, mediation varies substantially
with the interests, attributes, and relationships of the partici-
pants, as well as the issues at play in a divorce. Mediators must
interpret, innovate, and improvise. It is too much to expect that
even the best-trained and most perceptive mediators will always
316. See supra notes 9-10 (citing sources advocating regulation to assure
quality in mediation).
317. See supra notes 2-3, 5 and accompanying text (citing commentary that
asserts mediation is unfair to women).
318. NCSC Database, supra note 18.
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understand fully the range of issues and priorities of each party.
Inevitably, mediation sessions unfold differently.
Furthermore, the participation of attorneys in Maine medi-
ation helps to assert the rights of and provide support for parties
at a disadvantage. It also provides for considerable levels of cli-
ent involvement, expression of feeling, and personal control.
Lawyers see themselves protecting clients against choosing a re-
sult because of the pressure of the process, the other party, or
the mediator. Yet lawyer attendance does not interfere with set-
tlement rates or with substantial client participation. The ac-
tive roles of lawyers "spoil" neither advocacy nor the mediation
process.
Finally, mandatory mediation in Maine does not usually re-
place trial. Instead, its major role is to structure and formalize
negotiation and to place parties at the center of those
negotiations.3 19
The evidence from Maine thus challenges the myths im-
plicit in much of the debate about how best to protect fairness in
divorce mediation. Recognizing that mandatory mediation pro-
grams vary, that lawyers can participate actively in mediation
without either spoiling mediation or neglecting advocacy, and
that mandatory mediation serves largely as an adjunct to nego-
tiation rather than as a substitute for trial, we examine anew
the alternatives for achieving fairness in divorce mediation.
V. BRING IN THE LAWYERS
Absent the faulty assumptions discussed above, one can
look anew at a regulatory scheme in which lawyers participate
in mandatory mediation. This scheme achieves fairness primar-
ily by encouraging lawyers to attend and participate. Legisla-
tors could accomplish this result by prohibiting exclusion of
lawyers from mediation sessions and, in fact, broadening the is-
sues covered in mediation to include matters of real property,
alimony, and other financial issues that stimulate lawyer partic-
ipation. This scheme includes only two other key regulatory
provisions-court review of mediated agreements and a prohibi-
tion against the mediator's recommendation to the court. It is
possible that some extra provision for domestic violence cases,
such as the right to refuse joint sessions with the attacker, ought
to be included as well.
319. Galanter makes a similar point about alternative dispute resolution
generally. Marc Galanter, Compared to What? Assessing the Quality of Dispute
Processing, 66 DENV. U. L. REv. xi, xiil-xiv (1989).
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A. COMPARED TO TE "REGULATORY" APPROACH
Most fairness concerns evaporate if lawyers attend media-
tion sessions with the parties or if the parties opt out of the pro-
cess when unrepresented.3 20 Less intrusive regulations, such as
judicial review of agreements, prohibition of settlement pres-
sures, and provisions for unrepresented parties, may moderate
the remaining fairness issues. The detailed rules of the "regula-
tory approach" largely become unnecessary to preserve fairness
if lawyers are present.
By encouraging lawyer presence and permitting modifica-
tion of the mediation ground rules, this scheme is more flexible
and certain in responding to the problems of bargaining imbal-
ances and mediator pressures. Especially given the unpredict-
ability and changing situational character of these challenges to
fairness, the presence of lawyers in the process can assure nec-
essary help in those unpredictable circumstances. The Maine
research shows that with lawyers present as advisors and poten-
tially as spokespersons, the risks of unfairness decline, even in
the most unbalanced situations. By permitting adjustment of
the mediation process (for example, allowing shuttle mediation),
mediation can be tailored to fit particular relationships and is-
sues in each case.
Lawyers prevent or moderate the effects of a face to face en-
counter with an abuser, thus diminishing the likelihood of un-
fairness in domestic violence cases. Maine lawyers attending
mediation sessions with their clients report arranging separate
sessions, time-outs, and other measures to protect their clients.
Past violence, which may be a key factor in determining whether
the parties will submit to an unfair settlement or will be forced
into a frightening situation,321 becomes less of a bargaining fac-
tor if the parties attend with their lawyers.322 Lawyers can ad-
vise clients to avoid settlements that will allow further
320. It should be noted that mediation may provide important, if imperfect,
protections for unrepresented parties who otherwise would negotiate on their
own or, for the pro se party, who would face a represented spouse in negotia-
tion. See infra part V.C.4 (discussing unrepresented parties).
321. But see Chandler, supra note 224, at 344 (reporting findings that wo-
men who reported spouse abuse did not enter unfair agreements). In an Ohio
study, women who reported domestic violence settled at about the same rate as
those who did not and were no more likely to report pressure to settle. Further-
more, settlement rates for those reporting violence were slightly lower in medi-
ation than in negotiation without mediation. CLEMENT ET AL., supra note 63, at
20-21.
322. There are, however, sometimes concerns or fear simply as a result of
the meeting, but arguably this can be handled by separate sessions.
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opportunities for abuse, or that are unlikely to be obeyed, or that
are bad deals.323 Lawyers can also advise their clients to termi-
nate mediation sessions. Although some suggest that mediation
should also be avoided because divorce settlement condones vio-
lence,324 research indicates that in the prime alternative to me-
diation-negotiation-settlements occur with about the same
frequency as in mediation.3 25 Thus, in domestic violence cases,
mediation probably encourages settlement more quickly rather
than more often.
Issue limitations also become unnecessary if lawyers attend
and can advise on economic trade-offs and legal issues. There is
no more danger in combining the issues in mediation than exists
if disposition of all issues occurs outside of mediation.
So, too, an assumption that lawyers will be absent underlies
reliance on mediator qualifications as a means to ensure fair-
ness. Absent lawyers, mediators must have at least some of the
skills and knowledge that lawyers would otherwise provide.3 26
In fact, Maine divorce lawyers acknowledge that they sometimes
get poor mediators. In these cases, the lawyers simply take
charge and use the sessions as four-way negotiation sessions.
Although mediator qualifications involving advanced educa-
tional degrees may help increase settlements or party confi-
dence, they are unnecessary to protect against unfairness under
the "lawyer-participant" approach, because mediators need not
substitute their knowledge for that of lawyers. Lawyers can in-
tervene (as discussed above) to compensate for inferior
mediators and can request their removal.
Mediator duties to appraise parties of various legal rights,
to terminate mediation, and to moderate bargaining imbalances
also rest on the assumption that lawyers are absent in media-
tion. Obviously, requirements for post-mediation review of set-
tlements by lawyers rest on the assumption that the lawyer does
not take part in the give-and-take of negotiations.
In other words, lawyer participation reduces substantially
the need for regulation. Probably, a mediation model should al-
323. Cf. Geffner & Pagelow, supra note 2, at 155-157 (arguing that ineffec-
five assistance of counsel often disadvantages battered women in the mediation
process).
324. Treuthart, supra note 2, at 726 (arguing mediation fails to hold an
abuser accountable for his actions).
325. CLEMENT ET AL., supra note 63, at 20.
326. There may be reasons for qualifications apart from fairness concerns,
such as enhancing the acceptance of a program. These are beyond the scope of
this Article.
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low domestic violence victims to opt out of joint sessions. This
model should also prohibit mediator recommendations to the
court. Such low-cost requirements as court review of the agree-
ment and brief mediation training should be incorporated into
this third model. Finally, because this model assumes lawyer
participation, perhaps unrepresented parties should be able to
avoid mediation.
Our opposition to regulation by court rule or statute in or-
der to achieve fairness is not an opposition to good management
and supervision of mediation programs. Such management
probably should insure periodic training, discussion of issues of
practice, and efforts at quality control. In attempting to insure
quality, mediation programs should make use of such devices as
peer evaluation and attorney commentary. Regulation, how-
ever, differs from management because regulation imposes rigid
and categorical obligations and thus introduces unnecessary
costs and inflexibility.
B. COMPARED TO THE "VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION" APPROACH
The "voluntary participation" approach to assuring fairness
assumes that lawyers can and will predict in advance whether
unfairness will occur at a mediation session.3 27 Under this ap-
proach, however, the lawyer still is not present if an unexpected
problem arises during a session. The "lawyer-participation ap-
proach," by contrast, does not compel the lawyer and party to
take riskl based solely on a prediction regarding the course of
negotiations. Also, the "lawyer-participation" approach makes
greater use of mediation, because lawyers who can attend medi-
ation sessions will more likely recommend that their clients par-
ticipate in such sessions. Finally, with lawyers participating,
the courts can, without undue concerns about fairness, compel a
reluctant party to attend, thereby increasing the use of
mediation.
C. CONCERNS ABOUT THE "LAWYER-PARTICIPANT" APPROACH
Critics of mandatory mediation will still question what re-
quiring parties to participate in mediation adds to a lawyer-
guided settlement or trial process. 3 2 8 Mediators may still ques-
tion whether the lawyer-participant approach, although fair,
327. See supra part H.B (discussing the "voluntary participation" approach
to mediation).
328. Bryan, supra note 76, at 208.
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provides worthwhile benefits for the parties. At base, these re-
actions stem from the myths discussed and dismissed above.
The remaining concerns of mediation critics and advocates
about this third regulatory model can be summarized in five
questions. First, does mediation add anything to the lawyer-to-
lawyer negotiation that usually would otherwise occur? Second,
does requiring participation undermine self-determination in
the litigation process? Third, does lawyer participation increase
the cost of the mediation process? Fourth, what happens in
cases in which both sides are not represented by counsel? Fifth,
and finally, does lawyer-participant mediation constitute "real
mediation"? The research in Maine provides a basis for answer-
ing these questions.
1. Mediation Versus Negotiation
One might ask whether lawyer-participant mediation dif-
fers from lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation. As described below,
Maine divorce attorneys believe that mediation improves negoti-
ation because, in their view, it increases efficiency, decreases
communication problems, enhances client involvement and un-
derstanding of the process, increases information for attorneys,
and dignifies the divorce process for many clients.
329
Unlike many of the theoretical models of negotiation, actual
negotiations over divorce cases are discontinuous and frag-
mented.330 By gathering everyone together at the same place
and time to give sustained attention to settlement, the "months
[or more] of diddling back and forth between lawyers"331 can be
diminished:
Years ago, there wasn't any real alternative. You make me a pro-
posal. I get the letter. I send it to my client. The client reviews. The
client comes on back into the office, we look at it together, and then I
make a counter-proposal. And you get this ... round robin thing that
is going back and forth like this. And often, very time consuming. A
lot of opportunity for miscommunication.
3 32
Each of the events in the negotiation round robin may be sepa-
rated by days or even weeks as lawyers play telephone tag with
each other and with clients. Frequently, one party simply fails
329. See infra text accompanying notes 330-354 (setting forth lawyers' de-
scriptions of their experiences with mediation).
330. For a similar assertion on regular civil cases, see HERBERT M. K~rIZER,
LET's MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY
LITIGATION 30-41 (1991).
331. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 227.
332. Id. No. 216.
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to respond at all, dragging out an already protracted process. At
each step, distracted lawyers and anxious parties must get up to
speed on the issues and possible settlement. Simply by assem-
bling the parties, mediation in Maine streamlines the negotia-
tion process.
Mediation also provides direct communication between the
two lawyers and the two parties, and thus insures that nothing
will be "lost in the translation":
I think people regard mediation as a good place to do their negotia-
tions and get them over with in one or two sessions. Everybody's there.
You don't have to say, "Well, rve got to ask my client." If there's any
confusion, they're both there to talk about it. They're both there to
disagree, so you don't lose. . . . Something isn't lost in the
translation.33 3
It gets them face to face with the other side. It eliminates all the
rumors. They tell me what their spouse said their lawyer said; all that
smoke is gone when we sit down in mediation.3 34
If I think the attorney on the other side is being the difficult one, if
my client keeps saying, "rm sure my ex, my soon-to-be ex, wouldn't be
saying those kinds of things," gives me an opportunity in mediation to
make our pitch, make our fair arguments, so that the clients hear, and
it's not always straight through me [and the other lawyer]. 3 35
At the least, the mediation process alters the dynamics of the
communication in negotiation. Instead of a process in which cli-
ent A talks to lawyer A who talks to lawyer B who talks to client
B and then back again, all actors are present to listen and to
speak to one another. This benefit, of course, would exist if law-
yers and clients met without the assistance of a mediator, but in
practice such four-way talks do not occur frequently unless
scheduled through mediation. 33 6 Several Maine lawyers ex-
plained why. They had doubts that such four-way talk would
work out with attorneys they did not know well and trust. In
addition, lawyers expressed concern about creating situations
where client emotions could run high without a helping hand to
guide and channel those emotions productively.
Apart from inefficiency and inaccuracy in communication, a
lawyer-run negotiation can also create tension in the relation-
ship between lawyer and client. Almost every attorney whom
we interviewed attempted to keep clients fully informed of the
333. Id. No. 209.
334. Id. No. 17.
335. Id. No. 201.
336. Judith Ryan, Mediator Strategies for Lawyers, 30 FAm. & CONCILIATION
CTs. RFv. 364, 364-69 (1992).
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progress of their cases by sending them copies of all or most cor-
respondence and informing them of any offers received. Yet,
lawyers frequently reported that clients felt left out and
uninformed:
If you're negotiating, and you're doing letters, which I hate to do
already... and phone calls, and you're meeting with lawyers, the cli-
ent's going to get the sense of 'Wait, who's doing this anyway? I didn't
say I would do that." And so [mediation] is a way of covering your tail
and involving your client and being efficient about getting a
resolution.3 3
7
In the episodic, lawyer-run negotiation, clients who play a pas-
sive and consultative role may believe that their lawyers are do-
ing little and resent the diminished participation in and control
over their case. The direct engagement of parties and concen-
trated attention to negotiation that mediation provides can thus
improve lawyer-client relationships as well as efficiency and
communication.
Lawyers also report that participation in mediation permits
them to glean additional information that increases their capac-
ity to serve as advisors to and advocates for clients. First, medi-
ation provides attorneys an opportunity for contact with and
first-hand assessment of the other party, something that rarely
occurs otherwise. Over one-third of the Maine divorce attorneys
whom we interviewed commented on this value of the mediation
process, often characterizing it as "discovery":
338
Also going is like early discovery, you get a sense of the other per-
son, and where they're at, and you get a sense of like issues that pop up
that maybe you don't know about and then, like, your client gives you
one story and now you hear the other story and if you're not there you
don't hear the other story.
3 3 9
That's one thing about mediation. If they do talk, the other party,
not their attorney, does talk, you can kind of understand where they
are coming from. Then you can kind of judge the ways that you are
going to present yourself to this person.
34 0
The exposure of lawyers to the other spouse in mediation also
helps each attorney to assess that person independent of the po-
tentially inaccurate reports of both their client and the opposing
lawyer.3 41 The conventional insulation from the other spouse
337. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 10.
338. Divorce Lawyer Interview Data, supra note 243.
339. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 26.
340. Id. No. 209.
341. In addition, attorneys report learning more from and about their own
clients through the mediation process:
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may at times contribute to contentiousness or compromise the
capacity of a lawyer to advise her client well.
Lawyers hear their [client's] side of the story, and they start from that,
and they believe in their side of the story, and they never really under-
stand or fully accept the other side, the other view of the same situa-
tion. If you hear it from the other lawyer, you don't believe in it as
thoroughly as if you're sitting there [in mediation], and the lawyer and
client are spelling it out in a way that you have to sit there and abso-
lutely listen, and you can't interrupt, and it really gets spun out.3 42
When attorneys cannot "size up" the other party directly, they
may be less effective in assessing the other spouse's priorities
and needs, a practice widely viewed as essential to effective
negotiation.343
Typically, arm's-length negotiation leaves little room for di-
vorcing husbands and wives to hear each other out in a rela-
tively safe setting. Either lawyers take over the communication,
or direct interactions between the parties are heated and unpro-
ductive. 344 Mediation provides a setting for communication be-
tween parties that settlement does not, a setting in which
parties can and do discuss and explain needs and problems and
[Mediation] gives you an opportunity to evaluate the other party
as to whether they're going to be a good or a bad client and also to see
whether or not there are some things that your client has not told you
about. You sit down, your client has said, "Well, it's going to be this,
that or the other," and all of a sudden, here's the other party saying,
"Well, how about the John Deere tractor," you know .... And you turn
to your client and say, "Let's step outside. What's this all about?"
Id. No. 2. According to another attorney, "[1It's amazing what comes out at me-
diation. I mean, I get surprises at mediation when clients divulge things that I
had no idea were there .... " Id. No. 44.
Factual information about her client's case is not the only potential by-
product of mediation for a lawyer. A divorce attorney can also evaluate a cli-
ent's potential as a witness at trial:
[Mediation] sometimes gives me the first opportunity to see how my
client reacts, not in court, but in court-like situations, where the client
is confronted with the other party and the other attorney and the medi-
ator. So it gives me a barometer of the client's possible reaction if we
do litigate.
Id. No. 222. Maine lawyers perceive mediation as providing a context to learn
more about their own clients as well as about the other party with the result
that they can better advise about settlement possibilities and about the likeli-
hood of success in a contested hearing.
342. Id. No. 203.
343. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WrrHouT GIVING IN 40-55 (1991) (asserting that effective negotia-
tion focuses on interests); Roy J. LEWICKI & JOSEPH A. LrrrERER, NEGOTIATION
69-71 (1985) (explaining that information about an opponent's objectives and
needs is crucial to the formulation of a successful negotiation strategy).
344. Erlanger et al., supra note 181, at 590-96.
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express anger and disappointment with the other party,345 not
just exchange demands and positions:
Sometimes the parties don't talk and [mediation means] maybe
listening and maybe hearing, that maybe makes sense, hearing the
other side. I think it's important to hear the other side.
34 6
[M]y experience has been that sometimes that room is the first
time that clients have been face to face, or it's one of the few times they
have the opportunity to be face to face, and they need to get some stuff
off their chests and it can be done in that setting safely and usefully
347
[Tihis is the only opportunity I have to have him sitting there lis-
tening to my client's point of view. He's probably never done it in his
life. Now he's got someone who's describing what her life is going to be
like; going through her budget. This is what expenses are going to be;
she's going to have to move out .... This is what your family, the
people that you are responsible for, the people that you married and
loved for fifteen years, this is how they are going to be living. This is
what they are going to be living on.
3 4 8
Mediation, unlike negotiations, is a dignified process that
engages the divorcing parties and gives them a chance to tell
their story, not only to their spouse but to someone "official":
Mediation introduces the supposedly neutral party and what a lot
of divorce clients want is the opportunity to tell the story to somebody
else and get it out of... their system.
3 4 9
I think that it also gives people the sense that they've had, maybe
not so much as their day in court, but they at least feel as if another
345. Professor Grillo has suggested that anger is best expressed through the
lawyer as surrogate or "mouthpiece." Grillo, supra note 2, at 1573 ("The parties'
anger is expressed in a formal, contained way through the ritualized behavior of
the lawyers."). Neither the typical divorce trial nor the even more typical di-
vorce negotiation, however, provides much room for the lawyer to deliver for the
client. Few avenues exist in negotiation-except nasty letters-because a law-
yer cannot talk directly with the other spouse if he or she is represented. In
addition, our interviews suggest that divorce lawyers generally try to resist
voicing client anger themselves because it diminishes their ability to be "rea-
sonable lawyers."
Moreover, attorneys often discourage the expression of anger even in the
privacy of their own offices. For example, lawyers frequently point out that
they cannot do anything about the client's feelings and that each emotional out-
burst costs the client considerable money in lawyer's fees.
Under these circumstances, mediation provides a more likely outlet for ex-
pression of anger than either trial or negotiation.
346. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 28.
347. Id. No. 21.
348. Id. No. 225.
349. Id. No. 218.
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person has heard their side of the story. And that the other side, the
other attorney has heard their side.350
[Mediation] is definitely something out of the ordinary. You are
not just sitting having coffee in your attorney's office, and the two at-
torneys aren't just whacking each other on the back and saying "Oh
well, I see you have a new tree in the corner of your office or...." You
know it's definitely a separate, formal procedure, and I think that in
going through a divorce it's very important the people have marked
guideposts and milestones.... When [couples] separate, many times
that's not so. Theyjust go into court and have five minutes in front of a
judge-boom, boom-my lawyer says this, his lawyer says this, we
signed a piece of paper-it's as if you're just left in the middle of a
hurricane, whereas at mediation it is a formal marking of the occasion
and the system is participating .... 3 5 1
A central conclusion from the research about procedural justice
is that people value highly the opportunity to voice their griev-
ances and to be heard in a dignified setting.3 52 Many Maine
lawyers see divorce mediation not only as a way of improving
efficiency in negotiation, but also as a way of formalizing and
dignifying the process for clients. Lawyer-participation in medi-
ation thus appears to add substantial "value" to lawyer-to-law-
yer negotiation.
A by-product of lawyer participation is its effect on lawyers
even when not in mediation. By changing the structure for ne-
gotiation through the addition of mediation involving parties
and attorneys, lawyer behavior may change over time. As dis-
cussed above, there is some evidence that Maine lawyers, for ex-
ample, are significantly more willing to endorse "reaching a
settlement fair to both parties" as the goal of negotiation-com-
pared to "getting as much as possible for their cient-than a
comparable group of New Hampshire lawyers who had no expe-
rience participating in court mandated mediation. 353 Further-
more, the use of the formal legal process-such as discovery
requests and motions to compel-declined significantly in Maine
after the introduction of mediation while increasing in neighbor-
ing New Hampshire. One plausible interpretation of these
350. Id. No. 41
351. Id. No. 4.
352. See e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 101-06 (1988) (arguing, generally, that the opportunity to
speak enhances one's experience of procedural fairness); E. Allan Lind et al., In
the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the
Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & Soo'y REv. 953, 980-983 (1990) (asserting that
procedural formality enhances the parties' satisfaction with the proceeding).
353. McEwen et al., supra note 141, at 176-80 (comparing data from Maine
and New Hampshire court dockets).
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changes and differences is that Maine lawyers have learned in
mediation to assist clients in achieving their goals in a more co-
operative fashion.3 54
2. Mandated Lawyered Mediation and Self-Determination
Maine mandates mediation.35 5 Lawyers may not simply se-
lect mediation voluntarily to enhance the negotiation process.
Requiring lawyer participation in Maine might appear to burden
substantially both lawyers and clients. 356 In practice, however,
mandatory divorce mediation in Maine permits considerable
flexibility and does not appear to undermine free choice regard-
ing settlement.
The general practice in the use of mediation varies from
court to court. In some courts, lawyers routinely request media-
tion soon after filing, while in others local culture encourages
mediation requests only when initial efforts at negotiation re-
veal problems in achieving settlement. Because of its costs, law-
yers are less likely to routinely request mediation in cases where
the parties have few resources. 357
From the perspective of clients, mediation in Maine simply
appears as another step in the divorce process-often described
by lawyers as an important opportunity-rather than as a spe-
cial burden. In fact, having incorporated mediation into their
practices, Maine divorce lawyers report that they typically de-
scribe the process, seriously examine settlement options and ap-
proaches, and preach mediation's virtues to clients in preparing
them to undertake the process:
[I] explain that we can take breaks and discuss things and that
they dont have to reach any agreement if they don't want to, that most
people are happier if they agree to something rather than having it
imposed upon them.3 5 8
354. See supra part IV.B.3 (asserting that Maine lawyers, rather than act-
ing as "spoilers," promote successful mediation and settlement).
355. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1994).
356. Indeed, only a small minority of Maine lawyers (four percent) indicated
interest in abandoning mandatory mediation altogether. The major concerns
about the mandate, even among some of its supporters, were that it imposed
added costs and that it sometimes demanded mediation in cases where failure
was inevitable.
357. The discretionary character of these choices is, in practice, suggested
by the fact that the proportion of cases entering mediation dropped from about
28% to around 21% after the initiation of a $60 fee for the mediation service.
See 1989 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 268 (author's calculations).
358. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 7.
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I explain what the process is and what I tell them is that my view
of a good mediation is a free-wheeling discussion where you can feel
free to say anything .... As far as my client goes, I tell them the best
thing that could happen is if you guys could get it all out and walk out
of the room with an agreement.
3 59
Belief in mediation's potential assistance in negotiation leads
eighty-five percent of the Maine divorce lawyers whom we inter-
viewed to request mediation even in cases not involving chil-
dren.360 In their vital role as translators and interpreters of the
legal process, lawyers convey to their clients a realistic view of
the process, but one which emphasizes the opportunities media-
tion provides rather than the burdens it imposes.
The slight imposition, as perceived by the parties' lawyers,
seems even less significant compared with the benefits. Without
mandatory mediation, settlement discussions are unlikely to oc-
cur as frequently, because both sides-rather than one-have to
agree to participate. By requesting mediation in Maine's
mandatory system, one side can bring a reluctant party to the
negotiation table.361
Sometimes, you cannot get the other lawyer to make a commit-
ment, you can't, they just want to march right into court, and (media-
tion] gets the other side to see that, that their own lawyer is [sort of
avoiding the case].3 62
[Without mediation] you cannot force the other party to sit down
with you face-to-face and discuss the issues.
36 3
Furthermore, compulsion to participate removes one tacti-
cal concern of the party requesting mediation. With mandated
mediation, the other side will not view a proposal that the par-
ties seek mediation as a sign of weakness or as a rush to settle.
Rather, parties will view such requests as either routine or as a
359. Id. No. 213.
360. Divorce Lawyer Interview Data, supra note 243.
361. These problems prevent lawyers from regularly using four-way confer-
ences of attorneys and clients. Additional resistance to four-way meetings is
generated by the special character of divorce cases. According to one lawyer:
"A lot of lawyers were very skittish about the emotions that get generated in a
divorce case and as a rule would never sit down and have that kind of meeting
[four-way conferences of lawyers and clients] in a divorce case." Interviews,
supra note 243, No. 56.
However, a few lawyers report that they have developed a level of trust
with a few other attorneys so that they regularly schedule such meetings.
Erlanger, Chambliss, and Melli take a different view of such four-person confer-
ences, describing them as a device to pressure clients into settlements.
Erlanger et al., supra note 181, at 593.
362. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 28.
363. Id. No. 23.
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sign that the requesting party wants to proceed to trial and
needs to get past the mediation stage.364
In addition, lawyers indicate that mandated mediation fo-
cuses the lawyers and parties to settle earlier than would other-
wise occur. The pressures of managing a law practice, of
handling a heavy caseload, and of responding to court deadlines
make it difficult for lawyers to pursue sustained efforts to settle
a single case. By scheduling mandated mediation, lawyers cre-
ate a settlement event and deadline:
[Mediation] moves the process along because it, for the unprepared
attorney, it forces the attorney to become prepared, or at least to come
to face the fact, that, okay, we're going to have to deal with these issues
in this divorce.36 5
[Miost lawyers tend not to get ready until they have to... [that is]
sitting down [and] focusing on what the issues are. And mediation
helps to speed up that process because they've got to be prepared for
that mediation.3
6 6
The mediation event may also move indecisive clients to make
decisions they have been reluctant to make:
And it also helps, I think, to get the parties ready in a sense, to be
prepared for mediation they really have to give the matters some
thought, think about what they truly want, what they expect out of the
process, and it causes them to focus on the real issues that they might
otherwise have been ignoring or just refusing to come to grips with
367
Lawyers often request mediation quite early in the case. The
scheduled inediation date then prompts case preparation and se-
rious involvement in negotiation.
Finally, required participation brings cases to mediation
that profit from the process but would not have gone to media-
tion in a voluntary system. In fact, the experience of many
Maine lawyers challenges the argument that the parties may
know something that the "state" does not about the value of me-
diation.3 68 Attorneys report that they were often mistaken in
364. See Deanne Siemer, Perspectives of Advocates and Clients in Court-
Sponsored ADR, in GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 423, 425 (arguing that
"[l]awyers may hold back from offering settlement alternatives so as not to ap-
pear too ready to compromise").
365. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 237.
366. Id. No. 8.
367. Id. No. 32.
368. Grillo, supra note 2, at 1582 ("It is presumptuous to assume that the
state has a better idea than the parties themselves about whether mediation
will work in their particular case.").
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their predictions about the uselessness of mediation for particu-
lar cases:
Other times it's just because, well, we're gonna have to go through
mediation because this one issue involving custody is just not going to
be resolved, but we've got to go to mediation before we can have a hear-
ing so we've got to go through the motions somewhat, but sometimes
you get fooled and things get worked out at the mediation.3 69
I'm growing increasingly of the opinion that they're productive
even in those case where rye said, "No way!"3 70
A lot of times you'l end up with a case that doesn't look like it's
going to settle, or people think that it won't.... But I also realize a lot
of those cases do settle in mediation. Very extreme cases will settle in
mediation, maybe even after one session.
3 71
If left alone to screen which cases should enter mediation, law-
yers might not guess well about when it may be useful.
The major impact of a mandated mediation program, such
as Maine's, is to structure and improve settlement negotiations.
What remains is the argument that mediation is an unnecessary
and costly procedure. Fifty-three percent of the Maine lawyers
interviewed reported that mediation was sometimes a wasted
step "on the way to trial," while forty-seven percent felt that this
happened rarely or not at all. In some situations, this argument
may trump all others.372 If settlement rates drop or if the ex-
pense of mediation climbs, mandatory mediation may not be
worth it, on balance. Thus, courts should monitor their
mandatory mediation programs and should change or abandon
them when they are not a net benefit or when their cost consti-
tutes a barrier to trial for some parties.
3. Cost and Lawyer Presence
Does lawyer presence make mediation more costly? Re-
search done in programs without lawyer presence indicates that,
on the average, the parties save if they settle through mediation
and do not pay more if they attend mediation and do not set-
tle.3 7 3 Some might argue that lawyer presence changes the
calculus by making mediation more costly. The Maine lawyers
369. Interviews, supra note 243, No. 256.
370. Id. No. 32.
371. Id. No. 209.
372. Divorce Lawyer Interview Data, supra note 243.
373. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Mediation Versus the Courts in
Child Custody Cases, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 235, 241-42 (1985); see Joan Kelly, Is
Mediation Less Expensive? Comparison of Mediated and Adversarial Divorce
Costs, 8 MEDIATION Q. 15, 23-25 (1990).
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whom we interviewed were almost evenly split on the question
of whether mediation increased the costs of divorce.374
We think there is a sound argument that the cost on aver-
age is about the same for those who undergo mediation under
either the "regulatory" approach or the "lawyer-participant" ap-
proach. With lawyers present, the sessions can take place early
in the case and can address all issues in the divorce. Research
in Canada indicates that parties in programs mandating media-
tion of all issues save costs, whereas no such savings result in
programs that mediate only custody issues.3 75 Pearson's review
of fifteen divorce mediation studies concludes that private pro-
grams offering mediation of all divorce issues achieve the great-
est cost saving for the parties.376
Furthermore, even with lawyers absent, parties incur sub-
stantial legal fees connected with mediation. Presumably, fees
for consultation before, during, and after mediation (a mean fee
of about $1500 per person in one California study)37 7 should be
lower if lawyers attend.
Mediators are not required to have substantial educational
qualifications in Maine, and the mediator's fee is therefore likely
to be low. Court mediator fees of $60 per party for the entire
mediation in Maine (with the mediator paid $50)378 compare fa-
vorably with fees of about $125 per hour (paid directly to the
mediator) in those Florida jurisdictions that refer parties to pri-
vate mediators who must meet higher qualifications. 37 9 One
private mediation center in California charged an average medi-
ation fee of $2224 in the late 1980s.3 80
Other cost-related factors deserve mention. When lawyers
attend, courts do not need to hold special conferences to assess
the case before assignment to mediation, eliminating attendant
costs to parties, perhaps including attorney costs. Lawyer at-
tendance renders unnecessary the post-mediation agreement re-
view by the attorney, and the lawyers will not need to advise
against signature, thus requiring a costly reconvening of media-
374. Divorce Lawyer Interview Data, supra note 243.
375. RicHAMSON, supra note 10, at 40, 45.
376. Pearson, supra note 4, at 62.
377. Kelly, supra note 373, at 15.
378. Telephone Interview with Paul Charbonneau, Director, Court Media-
tion Services, Augusta, Maine (Mar. 8, 1994).
379. Telephone Interview with Sharon Press, Director, Florida Dispute Res-
olution Center, Florida Supreme Court (May 10, 1993).
380. Kelly, supra note 373, at 15.
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tion.381 Attorney presence in mediation may reduce the need for
discovery and may narrow the issues, even if the parties do not
settle. In Maine, the use of discovery requests and motions to
compel for contempt and for temporary support declined signifi-
cantly after mandatory mediation involving lawyers began.382
In other words, there is reason to believe that mediation does
not simply add a step to an otherwise unaltered litigation or set-
tlement process; instead, mediation involving lawyers changes
those processes substantially, making them more efficient and
less costly.
It also seems likely that mediation with lawyers can occur
more expeditiously than mediation without them. Lawyers as-
sist in clarifying information, consult with and advise clients on
the spot, and help identify unaddressed issues. Absent lawyer
participation, mediation experts advise a series of sessions with
time for consultation between them.383 By contrast, Maine di-
vorces cases typically require only a single session.
38 4
In sum, the research in Maine offers promise that
mandatory mediation, even with lawyers attending, on average
does not increase costs and that mandatory mediation does not
decrease the possibility of affordable trials.
4. Fairness for Unrepresented Parties
The typical party to a divorce proceeding is represented only
if the case is contested. A recent study of divorce in sixteen ur-
ban areas indicates that one or both parties was unrepresented
in anywhere from fifty-three percent to eighty-eight percent of
the cases, with an average across areas of seventy-two per-
cent.38 5 The authors of this study conclude that many divorce
litigants represent themselves because "substantial percentage
of divorces are uncontested, and most parties have meager prop-
erty or financial assets. These cases are simple and, with a little
guidance, the parties can obtain a divorce without incurring a
381. See Pearson, supra note 25, at 194 (reporting occasional need to revise
agreements based on attorney feedback).
382. During the same period, discovery requests and motions of various
kinds increased in neighboring New Hampshire, a state without mandatory
mediation.
383. There may be other values in scheduling multiple sessions over time,
but they seem to be less significant as a means to reach settlement, as multiple
sessions were often not needed in Maine to settle a case.
384. Richard Wagner, Mediated Divorces Last-At Least to the Bench, 6 Nu-
GOTIATION J. 47, 47 (1990).
385. GOERDT, supra note 245, at 48, 61-63.
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few hundred dollars of lawyer's fees."88 6 These conclusions par-
allel those described earlier for Maine. Clearly, case duration
and the likelihood of motions-both good indicators of contest-
are substantially greater for two-lawyer cases than for single-
lawyer cases, and are greater for single-lawyer cases than for
no-lawyer cases. Thus, even given the empirical reality that
most divorcing parties have no legal representation, it is far
more likely that parties have attorneys in contested cases.
The courts mandate mediation only in contested cases.
387
Because parties are usually represented in contested cases, me-
diated cases are particularly likely to involve parties with law-
yers. A study of three urban domestic relations courts in Ohio
indicated that in 247 contested custody cases, about ninety-five
percent of the parties had lawyers.38 8 In Maine, we estimate
from docket records that eighty percent of all mediation cases
involved two lawyers. Thus, the nature of selection into
mandatory mediation insures that disproportionate numbers of
cases involve counsel when compared to the total population of
divorce cases. But not all do.
A system for insuring fairness that rests largely on the par-
ticipation of lawyers, of course, would appear to fall short when
parties are unrepresented. Clearly, when lawyers are not repre-
senting parties to mediation, they cannot be present to assist
them and protect their rights. Although we lack research on
this point, we suspect that problems of inequity in bargaining
power would be more pronounced and the potential for unfair-
ness greater in negotiations conducted in the absence of a medi-
ator. The mediator can set ground rules, prevent interruption,
serve as a drafter, and in other ways moderate the effects of ag-
gressive negotiation on a weaker party. Thus, even weak media-
tion may be better than leaving the parties alone to work out a
settlement, perhaps with one party negotiating, pro se, with the
other party's lawyer.
In addition, the regular presence of lawyers in mediation
sessions may provide training, education, and a regular check on
inappropriate mediator conduct that may in turn improve the
quality and fairness of mediation in cases where attorneys are
not present. Lawyers might effectively contribute to a system of
supervision and quality control of mediators that would be far
more effective than rules and qualifications in rooting out inef-
386. Id. at 63.
387. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 10, § 7:01.
388. CLEMENT ET AL., supra note 63, at 15.
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fectiveness. As experienced users of many mediators, lawyers'
confidential judgments of mediator competence could be a far
better device for assessing quality than a collection of responses
from divorcing parties who only have the one experience to
judge.
Still, the research provides little guidance about whether
the greater prospect of unfairness for pro se litigants argues in
favor of giving those litigants an opportunity to "opt out" of
mandatory mediation.38 9 The pro se party who opts out would
be left to his or her own devices. Because the most likely alter-
native to mediation is negotiation, those who opt out would pre-
sumably face negotiating with the other party's lawyer or
directly with the other party. If they are not permitted to opt
out, however, the "regulatory" approach is not likely to assure
fair mediation. Furthermore, the regulation is likely to be costly
for the bulk of the mediation parties who have lawyers. Thus,
an "opt out" provision for pro se parties may be the best alterna-
tive for the present.
5. Is This "Real Mediation"?
To the divorce mediation traditionalists, lawyers attend ju-
dicially-hosted settlement conferences but not mediation ses-
sions, and Maine mediation may thus seem more like facilitated
pretrial settlement conferences and less like mediation sessions.
These traditionalists may say that sessions involving lawyer
participation do not constitute "real mediation."
What is meant by "real" in this context? If "real" references
active participation by the divorcing parents, the research sug-
gests that party participation can be maintained, even with law-
yers present.3 90 If "real" describes an opportunity for expression
of emotions, there is also evidence that this occurs in Maine me-
diation.391 If it describes an opportunity to listen, research indi-
cates that this occurs in the largely joint sessions in Maine. 392
The same is true for a focus on the parties' interests, 393 for a
389. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-310.5(3) (Supp. 1994) (permitting pro se liti-
gants to opt out of neglect/dependency mediation).
390. See supra part IV.B.3.c (asserting that lawyer presence does not pre-
clude parties from actively participating in mediation).
391. See supra part IV.B.3.c.
392. See supra part IV.B.3.c.
393. See supra part IV.B.3.a (discussing effect of lawyer participation on
settlement).
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problem-solving approach to negotiations, 394 and for opportuni-
ties for integrative solutions.395 Settlement rates resemble
those in programs where lawyer attendance is the exception.
Over fifty percent of all Maine mediations result in settle-
ment.3 96 Two Florida counties in which parties typically have
lawyers with them during mediation have settlement rates of
seventy-five percent and sixty-nine percent; six Florida counties
in which parties attend without lawyers in ninety percent or
more of the cases have settlement rates of forty-nine percent,
sixty-five percent, sixty-eight percent, sixty-eight percent, sixty-
eight percent, and eighty-seven percent.397 The agreements en-
dure at least in the short term. In Maine, only one percent of
the mediated agreements fail to survive long enough to become
court judgments.398 "Real" may also refer to confidentiality, and
Maine mediation sessions are privileged.3
99
In short, divorce mediation involving lawyers resembles the
mediation described in the literature,400 with a few exceptions.
First, mediation tends to take less time.40 1 Second, "lawyer-par-
ticipant" mediation sends fewer fees to mediators and more fees
to lawyers, probably with approximately the same total expense
by divorcing parents.40 2 Third, mediators tend not to be lawyers
394. See supra part IV.B.3.a (discussing lawyer's role in facilitating
settlement).
395. See supra part IV.B.3.a.
396. Orbeton & Charbonneau, supra note 268, at 64-65.
397. MASON & PRESS, supra note 72, at 4-5 to 4-7, 4-10.
398. Orbeton & Charbonneau, supra note 268, at 67. But see Wagner, supra
note 384, at 50 (noting a 10% rate of challenge to mediated agreements in Lew-
iston, Maine).
399. ME. R. EvID. 408(b) (disallowing admissibility of conduct or statements
by parties or mediator during court-sponsored domestic relations mediation
sessions).
400. See, e.g., Weissman & Leick, supra note 8, at 279-80 (describing advan-
tages of mediation).
401. Orbeton & Charbonneau, supra note 268, at 64-67 (reporting that me-
diation resolved 56% of cases studied; most cases took only one mediation ses-
sion); Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 155, at 432 (reporting that an average
mediation in the private sector takes 8.7 hours and requires an average of 6.2
sessions; the average mediation in the public sector takes 6.3 hours and re-
quires an average of 3.4 sessions).
402. See supra text accompanying notes 373-383 (discussing costs of media-
tion with lawyers present).
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or mental health professionals. 403 Fourth, there seem to be
more assurances of fairness. 40 4
Ultimately, the needs of divorcing families and the indicia of
fairness in the process ought to be key factors in defining media-
tion procedures. Lawmakers should discard traditional media-
tion, even if it seems more "real" or satisfying to the mediator, if
it fails to serve the families' needs or ensure fairness. The
courts call upon mediators to serve these aims rather than to
create satisfying professional goals for themselves. Thus, the
value of the procedures should not depend on whether mediation
professionals view them as producing "real mediation."
CONCLUSION
Critics and proponents of mandatory divorce mediation rec-
ognize potential for unfairness in its use. They should also real-
ize that the remedy is that lawyers should participate, along
with their clients, in mandatory divorce mediation. Alternative
approaches-the "voluntary participation" and "regulatory" ap-
proaches-are ineffective and costly. Furthermore, the assump-
tions underlying these dominant approaches are myths.
With lawyers present and participating, the concern for
fairness no longer justifies heavy regulation or confining media-
tion to voluntary participants. Lawyer participation in the me-
diation sessions permits intervention on behalf of clients and
buffers pressures to settle. Lawyers may also counsel clients to
moderate extreme demands. In addition, once lawyers become
accustomed to mediation, lawyer involvement in mandated me-
diation does not appear to prevent the meaningful participation
of parties or inhibit emotional expression between spouses.
40 5
With mediation covering a broad scope of issues and with
lawyers in attendance, the parties probably will pay more for
lawyers and less for mediators. Overall costs, however, will
probably remain unchanged because settlements are more likely
to be comprehensive and less likely to fall victim to negative re-
403. COURT MEDIATION SERv., MAINE JUDICIAL DEPT, TEN YEARS OF PRO-
GRESS: THE COURT MEDIATION SERVICE 1977-1987 at 10-13 (1988); Telephone
Interview with Paul Charbonneau, Director, Maine Court Mediation Service,
Portland, Maine (Apr. 19, 1995) (indicating that mediator qualifications are
similar to those reported in 1988).
404. See supra text accompanying notes 320-326 (discussing how lawyer
presence reduces risks of unfairness).
405. Moreover, involvement has generated a favorable view by lawyers to-
ward mediation and may alter attitudes about negotiation outside of mediation.
McEwen et al., supra note 141, at 177-79.
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views by a non-participating lawyer. In addition, mediation
with lawyers may reduce discovery costs. What the parties will
get is likely to be a fair process in which lawyers intervene to
protect against pressures from the other party, the process, or
the mediator. They are also likely to get a more spontaneous
mediation, unfettered by a web of regulation or defensive
mediators. They will enjoy, as compared with parties in a sys-
tem without mandatory mediation, a greater likelihood of hav-
ing the opportunity to express themselves and to listen to
discussions regarding matters of utmost concern. About one-
half the time, they can expect to secure a settlement earlier in
the process than would otherwise be the case.
Bringing the lawyers into mandatory mediation will permit
the repeal of numerous statutes and a reduction in court rules.
Furthermore, it will ease fairness concerns as a reason not to
compel participation in mediation. The revised regulatory ap-
proach preserves the widespread use and flexibility of the medi-
ation process without undue risk of unfairness.
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APPENDIX A
JURISDICTIONS WiTH REGULATED MANDATORY MEDIATION
A. Mediator Qualifications
1. California: Master's degree; at least two years counsel-
ing or psychotherapy experience; knowledge of court system and
procedures, community resources, family psychology; familiarity
with the effects of domestic violence on children sufficient to as-
sess needs of children. CAL. Fm. CODE § 1815 (West 1994).
2. Florida: Forty hours of training; observation and super-
vision experience; Master's or Doctoral degree in behavioral or
social sciences, or psychiatrist, attorney, or C.P.A. with four
years in that field or eight years of family mediation experience.
FLA. MEDIATORS R. 10.010(b).
3. Idaho: Any one of several professional credentials and
twenty hours of additional training every two years. IDAHO R.
Cwy. P. 16(j)(6).
4. Indiana: Forty hours of training with an additional five
hours of training every two years; Indiana-licensed attorney,
bachelor's degree, or a person approved by the court and parties;
knowledge of community resources. IND. R. ALT. Disp. RESOL.
2.5(a)-(c).
5. Iowa: Mediation to be conducted by an attorney alone
or with individuals from other disciplines, qualified by training,
experience, and temperament. Introduction, IOWA R. PRAc. FOR
LAWYER MEDIATORS IN Fim. DISPUTES, reported in IOWA CODE
ANN. § 598 App. (West Supp. 1994) [hereinafter IOWA
MEDIATORS R.I.
6. Maryland: Court must approve mediators and develop
list of qualified mediators. MD. R. SPEC. P. S73A(h).
7. Minnesota: Forty hours of training and knowledge of
related issues. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619(4) (West 1990 &
Supp. 1995).
8. Nebraska: Thirty hours mediation training; additional
thirty hours of family mediation training; and three supervised
sessions. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2913(1)(Supp. 1994).
9. Nevada: A child custody specialist to conduct mediation
where parties contest child custody or visitation. NEv. R. 8TH
DIST. CT. § 5.70(c).
10. New Jersey: Forty hours of training, as well as gradu-
ate degree or certificate of advanced training in behavioral or
social sciences; supervised clinical experience in mediation or
relevant experience. N.J. R. GEN. APPL. 1:40-10(2.1).
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11. North Carolina: Master's degree in a human relations
discipline; forty hours of training; professional training and ex-
perience in child development, family dynamics or related areas.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-494(c) (1989).
12. Oklahoma: Twenty hours of training; observation; ex-
perience; annual written approval of program coordinator; con-
tinuing education. OKLA. R. & PROC. FOR Disp. RESOL. ACT, R.
1.1, reported in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, ch. 37 app. (West 1993)
[hereinafter OKLA. R. FOR Disp. RESOL.].
13. Utah: Licensed psychologist, social worker, marriage
therapist, family therapist, or attorney; forty hours of training;
knowledge of family issues. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-27 (Supp.
1994).
B. Mediator Duties
1. California: Duty to assess the needs and interests of
children involved, including the right to interview children when
appropriate or necessary, CAL. FAm. CODE § 3180 (West 1994);
authority to exclude counsel from mediation where appropriate
or necessary, id. § 3182; must inform the court when the best
interests of a child require appointing counsel for the child. Id.
§ 3184.
2. Florida: Duty to promote a balanced process, to en-
courage parties to conduct nonadversarial deliberations, and to
promote consideration of the interests of those affected by an
agreement but not represented at the mediation, FLA.
MEDIATORS R. 10.060(d)-(e); must advise parties to seek legal
counsel, id. R. 10.090(b); must terminate session when unsuita-
bility of a case for mediation becomes apparent, id. R. 10.050(b).
3. Idaho: Duty to advise parties to seek legal counsel
before resolving issues and forming an agreement; duty of im-
partiality; duty to advise parties of any possible bias, prejudice
or partiality. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(j)(7).
4. Indiana: Duty to advise parties that the mediator does
not represent either party; duty to advise parties to seek in-
dependent legal advice; duty to ensure that the parties consider
the best interests of any children involved; duty to terminate the
session when continuation would harm or prejudice a party or
child involved; right to interview involved children out of the
presence of the parties and their attorneys. IND. R. ALT. DisP.
RESOL. 2.7.
5. Iowa: Continuing duty to advise each party to obtain
legal review prior to reaching an agreement, IowA MEDIATORS R.
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6; must give parties written statement warning them of risks in
not being represented by legal counsel, id. R. 6; duty to facilitate
negotiations while raising questions of fairness, equity and fea-
sibility of proposed agreements, id. R. 3; mediators must ensure
that parties fully consider the best interests of affected children
and to inform parties when such interests appear ignored, id. R.
3; must assure that participants base decisions upon sufficient
information and knowledge, R. 4; duties to suspend or termi-
nate sessions when continuation would harm a party, id. R. 5;
duty to assure a balanced dialogue by diffusing manipulation or
intimidation of either party, id. R. 5.
6. Kansas: Duty to advise parties to obtain independent
legal advice, to ensure consideration of the best interests of chil-
dren involved, and to advise parties, in writing, to obtain review
by an attorney of any agreement proposed by the other party.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(5), (8), (9) (1988).
7. Louisiana: Duty to advise parties to obtain legal review
prior to reaching any agreements. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:353(B) (West Supp. 1995).
8. Maryland: Duty to send a copy of any agreement
reached to the parties and their attorneys. MD. R. SPEC. P.
S73A(d).
9. Nebraska: Duty to terminate session if agreement
would be unconscionable and to advise parties to obtain legal
review prior to reaching an agreement. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-
2913(4)-(6) (Supp. 1994).
10. Nevada: If appropriate or necessary, mediator may ex-
clude counsel and may interview any children involved during
the mediation. NEV. R. 2D DIST. CT. 53(7)(b)-(c)
11. Oklahoma: Duty to suspend or terminate mediation
when continuation would harm or prejudice any party. OiKA. R.
FOR Disp. RESOL. A(B)(1)(e)(1).
C. Case Selection
1. Colorado: Court may not refer a case to mediation
where one party physically or psychologically abuses the other
party and the victim is unwilling to mediate or when one party
shows compelling reasons not to order mediation. COL. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311(1) (West Supp. 1994).
2. Florida: Court may not refer cases to mediation when it
finds significant history of domestic abuse which would compro-
mise the mediation process, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(b) (West
Supp. 1995); the mediator and parties shall evaluate the bene-
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fits, risks, and costs of mediation to determine its appropriate-
ness for the case. FLA. MEDIATORS R. 10.050(b).
3. Idaho: Court shall not order mediation if it is not in the
best interests of the children involved or if otherwise inappropri-
ate under the circumstances. IDAHO. R. CIrv. P. 16Q)(5).
4. Iowa: Mediator shall conduct an orientation session to
determine appropriateness of mediation for participants. IOWA
MEDIATORS R. 1.
5. Louisiana: Court shall not order mediation where there
has been family violence. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-363 (West
Supp. 1995).
6. Maryland: Court may not initially order the parties to
attend more than two mediation sessions and may order up to
two additional sessions only for good cause shown and upon the
mediator's recommendation unless the parties voluntarily con-
tinue with mediation. MD. R. SPEC. P. S73A(c)(1).
7. Minnesota: Court may not order mediation when it
finds probable cause of domestic or child abuse. MINN. FAM. CT.
GEN. PRAC. R. 310.01(a).
8. Nevada: Mediation program must allow the court to ex-
clude cases for good cause shown, including a history of child
abuse or domestic violence. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3.500(2)(b)
(Michie Supp. 1993).
9. New Jersey: Court may not refer a case to mediation
where an order of domestic violence has been entered; all cus-
tody and visitation issues must be screened to determine that
genuine and substantial issues exist; a case can be removed
from mediation for good cause shown; parties must attend a me-
diation orientation program. N.J. GEN. APPL. R. 1:40-5(a)-(b).
10. North Carolina: Court may waive mandatory media-
tion for good cause shown, including undue hardship to a party,
allegation of spousal or child abuse or neglect, a drug or alcohol
problem, or mental problems. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(c)
(Supp. 1994).
11. Oklahoma: Court must conduct an initial interview to
determine if the case is appropriate for mediation and if the par-
ties are capable of meaningful participation in the process,
OKLA. R. FOR Disp. RESOL. 8(B); no mediation will be conducted
if an unassisted party refuses to participate due to the presence
of a person assisting the opposing party, id.R. 10(B)(3).
12. Utah: Court may waive mandatory mediation when it
would cause undue hardship to or threaten mental or physical
health or safety of a party or child involved, including child
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abuse, spousal abuse, alcohol or drug abuse, mental illness or
incompetence, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-22 (Supp. 1994); parties
shall attend an initial evaluation session to determine whether
mediation is appropriate, id. § 30-3-23.
13. Virginia: Parties must attend one evaluation session
to determine whether to continue with mediation. VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-272.1 (Michie Supp. 1994).
D. Issue Limitations
1. California: Mediation limited to issues relating to
parenting plans, custody, and visitation, CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 3178(a) (West 1994); mediation limited to visitation when
step-parent or grandparent is petitioner, id. § 3178(b).
2. Florida: Court must order mediation in domestic rela-
tions actions involving custody, visitation, or other parental re-
sponsibility disputes. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(b) (West Supp.
1995).
3. Idaho: Court must order mediation in custody or visita-
tion controversy. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(j)(2).
4. Kansas: Court may order mediation of any contested is-
sue of child custody or visitation. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-602
(West 1988).
5. Louisiana: Court may order the parties to mediate their
differences in a custody or visitation proceeding. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:332 (West Supp. 1995).
6. Maryland: Mediation limited to custody and visitation
issues unless parties agree otherwise in writing. MD. R. SPEC.
P. S73A(c)(2).
7. Nevada: District courts must establish mandatory me-
diation program in cases that involve custody or visitation. NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.500 (Michie Supp. 1993).
8. New Jersey: All complaints involving a custody or visi-
tation issue shall be screened and referred to mediation. N.J. R.
GEN. APPL. 1:40-5(a).
9. North Carolina: Court may not refer alimony, child
support, and other economic issues to mediation under this sec-
tion. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(b) (Supp. 1994).
10. Utah: Mediation shall not include property division is-
sues unless related to legal custody or visitation dispute. UTAH
CODE. ANN. § 30-3-25 (Supp. 1994).
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E. Required Lawyer Referral for Review of Agreement
1. California: Mediator must report any agreement by the
parties to counsel before reporting it to the court, CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3186(a) (West 1994); the mediator must inform the court
if the best interests of children involved require appointment of
counsel, id. § 3184.
2. Florida: Any agreement must be in writing signed by
parties and counsel, if any, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.740(f)(1); counsel
may object to agreement in writing within 10 days after receipt
if not present at the mediation, id.; mediator shall advise parties
to seek legal counsel if the party does not understand the legal
significance of the matters involved, FLA. MEDIATORS R.
10.090(b).
3. Idaho: Parties have the right to retain counsel to review
any agreement before submission to the court; mediator shall
advise parties to seek independent legal counsel prior to resolv-
ing any issues and forming any agreement. IDAHO R. Civ. P.
16()(7).
4. Indiana: Mediator shall advise parties to consider in-
dependent legal advice; attorneys shall be present at any media-
tion session unless otherwise agreed. IND. R. ALT. Disp. RESOL.
2.7.
5. Iowa: Independent counsel should review any proposed
agreement before parties sign; mediator has duty to advise each
party to obtain legal review prior to reaching an agreement.
IOWA MEDIATORS R. 6.
6. Kansas: Attorneys of parties must review any agree-
ment; the mediator must advise parties to obtain independent
legal advice. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(9)(c) (1988).
7. Louisiana: Mediator must advise the parties to obtain
independent legal advice. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353(b) (West
Supp. 1995).
8. Maryland: Mediator shall send a copy of any agree-
ments to counsel for the parties. MD. R. SPEC. P. S73A(d).
9. Minnesota: Parties shall discuss any agreement with
their attorneys, if any, and the agreement shall not be enforcea-
ble unless parties and their counsel consent to present it to the
court. MINN. STAT. § 518.619(7) (1994).
10. Nebraska: Mediator must advise parties to obtain
legal review of any agreements. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2913(6)
(Supp. 1994).
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11. Utah: Any agreement involving child custody or visi-
tation must be reviewed by the attorney of each party and by
appointed guardian ad litem for child, if any, and all attorneys
must certify in writing that they reviewed the agreement and
that the agreement meets the best interests of children involved.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-29 (Supp. 1994).
12. Virginia: Failure to advise parties to seek attorney re-
view before signing is grounds to vacate an order or agreement.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272.2(3)(iv) (Michie Supp. 1994).
F. Required Court Review of Agreements
1. Florida: When court approval is necessary, an agree-
ment becomes binding upon court approval. FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.740(f)(2).
2. Idaho: Any agreement shall be submitted for court re-
view and approval and the court shall reject any agreement not
in the best interests of children involved. IDAHO R. CIrv. P.
16(j)(7).
3. Iowa: The court may disapprove any proposed agree-
ment contrary to the legal rights of the parties or affected chil-
dren. IOWA MEDIATORS R. 6.
4. Kansas: Agreements are not binding until approved by
the court. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603 (1988).
5. Maryland: Mediator shall submit agreements to the
court for approval and entry. MD. R. SPEC. P. S73A (d).
6. Minnesota: Agreement is unenforceable against the
parties until the court adopts it. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619(7)
(West 1990 & Supp. 1995).
7. Nevada: Any agreement regarding child custody, visita-
tion or support issues requires submission to the court for ap-
proval. NEv. R. 2D DIST. CT. 53(8)(a).
8. North Carolina: All agreements must be submitted to
court and shall be incorporated into the court order unless the
court finds good reason to refuse incorporation. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.1(g) (Supp. 1994).
9. Utah: Court may approve or reject any mediation
agreement based on the best interest of the children. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-3-29 (Supp. 1994).
10. Virginia: Court, in its discretion, may incorporate any
mediated agreement into the terms of its final decree. VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-272.1 (Michie Supp. 1994).
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G. Miscellaneous
1. California: Uniform standards of practice adopted by
the Judicial Council should govern mediation of custody and vis-
itation issues, which standards to include a provision for the
best interests of children, safeguarding the rights of children,
and conducting negotiation to equalize power between the par-
ties, CAL. FAm. CODE § 3162 (West 1994); where a history of do-
mestic violence exists, the mediator may, upon request, meet
with the parties separately, id. § 3181(a) (West 1994 & Supp.
1995); where custody of visitation with minor child is at issue,
court may require counseling for parties, id. § 3190(a) (West
1994); a party protected by restraining order due to domestic vi-
olence may have a support person in mediation, id. § 6303(c).
2. Iowa: Mediator shall ensure full financial disclosure
and promote the equal understanding of this information before
any agreement is reached and assure that each participant has
had the opportunity to fully understand the implications and
ramifications of all available options. IowA MEDIATORS R. 4.
3. North Carolina: Either party can terminate mediation
due to mediator bias, undue familiarity with party, or other prej-
udicial background. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(d) (Supp. 1994).
4. Utah: Parties can opt out of mandatory mediation if one
party objects and if the court finds it would create undue hard-
ship or threaten the mental or physical health or safety of either
party or children of parties. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-22(1)
(Supp. 1994).
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APPENDIX B
JURISDICTIONS WITH VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION OR LESS
REGULATED MANDATORY MEDIATION
A. Mediator Qualifications
1. Alaska: Court may appoint any person it finds suitable
to act as mediator. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060(b) (1991).
2. Delaware: Twenty-five hours of mediation training.
DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. INTERiM R. 16.2(g).
3. Illinois: Thirty hours of training in various mediation
techniques. ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 710, para. 20/5(2) (Smith-
Hurd 1992).
4. Michigan: Licensed psychologist, or a master's degree
in counseling, social work, or marriage and counseling; or five
years of experience in family counseling; or a graduate degree in
a behavioral science and successful completion of a mediation
training program with forty hours of classroom training and 250
hours of practical experience; or membership in the Michigan
bar and completion of a training program; knowledge of the
court system and procedures, community resources, child devel-
opment and other family related issues. MICH. COMp. LAws
ANN. § 552.513(4) (West 1993).
5. Missouri: Attorney or graduate degree in behavioral
sciences substantially related to marriage and family relations;
twenty hours of child custody mediation training. Mo. R. Civ. P.
88.05(b).
6. Montana: Knowledge of the court system and proce-
dures in family law matters, resources in the community, child
development, issues relating to children, the effects of dissolu-
tion on children, child custody research, and the mediation pro-
cess. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-307 (1993).
7. New Hampshire: Forty-eight hours of instruction, eight
of which must be in domestic violence and related family law
issues; mediation internship; twenty hours of supervised media-
tion and three recommendations from co-partners in marital
mediation work. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-C:5 (1994).
8. North Dakota: Supreme court shall adopt rules estab-
lishing mediator qualifications. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-04
(1991).
9. Ohio: Mediation procedures adopted by local court rules
shall include provisions establishing qualifications for mediators
and provisions for establishing standards of conduct for
mediators, Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.052(A) (Anderson
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1993); bachelor's degree, two years of professional experience,
forty hours of mediation training, ethics and liability insurance.
OHIo R. SUPERINTENDENCE FOR CTS. C.P. 81.
10. Oregon: Personnel performing mediation services for
the circuit court shall have the minimum educational and expe-
rience qualifications required by rule of the Dispute Resolution
Commission. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 107.775 (Butterworth
1990).
11. Pennsylvania: Certified mediator must have at least
fifteen years membership in the bar of a state or be admitted to
practice in Pennsylvania and determined by the Chief Judge to
be competent. U.S. DIST. CT. R., E.D. PA. LOCAL R. 155 (West
1995).
12. Texas: Forty hours training and twenty-four hours of
family dynamics, child development, and family law training; or
court may appoint a mediator who is qualified because of legal or
other professional training or experience in dispute resolution.
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.052 (West Supp. 1995).
13. Washington: Mediator may be a member of the profes-
sional staff of the family court or a mental health services
agency, or any other person or agency designated by the court.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.015 (West Supp. 1995).
14. West Virginia: Administrative office of the supreme
court shall hire one qualified mediator for each of the regions
participating in the pilot project or may establish and train
panels of volunteer mediators. W. VA. CODE § 48A-5-7a (Supp.
1994).
15. Wisconsin: Every court-referred mediator must have
twenty-five hours of mediation training or not less than three
years of professional experience in dispute resolution. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.11(4) (West 1993).
B. Mediator Duties
1. Missouri: Duty to advise each party to obtain independ-
ent legal advice, ensure that the parties consider fully the best
interests of their children and that the parties understand the
consequences of any decisions regarding the children; duty to
advise the parties to get legal assistance with drafting an agree-
ment or legal review of the other party's proposal; duty to termi-
nate the session when continuing it would harm or prejudice the
other party or any children involved. Mo. R. Crv. P. 88.06-.07.
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2. North Dakota: Duty to inform the parties of their right
to review any agreement with their attorneys before signing.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-07 (1991).
3. Oregon: Duty to provide written report of any agree-
ment reached by the parties to counsel for the parties. OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 107.765(2) (Butterworth 1990).
4. Washington: Duty to assess the needs and interests of
the children and interview them if appropriate or necessary.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.015 (West Supp. 1994).
5. Wisconsin: Duty to consider the best interests of the
children; may include a child's guardian ad litem in mediation,
interview the child, terminate mediation when evidence of child
abuse, spousal abuse, or drug and alcohol abuse exists. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.11(10) (West 1993).
C. Case Selection
1. Arizona: Court may waive the mediation requirement
upon a hearing on a petition alleging substantial good cause.
AIz. SUPER. CT. LocAL PRAc. R. (PIMA CTY.) R. 8.7, reported in
17B ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. (1988).
2. Delaware: Court review and by-pass of mediation pro-
cess if petition alleges child dependency, neglect, or abuse of an
emergency nature; parties to mediate if petitions include above
allegations of a non-emergency nature. DEL. FAm. CT. Civ. R.
20.
3. Hawaii: Court may excuse a party from participating in
mediation if allegations of spousal abuse are involved and if the
court determines that excusing the party is in his or her best
interest. HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-41.5 (1993).
4. Illinois: Court may prohibit mediation upon good cause
shown. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/404 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
5. Maine: Court may waive the mediation requirement for
extraordinary cause shown. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 752(4) (West Supp. 1994).
6. Montana: Court may not authorize or permit mediation
if it suspects that one of the parties has physically, sexually, or
emotionally abused the other party or a child of a party. MONT.
CODE AN. § 40-4-301 (1993).
7. New Hampshire: Court may not order mediation when
abuse "has occurred, unless the alleged victim... requests me-
diation and the mediator" is aware of the alleged abuse. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:15-a (1994).
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8. New Mexico: When custody is contested, court shall
suspend mediation when domestic violence or child abuse has
occurred unless court finds that three conditions are satisfied:
1) the mediator has substantial training in the effects of child
abuse or domestic violence on victims; 2) the alleged victim is
capable of mediating with the other party without suffering from
an imbalance of power; and 3) the mediation process contains
provisions to protect against an imbalance of power between the
parties resulting from the violence. If the violence involves the
parents, court shall stop or suspend mediation unless the victim
requests mediation and the mediator is informed of the violence.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-8 (Michie 1994).
9. North Dakota: Court may decline ordering mediation if
custody, support, or visitation issues may involve physical or
sexual abuse of any party or involved children. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09.1-02 (1991).
10. Ohio: If history of domestic violence or child abuse is
present, the court may order mediation only if it determines it is
in the best interests of the parties and the court makes written
findings of fact to support the order. OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.052(A) (Anderson Supp. 1994).
11. Oregon: Court may waive mediation if either party ob-
jects to mediation on the grounds of severe emotional distress
and moves to waive mediation. OR. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 107.179(3) (Butterworth 1990).
12. Wisconsin: Initial session is required to assess the
possible efficacy and appropriateness of mediation; court may
waive mediation if it would endanger the health or safety of any
party, including child abuse, spouse abuse, and alcohol or drug
abuse. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(8) (West 1993).
D. Issue Limitations
1. Alaska: Court may order the parties to submit to medi-
ation when a petition for child custody is filed. ALAsKA STAT.
§ 25.20.080 (1991).
2. Arizona: All actions involving custody or visitation of
minor children shall be subject to mediation. Aiz. SUPER. CT.
LocAL PR~c. R. (CocmsE CTY.) R. 10, (MAmcOPA CTY.) R. 6.8,
(PimA CTY.) R. 8.7, (PnvAL CTY. R.) 4.2, (YAVAPAI CTY.) R. 10.2,
reported in 17B Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. (1988)
3. Connecticut: Mediation services shall address property,
financial, child custody, and visitation issues. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-53a (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
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4. Delaware: Any issues relating to relief in the form of
support, custody, or visitation shall be mediated. DEL. FAM. CT.
Civ. R. 16.
5. Maine: Court shall refer the parties to mediation when
there are minor children of the parties. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 752 (West Supp. 1994).
6. Michigan: Parties may mediate child custody or visita-
tion disputes. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 552.513 (West 1988).
7. Missouri: Any judicial circuit may elect to establish a
mediation program for child custody and visitation disputes.
Mo. R. Civ. P. 88.02.
8. Montana: Mediator shall attempt to effect a settlement
of child custody, support, visitation, maintenance, or property
settlement dispute. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 40-4-302 (1993).
9. New Mexico: Domestic relations mediation shall be ini-
tiated in a case where child custody is at issue. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-4-8 (1994).
10. North Dakota: In any proceeding involving custody,
support; or visitation, court may order mediation. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09.1-02 (1991).
11. Ohio: Mediation may include issues of parental rights
and responsibilities or visitation. OMo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.052 (Anderson Supp. 1994).
12. Oregon: Where custody or visitation, or both, are con-
tested, court shall order mediation; the mediator shall not con-
sider issues of property division or spousal or child support
without written approval of both parties or their counsel. OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.765 (1990).
13. Rhode Island: Court may order mediation of custody
and visitation issues. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-29 (1988).
14. South Dakota: In any custody dispute, court may or-
der mediation. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-4-56 (Supp.
1994).
15. Texas: State's policy "to encourage the peaceable reso-
lution of disputes, with special consideration given to those in-
volving the parent-child relationships, including the mediation
of issues involving conservatorship, possession, and support of
children." TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.002 (West
Supp. 1995).
16. Washington: Court commissioners or judges do not
have the authority to require parties to mediate disputes con-
cerning child support. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.12.190 (West
Supp. 1995).
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17. West Virginia: Mediation will be provided in desig-
nated counties in all cases in which the issues of custody or visi-
tation are contested. W. VA. CODE § 48A-5-7a (Supp. 1994).
18. Wisconsin: Mediation provided by the court may not
include issues related to property division, maintenance, or child
support unless it is directly related to legal- or physical custody
and the parties agree in writing. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(9)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
E. Required Lawyer Referral for Review of Agreement
1. Arizona: Agreement shall be in writing and submitted
to each party and counsel, if any. ARiz. SUPER. CT. LocAL PRAc.
R. (MARICOPA CTY.) R. 6.8, (PINAL CTY.) R. 4.2, (YAVAPAi CTY.) R.
10.2, reported in 17B ARiz. REV. STAT. (1988).
2. Delaware: Attorneys may be present during mediation
and unrepresented parties are encouraged to consult with coun-
sel prior to executing an agreement. DEL. SUPER. CT. CiV. IN-
TERIm R. 16.2.
3. Missouri: No agreement is binding until signed by the
parties and their attorneys, if any. Mo. R. Civ. P. 88.06.
4. Montana: Agreement that the parties reach by media-
tion must be discussed by the parties with their attorneys, if
any. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-305 (West 1993).
5. North Dakota: "The mediator shall inform the parties
of their right to review any agreements with counsel before they
sign the agreement." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-07 (1991).
6. Oregon: Mediator shall report in writing to counsel for
the parties any agreement reached by the parties in mediation.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.765(2) (1989).
7. Washington: Mediator shall report any agreement
reached by the parties to counsel for parties. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.015(5) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
8. Wisconsin: Agreement must be in writing and reviewed
by attorneys, if any, and guardians of children, if any; all attor-
neys shall certify that the agreement was reviewed and is in the
best interests of children involved. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(12)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
F. Court Review of Agreements
1. Arizona: Parties must present any agreement to the
court, and the court retains the final authority to accept, modify,
or reject the agreement. AIz. SUPER. CT. LocAL PPAc. R. (MARI-
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COPA CTY.) R. 6.8, (PmA CTY.) R. 8.7, (PINAL CTY.) 4.2, (YAVAPAI
CTY.) 10.2, reported in 17B ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. (1988).
2. Maine: Mediator shall present any agreement reached
through mediation to the court for approval. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (West Supp. 1994).
3. Missouri: No agreement is binding until approved by
the court. Mo R. Civ. P. 88.06.
4. Montana: Court may adopt an agreement reached as a
result of mediation if the parties agree to submit it to the court.
MoNr. CODE. ANN. § 40-4-305 (1993).
5. North Dakota: No agreements are binding until ap-
proved by the court. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-07 (1991).
6. Oregon: Mediator shall present, in a proposed order
prepared for the court, any agreement reached in mediation.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.765 (1989).
7. Washington: Mediator shall report, to the court and to
the parties' counsel, any agreement reached in mediation.
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 26.09.015 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995).
8. Wisconsin: Court may approve or reject any mediation
agreement based on the best interest of the children and shall
state reasons for rejecting an agreement. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.11(12) (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
G. Miscellaneous
1. Alaska: Each party shall have the right once to chal-
lenge peremptorily any mediator appointed, ALAsKA STAT.
§ 25.24.060(b) (1991); a court-appointed representative of the
minor children shall attend the mediation, id. § 25.20.080
(1991).
2. Arizona: Mediator may interview children and all per-
sons having any relation to the controversy when such inter-
views are appropriate. Amz. SUPER. CT. LocAL PRAc. R.
(MARicopA CTY.) R. 6.8.e., (PnA CTY.) R. 8.7(g), (PnAL CTY.) R.
4.2.c.(4), (YAVAPAI CTY.) R. 10.2.C.4, reported in 17B ARz. REV.
STAT. ANN. (1988).
3. Missouri: Mediator may meet with children involved
and, with consent of the parties, may meet with the opposing
party; the mediator must ensure that the parties fully consider
the best interests of affected children and that the parties un-
derstand the consequences of any decisions regarding the chil-
dren. Mo. R. Civ. P. 88.06(7)-(8).
4. New Mexico: When parties contest custody of minor
children, court may appoint an attorney as guardian ad litem to
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appear for and represent the minor children. N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-4-8(A) (Michie 1994).
5. Washington: Mediator shall assess the needs and inter-
ests of the children and may interview them if appropriate or
necessary. WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 26.09.015(4) (West 1994).
6. Wisconsin: Court-appointed mediator shall be guided
by the best interests of the children and may include a child's
guardian ad litem in mediation, interview the child, and termi-
nate mediation when evidence of child abuse, spousal abuse, or
drug and alcohol abuse exists. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(10)
(West 1993).

